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The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) and lack of mandated 
standards has led to unique Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Ground Control 
Station (GCS) designs.  A former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, stated in a 2009 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
that commonality in UAS GCSs would reduce Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
manpower, procurement, sustainment, and life-cycle costs.  He went on to profess that 
increased commonality could improve interoperability for joint and combined UAS 
operations.  This project develops twelve necessary UAS requirements to produce a 
proposed functional architecture for a common GCS.  This architecture enables greater 
commonality and interoperability among UASs.  Additionally, it was determined that 
cost savings could be realized by implementing this common GCS concept. 
To approach the problem, a tailored systems engineering process was 
implemented.  The first step included information gathering to obtain background data 
about existing and proposed UASs and commonality concepts.  This phase explored UAS 
Integrated Roadmaps, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Standard Agreement (STANAG) documents, and the ADM 
that initially called for GCS commonality.  The UAS Integrated Roadmap, various GAO 
reports, and the previously discussed ADM all call for increased commonality between 
both inter-service and intra-service GCS designs.  These documents surmised that such 
goals could be met with the use of modular, open source, standardized systems.  A survey 
of current GCSs clearly indicates a lack of commonality across the DoD and illustrates 
the problems resulting from such an uncoordinated development approach.  Even UASs 
of similar sizes and missions utilize non-standard control systems that do not facilitate 
commonality or interoperability.  A review of literature has revealed that UAS 
commonality is desired, but no guidelines for implementation have been provided.  
Next, stakeholder feedback was gathered, and background information was 
utilized to scope the direction of the project.  This led to a focus on the need for a 
common Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for the air vehicle control functions of Groups 
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3-5 UASs.  Additionally, the project was limited to Department of Navy (DoN) assets 
due to information accessibility and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
recommendations.  Further scoping limited the quantitative benefits analysis to 
Operations and Support (O&S) costs for training UAS Air Vehicle Operators (AVOs).   
To compare the requirements of current DoN acquisition programs with the 
project scope, a detailed survey of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, 
Vertical Take-off and Land Tactical UAV (VTUAV, known as Fire Scout), and Small 
Tactical Unmanned Air System (STUAS) requirements documents was performed.  The 
Key Performance Parameters and Key System Attributes of each system were compared 
and contrasted.  The resulting analysis produced a list of twelve requirements necessary 
for the creation of a common functional GCS architecture that supports AVO functions. 
The list of requirements led to the creation of a proposed common GCS 
architecture.  The Model Based Systems Engineering program CORE® was used to show 
the architectural concept through the Integration Definition for Functional Modeling 
(IDEF0) language.  Each sub-function was then modeled in IDEF0 to ensure consistent 
data flow between levels.  A high level benefits analysis was performed assuming the 
implementation of the proposed common GCS architecture.  This analysis was limited to 
the AVO functions required for Basic UAS Qualifications.  It showed a potential cost 
savings of over $400 million in O&S for training aspects of the GCS common 
architecture over a twenty year span.  This quantification did not include potential 
benefits other than those found in training, and additional benefits can be expected when 
other logistical elements are analyzed.  
Utilizing a common GCS architecture would enable benefits in the areas of 
basing, manpower requirements, personnel assignments, reliability, maintainability, 
interoperability and training.  This project quantified AVO training cost benefits and 
found that implementation of the common GCS architecture in accordance with the 
derived requirements will benefit the Department of Defense through reduced O&S costs 
and increased operational capability.     
   
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) have become an integral part of the United 
States armed forces as well as other militaries around the world.  “When the U.S. forces 
went into Iraq in 2003, the military had fewer than 170 unmanned aerial systems…  By 
2008, the number of unmanned aerial systems had reached 6,358” [Firebaugh, 2009].   In 
the U.S. inventory, the acquisition process of buying complete systems in a single 
program from a single prime contractor has led to a Ground Control Station (GCS) being 
purchased with each type of new Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV).  The proliferation of 
UASs, including each unique GCS, has resulted in a procurement and development 
process that has not had a chance to generate, accept, and mandate common standards.  
This proliferation has led to a lack of commonality and interoperability among 
UASs.  Mr. John Young, a former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), stated in a 2009 Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) that commonality in UAS GCSs could reduce Department of 
Defense (DoD) manpower, procurement, sustainment, and logistics costs, and that 
interoperability could improve joint and combined operations.  He went on to state his 
thoughts on the importance by saying “…the acquisition team has the opportunity to do 
something truly joint and powerful by adopting a common GCS architecture that is open 
and thus will allow for rapid addition of modular functionality” [USD(AT&L), 2009].   
To prove his point, Mr. Young stated that if certain provisions in the ADM were 
not addressed, he “…may restrict funding obligations on the UAS GCS development 
and/or procurement contract…” [USD(AT&L), 2009].  This statement has not been taken 
lightly by the acquisition community and reveals the immediacy of the action required for 




A. COMPONENTS OF A UAS 
A UAS consists of one or more UAVs and a GCS.  A GCS is the interface and 
conduit between human users, or operators, and the UAVs.  The GCS also receives and 
disseminates information to outside elements including military commands and air traffic 
control.  A GCS is not limited to the ground, but can also be onboard a ship, vehicle, 
submarine, or airborne platform.  For the purposes of this report, GCS will be used as the 
generic term referring to the control element of the UAV.  Figure 1 shows an example 
from a UAS airspace integration brief that highlights the complex connections between 
the UAVs, GCSs and other entities within the UAS environment.  It can be seen in this 
figure that the GCS is the central element for interactions between the operators, UAVs, 
other aircraft, ground support elements, air traffic control and command authorities.  
 
Figure 1. Example Detailing UAV and GCS Connections  
This diagram shows an example of the connections between a UAV, a GCS and other entities within the 
UAS environment.  Methods of communication and types of GCSs will vary based on type and capability of 





All user controlled functions of the UAV are input through the GCS.  This 
includes piloting functions, navigation, sensor payload control, and in some cases 
weapons control.  Most large UASs are staffed by two or more personnel, with at least 
one being an Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and other positions being a Mission Payload 
Operator (MPO), other sensor operators, communications operator, etc.  The key 
purposes of the GCSs are to function as the interface for human operators to control or 
direct the UAV, control the payloads (both sensors and weapons), and direct information 
from the UAS to the appropriate command authority.  
The emphasis has been on the air vehicle component of the UAS, however a 
primary driver in realizing system capabilities is the GCS.  The GCS houses the most 
vital interface found on a UAS, the connection between the human operator and the air 
vehicle.  A UAV is different from a missile due to a high level of interaction between the 
operator and the air vehicle, allowing real time mission flexibility and tasking.  Through 
the GCS interface, the operator (or team of operators), command desired air vehicle 
functionality including takeoff and landing, navigation, sensor operation, and weapons 
delivery.  The GCS may also serve as the intelligence center, where raw, actionable data 
is analyzed, mensurated, and relayed to other combat assets.  Legacy GCS development 
and deployment has been conducted in a proprietary manner, which has lead to 
stovepiped systems that are not common or interoperable across different UASs [National 
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), 2003].  A need for a change for future systems 
was recognized by the recent ADM dictating that the DoD services develop and 
implement plans to increase synergies across current and future systems [USD(AT&L), 
2009]. 
The GCS is responsible for several functions contained within the UAS 
architecture.  The first function is to allow the AVO to control and monitor the UAV.  
The AVO commands air vehicle navigation and maneuver parameters through the GCS.  
Different human interfaces are employed by current GCSs to accomplish this task, 
including the use of stick-and-rudder type designs, as well as point-and-click computer 
based designs.  The second aspect of this function is to monitor the health and equipment 
status of the UAV.  The GCS houses the displays that allow the AVO to detect 
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malfunctions and enact corrective measures when necessary.  The monitoring function of 
onboard UAV sensors also allows the AVO to determine which sensors are operational, 
thus driving the tactics employed in conducting the UAS mission. 
The control and operation of the UAV sensors and weapons is another vital 
function of the GCS, as they provide the true warfighting capability.  Different UASs 
employ different sensors with different capabilities.  Each GCS must be able to operate 
its corresponding sensors and provide information to the sensor operator and other 
crewmembers.  Currently there are many different sensor operator interfaces to match the 
number of different sensors employed by UASs.  These sensors usually provide the 
targeting data required to employ the various weapons carried by different UAVs.  The 
man-in-the-loop aspect required to launch weapons is a critical GCS interface.  The 
ability for the mission commander to conduct hostile engagements is directly related to 
the quality of the information the GCS can display.   
These operations require a robust method of communication between the GCS 
and UAV.  This is a vital interface, and can vary based on the size and mission of the 
UAS.  The two basic categories of air vehicle control links are Line-Of-Sight (LOS), 
which is generally employed on smaller UAVs, and Over-The-Horizon (OTH), which is 
employed on larger UAVs.  These can be implemented in various ways and several 
different data links are currently used.  OTH data links are usually done via a satellite 
data link.  This can present problems due to the limited bandwidth available, especially in 
some cases where military traffic is carried by commercial satellite systems with no 
overriding priority.  With the growing number of large OTH UASs, the available satellite 
bandwidth is another consideration that the GCS must accommodate.  These links, along 




Figure 2. Links Between the GCS and UAV with Operator Functions 
This figure shows the communication links between the GCS and the UAV.  Additionally, the roles of the 
UAS operators are shown in the GCS portion of the figure.  The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) is used 
by the operators to enter commands to the UAV through the GCS.  Figure after [IHS (Global) Limited, 
2009]. 
 
A final important area of GCS architecture is the contingency planning and 
monitoring of the UAS.  While the UAV is responsible for executing pre-planned 
contingency measures, the GCS provides the means to program them into the UAV flight 
control logic.  Three of the general contingency plans that need to be accounted for, and 
pre-programmed are:   
 What should the UAV do if the air vehicle control data link should fail and the 
UAV can no longer receive commands from the ground?   
 What should the UAV do in the event of a loss of the engine (especially if the 




 What should the UAV do in the case of extreme emergency (engine fire, etc, 
especially if the data link has been previously lost)?   
There may be alternate methods of performing these contingency functions in future UAS 
designs, however, contingency planning is currently considered a vital function of a GCS. 
B. COMMONALITY AND INTEROPERABILITY  
While the concepts of commonality and interoperability are generally understood, 
exact definitions are more difficult to articulate.  Commonality is often described at a 
high level as the ability to use the same hardware, software or data links.  The ability to 
communicate between different types of UASs is described as interoperability, but it is 
often associated with commonality.  Properly defining commonality and interoperability 
is a challenging issue among many DoD UAS user groups.  The primary focus of this 
project is defining commonality with the realization that commonality tends to enable 
interoperability. 
The current generation of UASs has been in development for defense applications 
since the 1980s [Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2006].  Commonality among 
subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations have not yet been attained [GAO, 
2009].  This lack of commonality is seen not only between cross-service UASs, but also 
within Department of the Navy (DoN) acquired UASs.  All DoN UASs are currently 
developed with unique dedicated GCSs.   
The current DoD acquisition process leads to a lack of commonality because each 
UAV system is procured as if it were a single aircraft.  This condition is referred to as 
stovepiping as it results from a lack of coordination between program offices on issues 
such as commonality.  Therefore, each system component, both UAV and paired GCS are 
developed together as standalone systems.  “In an effort to minimize „stovepiping,‟ 
Congress has mandated that all unmanned aircraft weighing more than 45 pounds must 
transition to a tactical common datalink that will enable them to inter-operate with 
various ground technologies” [Jean, 2009].  
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Another barrier to obtaining DoD commonality is that “manufacturers have been 
reluctant to share their proprietary communications datalink formats with other 
companies.  They produce ground stations that control only their specific aircraft, which 
means that the services often have to buy the complete package of Air Vehicle (AV) and 
GCS.  That has proven cumbersome and inefficient because the equipment is not 
compatible with aircraft made by other manufacturers” [Jean, 2009].  Raytheon, a 
company that makes independent GCSs, stated “we, the ground system providers, are 
being held hostage by the platform providers” [Jean, 2009].  Therefore, as more systems 
are being acquired by the DoN, the population and variety of GCS equipment has begun 
to proliferate with few effective efforts to increase commonality in hardware, software, or 
logistics.  Additionally, GCSs have proven not to be interoperable, resulting in reduced 
operational effectiveness.  A detailed discussion about commonality and interoperability 
can be found in Chapter III.B.    
C. EXAMPLE COMMONALITY PROBLEM: PREDATOR AND SKY 
WARRIOR 
In 2001, the U.S. Army began to develop requirements to replace the legacy RQ-5 
Hunter UAS.  The U.S. Army was having problems accessing and tasking the small 
number of UASs in the DoD inventory, specifically the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Predator 
systems.  Due to the lack of access to USAF Predators, the U.S. Army decided to begin 
its own program citing ground commanders‟ “urgent need for this capability” [GAO, 
2009].  The U.S. Army put out their own request for proposal, conducted their own 
source selection and chose the MQ-1C Sky Warrior.  The requirements for the new U.S. 
Army UAV program appeared to be very similar to the already existing Predator.  As 
stated in a 2009 GAO report, “Both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for 
reviewing Sky Warrior‟s requirements and acquisition documentation raised concerns 
about duplicating existing capability – specifically, capability provided by Predator.” 
The U.S. Army could have purchased Predators or helped in the development of 
the follow-on Predator-B (Reaper), but instead used the urgent need to push their own 
uncommon system through.  This decision was made to ensure their service-specific 
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requirements were not affected by the USAF if a joint solution was pursued.  General 
Atomics won the U.S. Army source selection and bid a larger (and unique) variant of its 
USAF Predator.  The U.S. Army developed this system as the Sky Warrior instead of 
joining a Reaper or Predator development [GAO, 2009]. 
It is important to note that the GCS for the USAF Predator is not common or 
interoperable with the U.S. Army Sky Warrior.  “The ground control station the Army is 
developing for Sky Warrior is expected to be used to control other Army unmanned 
aircraft, it will not be common with the Predator and Reaper ground control station used 
by the Air Force” [GAO, 2009].  While the U.S. Army is trying to be common with U.S. 
Army GCSs, these nearly identical systems cannot communicate or control each other.  
The GCS for the U.S. Army adds an automatic takeoff and landing capability missing on 
the Predator GCS, making it considerably different from its USAF counterpart. 
This example shows the complexity and difficulty in accomplishing common 
UAS solutions even when missions and requirements are similar.  Individual services 
within the DoD are rarely willing to compromise on service-specific needs, even when 
confronted with the expense of an entirely unique acquisition program.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The implication of a common UAS ground control station leads to some 
interesting research questions.  The following five research questions guided the direction 
of this project‟s research and analysis: 
Research Question 1. What is meant by common and what is this project‟s 
interpretation of common? 
Research Question 2. Is there a link between commonality and interoperability? 
Research Question 3. Is it possible to achieve some level of commonality for 
UAS GCSs, and if so, what requirements are necessary? 
Research Question 4. To meet these requirements, what architectural 
characteristics need to be developed? 
Research Question 5. What are some of the benefits and challenges of achieving 
UAS GCS commonality?  
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E. PROJECT GOALS AND DELIVERABLES 
The primary goal of this project was to investigate the challenging aspects of 
creating common UAS GCSs and the potential benefits of achieving this commonality.  
Efforts leading to this goal included conducting a detailed survey of available background 
information related to UASs and GCSs.  Commonality and interoperability concerns with 
respect to these GCSs have been explored.   
After adequate background information was compiled, high level requirements for 
a common GCS were developed based on multiple sources.  These sources ranged from 
existing requirements from current DoN programs, other governmental documents, and 
concept of operations from UAS communities.  The final list of extracted requirements 
included twelve detailed elements that would ensure the capability to enable common 
AVO training and would allow for GCS interoperability between platforms. 
These requirements were utilized to create a functional architecture.  The 
functional architecture was taken to a fifth level of decomposition in some cases, to 
ensure adequate detail for proper implementation.  The final deliverable includes a 
hyperlinked architecture that allows for point-and-click decomposition of hierarchical 
levels.  
After the functional architecture was developed, a small subset of possible 
benefits from achieving commonality was explored.  This benefits analysis was used to 
show some of the quantifiable advantages that the DoN could gain by pursuing the 
common GCS architecture. 
The breadth of the project required limiting the scope of the efforts in order to 
achieve the goals in the time allotted.  The commonality aspect for the proposed GCS 
architecture was limited to the air vehicle control operations performed by the AVO only.  
Additionally, the architecture was limited to functional vice physical allocations.  The 
benefits that could be expected from implementing the proposed common GCS 
architecture were limited to those related to common AVO training only.  This effort did 
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not include a detailed cost-benefit analysis due to limited time and resources.  Further 
details regarding the scoping of the project can be found in Chapter IV. 
F. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
The systems engineering method utilized for this project was a tailored approach 
to the process presented in Systems Engineering Principles and Practice [Kossiakoff & 
Sweet, 2003].  This method describes three phases of systems engineering as Concept 
Development, Engineering Development and Post Development.  For the purposes of this 
project, much of the work was contained in the Concept Development and Engineering 
Development phases.  Additional documentation of the tailored systems engineering 
process can be found in the Project Management Plan in Appendix A. 
The generic systems engineering process was then tailored specifically for use in 
this project.  The tailored process, as shown in Figure 3 on the next page, is divided into 
four phases: Information Gathering and Problem Definition, Concept Development, 
Engineering Development, and Design Recommendations and Conclusions.   
The method began with Information Gathering and Problem Definition.  Once the 
problem had been defined, the iterative phase of Concept Development was initiated.  
This iteration continued until an initial functional architecture had been created that 
satisfied critical functional requirements.  Next, the Engineering Development iterated 
until a final functional architecture had been developed that met detailed requirements 
based on stakeholder feedback.  Lastly, the Design Recommendations and Conclusions 
were produced.  Problem scoping and stakeholder feedback loops were utilized 




Figure 3. Tailored Systems Engineering Process for This Project 
This figure is the tailored systems engineering process for this project.  The process is divided into four phases of Information Gathering 
& Problem Definition, Concept Development, Engineering Development and Design Recommendations & Conclusions.  
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1. Information Gathering and Problem Definition 
The first phase of the systems engineering process included defining the problem 
and gathering information.  The problem was initially presented by Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) as a topic of interest for further study.  In addition to the guidance 
from NAVAIR, other efforts included conducting a survey of available documentation to 
further define the problem related to GCS commonality.  After the problem was properly 
defined, existing systems were researched to provide an adequate background for further 
studies. 
After information gathering, an initial scoping of the problem occurred.  This 
problem scoping was iterative with the concept development phase to ensure the 
objectives of the program were achieved in the timeframe allowed. 
2. Concept Development 
In the concept development phase, the team performed a stakeholder needs 
analysis to determine the requirements and priorities of the stakeholders.  The initial step 
was to ensure the correct set of stakeholders had been identified.  The team then elicited 
the stakeholders‟ requirements and priorities potentially affected by GCS commonality.  
Requirements and constraints were defined and analyzed in relation to the problem 
statement.   
An initial functional analysis of legacy GCS architectures was performed to 
identify critical functional requirements for common GCSs.  It was found that existing 
GCS architectures would not meet all of the requirements for a common GCS.  
Therefore, a new common GCS functional architecture was developed.  This functional 
analysis yielded an initial functional architecture at a high, conceptual level. 
3. Engineering Development 
In the engineering development phase, the initial functional architecture was 
further developed into a final functional architecture for a common GCS.  It is important 
to note that the functional architecture did not include any physical allocation for the 
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common GCS.  Additionally, the engineering development phase performed an analysis 
of potential benefits from achieving this common GCS architecture.   
4. Design Recommendations and Conclusions 
The final phase in the defined systems engineering process utilized the 
information from the preceding phases to formulate recommendations on the future 
application of the proposed common GCS architecture to the stakeholders. 
The final recommendation for U.S. Navy (USN) acquisition programs was to 
adopt the common GCS functional architecture provided in this report as a basis for 
further design.  Further, the benefits in training afforded by this architecture can only be 
realized through consolidation of training infrastructure among those same programs. 
G. INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS AND TEAM MEMBER ROLES 
To facilitate work on the project, the Capstone group formed a team named the 
Joint UAS Common Control Station (JUCCS).  A logo was developed as part of the team 
forming process and can be seen in Appendix B.  The JUCCS team broke into Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) to perform the systems engineering process that was defined in 
previous sections.  The IPT hierarchy can be seen in Figure 4.  The roles and 
responsibilities of the individual IPTs are defined in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 4. JUCCS Integrated Product Team Hierarchy 
The IPT hierarchy can be seen in this figure. The PM is at the top of the hierarchy with the individual IPTs 
reporting upward to the PM.  The structure includes representatives for Project Management, 













The Project Manager (PM) was responsible for managing all IPTs within the 
organizational structure of the Capstone project.  The PM made executive decisions at 
times when matters were not agreed upon by the team members.  The PM was the 
primary point of contact between the project advisors, external stakeholders, and the 
Capstone team members. 
The Requirements IPT was responsible for compiling requirements documents 
from existing DoN UAS programs in support of the requirements and constraint analysis.  
The analysis from the requirements IPT aided with the architectural development.  
The Architecture IPT was responsible for defining and implementing the 
proposed common architecture.  Tasking included creation of an upper level list of 
requirements, functional decomposition and proposed functional architecture. The 
architecture team members used the CORE® software package as their primary tool.   
The Logistics IPT was responsible for assessing potential benefits of 
implementing the common architecture designed by the Architecture IPT.  The 
assessment included benefits that could be expected from a logistical, primarily training 
standpoint.  Tasking included development of appropriate metrics and meetings with 
stakeholders. 
The Project Management IPT was responsible for assisting the PM with all 
project management efforts including schedule generation and the compilation of 
document deliverables.  The Project Management IPT included editors, configuration 
managers, and a scheduler.  The editors were responsible for the proper editing of all 
document deliverables.  The configuration managers were responsible for configuration 
control and administration of the learning management system used for the project.  The 





II. UAS AND GCS BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section provides a general overview of GCSs, their components, and 
respective functions based on a limited number of documents that are directly relevant to 
the discussion of commonality and interoperability with respect to UAS GCSs.  The most 
relevant documents reviewed were the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (2009), GAO commonality and interoperability 
reports (March 2005; December 2005; 2006; 2009), STANAG 4586 (2007), and the 
ADM from USD(AT&L) (2009).  These documents are analyzed and referenced in this 
project. There are other documents from sources such as American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) along with documents from various other countries, which were analyzed for 
relevance, but are not cited in this background section.  Many of these documents are 
referenced within specific sections of the paper as appropriate.     
A. UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP (FY2009-2034) 
The second edition of the FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 
[OSD, 2009] provides a DoD-wide vision for the future of unmanned systems. It lays out 
the potential missions that unmanned systems could perform in the future, describes the 
functionality and performance needed to execute these missions, and identifies common 
areas of technology maturation that can lead to performance improvements for all 
unmanned systems: UASs, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), and Unmanned 
Maritime Systems (UMSs).  The OSD Roadmap also reflects the guidance set forth in 
Section 141 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (Public 
Law 109-364) to address joint development and procurement of unmanned systems and 
components, to transition service unique unmanned systems to joint systems, to evaluate 
the organizational structure for effective management, and to coordinate and budget for 
the development and procurement of unmanned systems. 
As reported by the OSD Roadmap, the technology of today in conjunction with 
the projected advancements of the future will enable a single platform to perform 
multiple missions across a variety of mission capability areas.  For example, all four 
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services currently employ multiple UASs to carry out a variety of missions.  The OSD 
Roadmap asserts that the DoD has an opportunity to realize a greater return on 
investment by achieving a common UAS with multi-mission capabilities rather than 
investing in mission-unique solutions.  It recommends that the DoD “promote the 
development, adoption, and enforcement of Government, international, and commercial 
standards for the design, manufacturing, testing, and safe operation of unmanned 
systems.” 
The OSD Roadmap also contends that interoperability will help the DoD achieve 
its vision by enhancing operational synergy during mission execution and by simplifying 
logistical elements.  Interoperability among unmanned systems enables information 
sharing that facilitates situational awareness of ground combatant commanders.  
According to the OSD Roadmap, interoperability can be achieved through the acquisition 
of common components, systems, and software, or by building systems to common 
interoperability standards. 
While the OSD Roadmap proposes that the DoD strive for commonality and 
interoperability, it provides no specific direction on how to achieve them.  It recommends 
common standards but does not provide one.  The OSD Roadmap itself states that it does 
not “create operational concepts, identify requirements, or program funds to invest in 
technology development and system acquisition. . . [and it] does not supersede the need 
for the Department to conduct the analysis and decision making associated with 
identifying the best means to satisfy capability gaps” [OSD, 2009].  In essence, the OSD 
Roadmap directs the DoD to be common and interoperable but it does not provide the 
tools necessary to achieve these goals.    
B. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS 06-49, 06-610T 
AND 09-520 ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is charged with auditing 
the Government and its activities, has been investigating the status of unmanned systems 
since early 1988 [GAO, December 2005].  Within the last decade, the GAO has released 
reports and testimony to Congress addressing commonality, interoperability, operational 
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performance, and the DoD‟s acquisition management approach to the growing demand 
for UASs.  While the DoD has experienced operational success with UASs, it is still 
challenged with maximizing its acquisition resources and effectively integrating these 
assets into joint combat operations. 
With the DoD‟s plans to invest more than $16 billion from 2008 through 2013 to 
develop and procure additional UASs, the acquisition of such systems has come under 
scrutiny.  For the ten unmanned aircraft acquisition programs that GAO reviewed in 
2009, total development costs have surpassed initial estimates by over $3 billion, or 37 
percent [GAO, 2009].  Such over-runs put strain on acquisition resources, which can lead 
to performance tradeoffs. 
The DoD recognizes the need for greater commonality among UASs in order to 
more effectively leverage its acquisition resources.  The National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2009 identifies commonality objectives that Congress expects 
unmanned system policy and acquisition strategy to achieve.  Those objectives include: 
the procurement of common payloads by vehicle class, achieving commonality of ground 
system architecture, common management of vehicle and payload procurements, ground 
station interoperability standardization, and common standards for exchanging data and 
metadata [GAO, 2009]. 
Although UASs have seen success in the operational environment, their effective 
integration into joint combat operations remains a challenge [GAO, 2006].  Not all UASs 
are able to easily exchange data with other communication systems because they were 
not designed to interoperable communications standards [GAO, December 2005].  Joint 
operations have been hampered when communication systems are incompatible.  For 
example, operating forces may be required to operate their own UASs to accomplish a 
mission, rather than using UASs that are already operating in the same area.  “To permit 
the sharing of tactical intelligence obtained by unmanned aircraft sensors, the Services or 
combatant commands have developed certain technical patches that permit compatibility 
but slow data transmission” [GAO, 2006].  Timely dissemination of information is 
critical to combat operations as delays in the receipt of the information can undermine 
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U.S. forces‟ ability to attack time-critical targets or allow the targets to escape [GAO, 
December 2005].  The commander of U.S. Central Command recently testified that 
experiences to date highlight the importance of an established interoperability standard 
for all intelligence systems that can function in a joint and combined environment [GAO, 
2006].   
Although DoD doctrine requires interoperability, no specific standards or detailed 
instruction exist, and no organization has been given the authority to enforce program 
direction [GAO, 2006].  The DoD specifies that systems, units, and forces shall be able to 
provide and accept data and information to and from other systems and shall effectively 
interoperate with other U.S. forces [GAO, December 2005].  It does not, however, 
provide guidance on how this is to be accomplished.  The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 identifies Congress‟ objectives for UAS policy 
and acquisition strategy.  The Act, however, provides no guidance or direction on how to 
achieve the desired commonality, or how to measure success.    
While the 2002 version of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap [OSD, 2002] 
emphasizes the need for UAS interoperability and identifies a number of existing 
standards for which systems should comply, it indicates that detailed standards for 
interoperability have not yet been developed [GAO, December 2005].  This situation still 
exists today with current systems.  GAO has reported that the OSD Roadmap describes 
desired capabilities for UASs such as commonality, integration, and interoperability, but 
crucial elements of how to develop and implement a strategic plan are lacking.  It does 
not provide specific guidance on UAS development, such as a clear link among the goals, 
desired capabilities, and plans.  Additionally the OSD Roadmap does not provide specific 
guidance on related force structure integration to sufficiently address the interrelationship 
among service plans to each other and how they promote joint operations, opportunities 
for joint endeavors, investment priorities and related funding needs [GAO, 2006]. 
The USD(AT&L) created the Joint UAV Planning Task Force in October 2001.  
The Task Force is the DoD‟s focal point for helping establish interoperability standards.  
Although the Task Force aims to guide UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and 
 
19 
execution across services, it does not have sufficient authority to enforce program 
direction [GAO, March 2005].   
The development and implementation of appropriate interoperability standards 
will help achieve successful integration and interoperability of UASs, but until the DoD 
addresses development of non-interoperable systems and enforces common standards 
among the services, problems are likely to continue and possibly become more 
widespread as new UASs are developed and fielded.  GAO has made recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense to develop standards for communications interoperability and 
overall UAS interoperability and to establish an office with sufficient authority to enforce 
program direction [GAO, 2006].  GAO has also recommended that DoD establish a plan 
that clearly identifies “goals, requirements, programs, funding needs, performance 
measures, and the interrelationship of service-specific programs to each other” [GAO, 
March 2005].   
C. STANAG 4586: STANDARD INTERFACES OF UAV CONTROL SYSTEM 
FOR NATO UAV INTEROPERABILITY 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standard Agreement (STANAG) 
4586 was created when the UAS acquisition community realized a shortage of standards 
applicable to their unique system development requirements [NATO, 2007].  While there 
has been generous re-use of existing commercial and military standards produced through 
other system developments, there is a shortage of unique and specific standards for the 
UAS community.  As mentioned earlier, the UAS development created stovepiped 
designs and although this was fairly acceptable when the community was smaller, the 
recent rapid growth in the quantity of systems presently fielded has created an 
interoperability problem that this document was initiated to discuss.  
In the DoD, recent efforts within the services have been applied to acquiring 
unmanned systems with increased commonality.  One effort in particular has each service 
providing representation in a collaborative effort through participation in Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense sponsored Standards and Interoperability Integrated Product 
Team (S&I IPT).   “The S&I IPT is chartered to provide recommendations for 
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regulations, policies, and standards that will lead to eventual acceptance of unmanned 
military aircraft routinely flying among civilian, manned aircraft” [OSD, 2009].  
STANAG 4586 is one of the standards that this IPT is helping to generate and define, as 
there is interest within the DoD to be common with NATO organizations.  Meanwhile, 
the international community through the NATO Standardization Agency has been 
investigating the issue of multi-national interoperable systems.  “In 1998, a NATO 
Specialist Team began work on a standard conceived to standardize unmanned control 
systems interfaces to help enable UAS interoperability” [CDL Systems, 2009].  It was 
their works which lead to the creation of STANAG 4586 and which the S&I IPT is 
playing an active role.   
There are four primary items of interest which STANAG 4586 helps to define.  
One of the first items is a standard top-level UAS architecture, which is depicted in 
Figure 5.  The UAS architecture is composed of four main elements:  the air vehicle 
element, the payload element, the data link element and the UAV surface element, or 
more commonly referred to as ground station element.  It establishes the air vehicle as an 
entity upon itself.  The payload includes any of the equipment onboard meant to support 
the mission and not directly used for flight of the aircraft.  It could be any form of 
camera, radar or any available equipment, which is to be flown on the vehicle.  The data 
link element is the form of communication between the air vehicle and the ground 
element, most likely some type of Radio Frequency (RF) transmission.  The ground 
station element is the set of equipment on the ground that controls the air vehicle and the 
payload systems onboard.  Agreement on fundamental system architecture lays the 




Figure 5. Top-Level UAS Architecture as Defined by STANAG 4586 
This diagram partitions the UAS into defined elements and shows the primary interfaces.  Figure from 
[NATO, 2007]. 
 
The second item of interest that STANAG 4586 addresses is the definition of 
Levels of Interoperability (LOIs).  The LOIs are shown in Table 1.  The intent for the 
creation of the LOIs was to assist in the understanding of various functional capabilities, 
which are supported by the interfaces.  LOI 1 is a condition in which information 
originating from a UAV is passed to a third party via the GCS.  LOI 2 is a condition 
whereby the controlling asset is directly receiving data from the UAV.  LOI 3 is a 
condition where an asset receives strictly payload data and it is received straight from the 
UAV.  LOI 4 is a condition where an asset is able to control just the UAV platform and 
not the payload systems.  The control available to that asset does not include the ability to 
manage the UAV takeoff or landing.  Finally, LOI 5 is a condition where an asset has 
control of the UAV for all phases of flight including takeoff and landing.  It does not 
imply control of payload systems. 
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Table 1. Levels of Interoperability 
This table shows the five Levels of Interoperability (LOIs) and the definitions associated with each.  Table 
after [NATO, 2007]. 
LOI Level Definition 
1 Indirect receipt of UAV data 
2 
Direct receipt of UAV data where direct covers reception of the UAV 
data by the GCS when it has direct communication with the UAV 
3 
Control and monitoring of the UAV payload in addition to direct 
receipt of UAV data 
4 Control and monitoring of the UAV, less launch and recovery 
5 Control and monitoring of the UAV, plus launch and recovery 
 
Something to consider is that an asset could have multiple LOIs at any given time.  
For example, a small hand-held UAV with a camera as its payload could utilize a GCS 
for control of the air vehicle for launch and recovery, control of the air vehicle in flight, 
and receipt of camera data.  This encompasses LOI 2, 4 and 5.  There could be a separate 
ground element used to monitor, control and receive the payload data, which would 
include LOI 2 and 3.  Should these two ground elements be configured as a single item, it 
would have LOI 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
The third item that STANAG 4586 helps define is a common physical 
architecture for the UAS as shown in Figure 6.  Note that the language used by the 
STANAG calls this figure a functional architecture, but it is understood here to be a 
physical representation.  This physical architecture takes into consideration that an AV 
may not directly interface with the core UAV Control System (UCS) but instead might 
require some translation in order to be interoperable.  The Vehicle Specific Module 
(VSM) would host the functionality needed to translate the necessary information for a 
specific AV if necessary.  Similarly, some translation may be required with the interface 
to the Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) system.  In 
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that case, the Command and Control Interface Specific Module (CCISM) would perform 
the necessary translation. 
 
Figure 6. UAS Physical Architecture as Defined by STANAG 4586 
This diagram depicts the control station physical elements and interfaces as defined by STANAG 4586.  
Figure from [NATO, 2007]. 
 
The fourth and final item of interest that STANAG 4586 addresses is a detailed 
definition of the three main GCS interfaces.  The Data Link Interface (DLI), the 
Command and Control Interface (CCI) and the Human Computer Interface (HCI) are 
each detailed in separate appendices of the STANAG.  The STANAG has grown in detail 
with each successive revision and update.  Presently, the DLI and CCI are well 
documented in Edition 2 with the HCI in a lesser state of completion.  It is expected that 
the HCI will be updated with the next edition as well as continually refined and clarified 
as required throughout the document.   
The major take away from the STANAG is documentation of a common 
architecture and functional description of a UAS at a very high level.  Additionally, the 
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document provides a detailed explanation of the major GCS interfaces.  Having these 
items quantified and established in a solitary standard assists the UAS community by 
providing a single frame of reference and baseline to assist in system acquisition and 
development as well as operational usage.   
As much as the STANAG has tried to facilitate interoperability within the UAS 
community, there are areas that are lacking which would be suitable for future updates or 
general knowledge when reviewing.  First, being a NATO standard, there are limits to its 
applicability to non-NATO system development efforts.  The U.S. DoD works with 
forces that are not necessarily part of NATO.  True interoperability for the DoD is not 
just within itself and with NATO forces, but with all the forces that may come into 
coalition operations.   
Second, while the STANAG tries to itemize each element of the Data Link 
Interface (DLI) and classify them as common messages, it also allows for private 
messages.  Private messages allow for support of unique functionality.  As industry 
develops more systems, there is a growing trend of more private message usage.  As a 
result, manufactures can claim adherence to an open standard while simultaneously 
having significant reliance on the use of unique private messages.   
Finally, another growing concern with usage of the STANAG is the evolving 
mandates for internet protocol based networked family of systems by the DoD.  Whereas 
the STANAG looks to ensure interoperability by locking down configurations and strict 
adherence to interface definitions, the DoD is moving towards a networked and more 
loosely coupled family of systems approach.  These approaches conflict with one another 
and the STANAG has not evolved to address this situation.  In closing, while the 
STANAG has done a good job at fostering a method to achieve interoperability, there are 
areas that still need to be addressed as the pace of system development outpaces its 
ability to keep up. 
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D. USD(AT&L) ADM 2009: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS GROUND 
CONTROL STATION ACQUISITION DECISION MEMORANDUM 
On 11 February 2009, the USD(AT&L), Mr. John Young, issued the UAS GCS 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force to develop plans to incorporate open architectures in the development of 
UAS GCSs.  The direction provided in the memorandum was the result of an extensive 
program review of USAF and U.S. Army UAS GCS acquisition efforts.  Mr. Young 
concluded that the acquisition community “has the opportunity to do something truly 
joint and powerful by adopting a common GCS architecture that is open and thus will 
allow for rapid addition of modular functionality” [USD(AT&L), 2009].  In addition to 
the warfighting flexibility that modular functionality allows, several other benefits of a 
common, open GCS architecture are discussed to include: innovation, competitive 
options, increased cost control, interoperability, efficient flow of data between 
stakeholders, reduced theater complications, training efficiencies, increased safety, and 
improvements in reliability and maintainability.  All of these benefits have a direct 
correlation to reduced Life Cycle Costs (LCC) in the development, operation, and 
sustainment of UASs.   
As discussed in the introduction, UAS GCS development to date has been 
characterized by proprietary systems and interfaces.  This has hindered the ability of the 
services to adapt functionality to meet emerging requirements, and has made the 
interoperability between UASs virtually impossible.  Proprietary development has also 
eliminated the possibility of introducing the benefits of competitive acquisition strategies 
to upgrade existing systems, which ultimately leads to higher costs to the government.  
The common, open systems architecture directed by USD(AT&L) is a complete change 
from these past practices.  Open systems architectures that address all of the necessary 
GCS interfaces would allow the government greater flexibility with acquisition strategies.  
These open interfaces could be called out in future requirements documents allowing for 
greater interoperability and competition.  Open systems architectures also beget 
innovation, as any corporation or government activity will have the opportunity to bring 
unique solutions to support the growth and sustainment of UASs. 
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Interoperability is a key focus of the ADM.  Mr. Young points out that reduced 
theater complications can be achieved through a common GCS architecture.  The ability 
to control tasking and receive data from cross-service UASs dramatically increases the 
effectiveness of the combatant commanders in conducting military operations. Currently, 
UASs are service unique, and data flow between differing operational nodes takes 
excessive time.  As discussed, interoperability is different from commonality, and Mr. 
Young reinforces this concept in the ADM.  The ADM does not direct that GCSs across 
all services be exactly the same (common), but rather the “flexibility to adapt the man-
machine interface for specific Military Service‟s Concept of Operations” [USD(AT&L), 
2009] be achieved while the underlying architectures employ common components to the 
maximum extent possible.  This allows the services to adapt human-machine interfaces 
that maximize performance based upon different operational scenarios while maintaining 
a common architecture and computing hardware.  The common architecture and 
hardware reduce government acquisition costs and allow cross service maintenance and 
supply chain management for UASs.   
The ADM also alludes to the dismal safety record of current UASs.  Open, 
common GCS architectures will allow for increased training efficiencies for UAS 
operators and maintainers, and may improve the safety record described by the ADM.  
Much like the training pipeline for the Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS) and 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, UAS operators and maintainers across multiple 
services could receive training at the same location.  This enables the potential for 
government cost savings in facilities and reduced development of service unique 
courseware.  It also allows for mission flexibility, as there is the potential for cross 
service operation of UASs.  Finally, it will increase the small pool of qualified UAS 
operators.  Mr. Young also highlights that takeoff and landing is the most likely regime 
for a UAS mishap, and directs the services to consider the employment of autonomous 
control to reduce this occurrence.  The ADM specifically tasks the USAF to incorporate 
this capability into its Predator and Reaper inventory.   
To accomplish the objectives discussed, the service secretaries, in coordination 
with the UAS Task Force, are directed by the ADM to “initiate a joint effort to develop 
 
27 
and demonstrate a common, open, and scalable UAS architecture supporting Groups 2-5 
UAS” [USD(AT&L), 2009].  Specific actions from USD(AT&L) include:   
 Accelerate the fielding of Common Data Link (CDL) compliant 
communication systems 
 Conduct a user assessment of the Sky Warrior One System GCS to evaluate 
aspects of functionality that could be applied to other GCSs 
 Identify the lead service and management structure toward these efforts 
 Develop a plan to conduct prototype demonstration with Predator, Reaper, and 
Sky Warrior UAS with Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and 
Global Hawk 
 Develop competitive acquisition strategies for future GCS procurements 
Finally, USD(AT&L) highlights the importance of these GCS efforts by ordering that any 
current UAS programs break out the GCS effort as a subprogram to increase oversight 
and visibility.  
Since the release of the ADM the services have begun taking steps toward completing 
these tasks.  Industry is also excited to participate in the growing UAS market, which is 
projected to be over $62 billion over the next decade [Shalal-Esa, 2009].  Mr. Bigham, 
Director of Business Development for Raytheon Missile Systems, sees the ADM as a 
watershed event.  “The fact that he forced everyone to use an open interface control 
document is the most important thing to happen in unmanned systems” [Warwick & 
Chavanne, 2009].  It is also recognized by USD(AT&L) that this effort will take several 
years.  Mr. Weatherington, the Defense Department Deputy Director for Unmanned 
Warfare states, “Effectively transitioning from where we are today to where we need to 
be in the future will take time.  Our strategy is to develop goals for the future 
architecture, then migrate legacy systems toward that architecture as they evolve.  New 
systems would be required to adopt the new, common architecture” [Warwick & 
Chavanne, 2009]. 
The ADM is an important document that provides direction with regards to the need 
for commonality in UAS GCS development.  This document, however, is not without its 
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shortcomings.  First, the assertions in the document related to benefits that could be 
expected from achieving GCS commonality are in no way substantiated.  These potential 
benefits are based on conventional notions about what improvements commonality can 
provide.  Second, the extent of, and method for executing the commonality are not 
described.  The ADM provides a goal without any specific guidance on how to achieve 
the goal.    
E. VARIATIONS OF GROUND CONTROL STATIONS 
GCSs can vary greatly in form and function.  These differences can generally be 
tied to the size, mission, and cost of the UAS.  Very small UASs, such as those produced 
by AeroVironment, can be controlled by a small device similar to a Personal Data 
Assistant (PDA) as shown in Figure 7.  The slightly larger hand launched RQ-11B Raven 
can be controlled from a laptop sized device such as the one shown in Figure 8.  Control 
of these smaller UASs is localized and many times can only be commanded through 
pre-programmed flight profiles or LOS communication.  In contrast, the USAF Global 
Hawk is controlled from a deployable trailer, where there may be multiple operators 
manning several different stations as seen in Figure 9.  These larger GCSs are capable of 
transmitting commands and receiving data over thousands of miles away via satellite 
communications.  For these large systems, the GCS may not be co-located with the actual 
airfield that houses the air vehicle.  For example, some large GCSs are located in the 
United States while the UAV is flying combat missions over the skies of Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  In these cases the Launch Recovery Elements (LREs) are stationed at the 
air bases where the UAV takes-off and lands.  The LRE has control over the UAV only 
during terminal control during launch and recovery, while the GCS conducts the transit 
and tactical portions of the UAV mission.  Again, it is important to note that while it is 
called a ground control station, the control element itself could be onboard a ship, 





Figure 7. Small Handheld AeroVironment GCS  
Small handheld devices, such as the one depicted above, can serve as the primary air vehicle control 
function for small UASs.  Usually these smaller UASs are hand launched, and have an autopilot to land, 
reducing the necessary functionality of the operator interface.  Figure from [AeroVironment Inc., 2009].   
 
Figure 8. Small UAS Ground Control Station  
The RQ-11B Raven can be controlled from a highly portable system.  For these less complex UASs, a 
single operator may control all air vehicle functionality such as takeoff, executing the mission, and the 




Figure 9. Larger UAS Ground Control Station for Global Hawk  
The Global Hawk Ground Control Station can be found in a trailer (as depicted above) or housed in a 
stationary building.  There are several operator stations to execute a Global Hawk mission.  It is likely that 
the picture above is during the transit phase of the mission, as the sensor operator stations are not manned.  
Figure from [Aviation Week, 2009].   
The Predator UAS has been in service for several years, and its GCS provides an 
example of the interface required to conduct air vehicle control tasks.  The GCS for the 
Predator is shown in Figure 10.  The Predator has a two-crew, side-by-side layout that 
allows the pilot and the sensor operator to share situational awareness across common 
screens.  In this picture, the pilot is on the left, and the sensor operator is on the right, 
which is the standard setup for Predator and Reaper operations.  The Predator GCS uses a 
joystick approach for UAV and sensor control, however there is a keyboard and trackball 
for some air vehicle control functions.  The GCS also houses the radio contact between 
the Predator operators and the forward tactical air controller.  These communications are 
accomplished through the headsets the operators are wearing.  The pilot and the sensor 
operator have the ability to talk internally to each other and also to the air vehicle control 





Figure 10. Predator Ground Control Station  
Inside a Predator ground control station at Creech Air Force Base showing commercial monitors and rack 
mounted militarized monitor.  Figure from [IHS (Global) Limited, 2009]. 
Figure 11 shows Raytheon‟s concept of a future GCS that could be used for 
Predator and other UASs.  By optimizing the GCS layout there is the potential to reduce 
the number of operators that are required for each UAS. 
 
Figure 11. Raytheon’s Universal Control Prototype Ground Control Station  
Raytheon’s concept for a GCS could be applied to several currently fielded and future UASs. Figure from 
[Defense Update, 2009]. 
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The Fire Scout is an unmanned helicopter that is currently in development.  The 
relative size of the Fire Scout is similar to that of a Predator UAS.  As such, the GCS, 
depicted in Figure 12, is founded upon the same design as the Predator.  The Fire Scout 
GCS employs the same two-operator, side-by-side concept that is currently used by the 
Predator system.  The Fire Scout is also being designed to have more autonomous 
operating capability than the Predator, which leads to a more streamlined control station 
design when compared to Predator.  There is the possibility that as the system matures, 
the GCS may look more like the single operator Raytheon design as shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 12. Fire Scout GCS  
The Fire Scout GCS is another side-by-side design where two operators control the air vehicle.  Figure 
from [Globe Newswire Inc., 2009].   
 
F. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The OSD Roadmap, GAO, and USD(AT&L) all call for more commonality 
between both inter-service and intra-service GCS designs.  This desire has been attributed 
to a need for more interoperability, greater ability to share tactical information, and a 
perceived reduction in LCC.  These documents surmise that such goals could be met with 
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the use of modular, open source, standardized systems, but none of the documents offer 
any specific guidelines on implementation of these standards, or any means of mandating 
such actions across the DoD.   
The STANAG is an attempt by NATO to document a common high level 
architecture and functional description of a UAS.  Additionally, the document provides a 
detailed explanation of the major GCS interfaces.  While this document is a step in the 
right direction, it does not offer enough detail to ensure interoperability among GCSs 
built according to its direction.  Also, the current revision of the STANAG does not offer 
many guidelines related to human-machine interfaces, or an approach to their 
commonality. 
A survey of current GCSs reinforces the lack of commonality across the DoD.  
Even UASs of similar sizes and missions utilize non-standard control systems that do not 




















































III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A review of the background information reveals a problem that requires further 
research about how to implement commonality and interoperability amongst the various 
GCSs.  This project reviewed various aspects related to commonality and interoperability 
of UAS GCSs, and then scoped the efforts of the project related to this problem in 
Chapter IV. 
A. PROBLEM IN GENERAL 
The lack of: 1) common standards, 2) design for modularity, and 3) open system 
specifications has resulted in the problem of unique GCSs for UASs, increasing 
acquisition expenses, training requirements, and logistics footprints. The DoD has been 
directed to develop a plan to add commonality to UAS programs since the DoD cannot 
continue to develop, sustain, and operate UASs designed with stand-alone, propriety 
architectures.  In the absence of any quantifiable evidence, former USD(AT&L) Mr. 
Young has stated, and the GAO has concluded, that a common GCS for UASs may yield 
cost savings benefits to the common logistics elements of training and maintenance.  
Additionally, operational effectiveness has been limited by the lack of interoperability in 
UAS GCSs.  A push for greater commonality may encourage a higher level of 
interoperability for UASs. 
B. A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COMMONALITY VERSUS 
INTEROPERABILITY 
In 2009, USD(AT&L) called for a “common, open and scalable UAS 
architecture.”  GAO has stated, “common subsystems and components can reduce both 
production and life-cycle costs as well as improve interoperability” [GAO, 2009].  Open 
architectures are the next frontier in GCS procurement.  “The new systems also are 
attempting to improve interoperability by conforming to open standards that facilitate 
communications with different types of aircraft” [Jean, 2009].  These statements imply 
commonality is a requirement for new UAS GCSs. 
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The second goal of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap (2007–2032) is to 
“emphasize commonality to achieve greater interoperability among system controls, 
communications, data products, and data links on unmanned systems” [OSD, 2007].  The 
FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap lists “greater interoperability 
among system controls, communications, data products, data links, and payloads/mission 
equipment packages on unmanned systems” as its fourth goal [OSD, 2009].   
Merriam-Webster defines commonality as possession of shared features or 
attributes [Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2009].  The DoD defines it as “A quality that applies 
to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling 
each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained on the others 
without additional specialized training; b. having interchangeable repair parts and/or 
components; and c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without 
adjustment” [Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 2009].  
Merriam-Webster defines interoperability as the ability of a system to work with 
or use the parts or equipment of another system [Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2009].  The 
DoD defines interoperability as the “a. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution 
of assigned tasks. b. (DoD only) The condition achieved among communications-
electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information 
or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.  
The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases” [JCS, 
2009]. 
Interoperability can be achieved without commonality.  For example, a DoN 
aircraft flying with an AN/ARC-210 radio can communicate with U.S. Marines operating 
AN/PRC-117 radios and with ships using AN/WSC-5 radios.  Although each operator 
has a different radio made by different vendors, they can all communicate through Ultra 
High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication (SATCOM).  In a similar manner, 
different UASs could achieve interoperability by using similar languages to share data 




Commonality can also be achieved independent of interoperability.  Use of the 
same display or joystick in different GCSs, for example, would provide commonality 
from a hardware perspective.  Advantages of this level of commonality include the 
economy of scale and the reduced logistics footprint of a singular component.  This type 
of commonality would not improve interoperability.    
STANAG 4586 defines five LOIs for UASs.  It goes on to say that maximum 
operational flexibility can be achieved if the GCS supports these LOIs with different 
UAVs.  Definitions of these LOIs can be found in Table 1.  Figure 13 illustrates the 
perspectives of these LOIs.  As shown, Level 1 can be achieved through the use of 
common or compatible file transfer protocols and message or imagery formats.   
 
Figure 13. Level of Interoperability Perspective  
This figure illustrates the relationships of the five LOIs as outlined in STANAG 4586. These levels vary 
from the lowest interoperability level of 1, where two-way communication between the GCS and the GIG 
allow sharing of payload data, to the highest interoperability level of 5, where a GCS would be capable of 
launch and recovery of multiple UAVs.  Figure from [PEO(U&W), 2009]. 
 
STANAG 7085 Interoperable Data Links for Imaging Systems outlines the 
requirements for Level 1 interoperability compliance.  It defines interoperable interfaces 
for UAV sensors as well as compliant data link and communications protocols [NATO, 
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2004].  The DoD has adopted the CDL and TCDL for sharing sensor data across the 
Global Information Grid (GIG).  Use of these links should ensure that UASs meets Level 
1 interoperability.  This should enable more forces to receive sensor data from compliant 
UASs.  
Level 1 interoperability would be a good starting requirement for all UASs.  
Sharing sensor data is necessary to let forces operating in the area with the UAS make 
decisions quickly.  This sensor data can also be used by military commanders to make 
decisions regarding close air support and time sensitive targets.  Level 1 interoperability 
allows decision makers to have more data to support their decision.  However, indirect 
sharing of data takes time and requires others to process and relay the sensor data.  Level 
2 would allow direct sharing of sensor data with those in direct communication with the 
UAS.  This direct link is illustrated by the one-way arrow from the air vehicle to the ship.  
Payload data is sent directly to the receiving entity.  Level 3 would allow any GCS in 
direct communication with the UAS to control the sensor, aim the cameras or identify a 
target location.  The two-way arrow indicates the commands to control the sensor and the 
data transmitted in response.  Level 4 allows for control of the air vehicle itself.  Again a 
two-way arrow indicates that commands are sent to the air vehicle and status updates are 
returned to the operator.  For a GCS to control both the sensor and the vehicle, it must be 
Level 3 and Level 4 interoperable [NATO, 2007].  Level 4 interoperability does not 
implicitly include Levels 1 through 3. 
For Level 2 through Level 5, the tenets of STANAG 4586 apply.  This document 
calls for the implementation of standard interfaces to allow a GCS the flexibility to 
communicate with various UAVs.  The use of standard interfaces could also facilitate the 
integration of common components from various sources into the GCS.  This would 
foster competition and creativity in the development of components and modules for use 
in GCSs.   
The One System Ground Control Station (OSGCS), built by AAI, is an example 
of a common GCS.  The OSGCS, shown in Figure 14, is currently used by the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Marine Corps on the Shadow, Hunter, Pioneer, Raven, Predator and Sky 
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Warrior platforms [AAI Corp., 2009].  The OSGCS has achieved interoperability through 
commonality.  The same control station, with common hardware and human interface, is 
used by different air vehicles. 
 
Figure 14. The One System Ground Control Station  
This figure shows the OSGCS installed in a mobile vehicle (left) and a closer view of this system in 
operation (right).  The OSGCS is an example of an attempted common ground system.  Figure from [AAI 
Corp., 2009]. 
 
The DoD could mandate that all UASs utilize the OSGCS.  This would provide 
many advantages.  All UAS operators and maintainers trained on the common OSGCS 
would be able to work with any UAS.  One supply system may be able to support all 
UAS GCSs, reducing the logistics footprint. On the other hand, mandating the use of the 
OSGCS would create a monopoly.  Competition and innovation would be stifled.  In the 
long term, the DoD could end up overpaying for outdated technology as no incentives 
would exist to constantly improve the OSGCS.  
An open-source GCS could be developed as a one-size-fits-all GCS.  The OSGCS 
could be a model for such a system, but this system should be open for multiple vendors 
to compete to support the entire system or components of the system.  This would allow 
the advantages of commonality while encouraging competition and innovation. 
The disadvantage of a one-size-fits-all approach to UAS GCS is the tradeoffs that 
must be made.  If every UAS needed to use the GCS, then it would optimize a common 
solution to all UAS needs.  No individual system would be optimized, as compromises 
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would need to be agreed to by all programs.  In the same manner that manned aircraft 
have differences, UASs may have enough differences to make a single system an 
unacceptable solution. 
A common GCS could allow the operator to control those functions of 
interoperable air vehicles that are deemed as common functions.  Table 2 shows common 
functions as well as vehicle or payload specific functions as defined by STANAG 4586.  
Control of common functions could be allocated to a common GCS or an LOI of 4 could 
be the benchmark, allowing the use of compliant GCSs to control compliant air vehicles. 
Table 2. Common versus Vehicle-Specific Functions of UAS 
This table lists UAS functions that are typically considered common to all UAS as well as those considered 




Commonality requirements could be achieved by implementing a common 
subsystem.  If GCSs used the same display subsystem, commonality would be improved.  
However, interoperability of these GCSs would not change.  Using a single-source 
proprietary display could result in a monopoly, and the idea of effective use of 
acquisition resources may not be realized. 
Interoperability could be achieved without commonality.  If interoperability is 
indeed the driver for the memo from USD(AT&L), then commonality may not be 
required.  However interchangeable parts, components, or subsystems could enable 
interoperability of systems.  Moreover commonality in GCSs could reduce the 
duplication of efforts in development.  It could also lead to an economy of scale through 
larger production runs of common components and systems.  
C. ELEMENTS INFLUENCING COMMONALITY AND 
INTEROPERABILITY 
In order to better understand the problem, a number of elements influencing 
commonality and interoperability in UAS GCSs were identified.  These elements are 
considered to have significant roles in the ability to achieve commonality and 
interoperability in GCSs.  Once the elements were adequately explored, the list was 
scoped down in Chapter IV for further analysis in the latter portions of the report. 
1. Airframe Size and Groupings 
UASs are currently categorized into five groupings per the Joint UAS (JUAS) 
Center of Excellence (COE) [JCS, 2006].  These groupings are based on weight, 
operating altitude, and speed of the air vehicle.  Group 1 UASs are relatively small 
systems that operate at lower altitudes and slower airspeeds than other groups.  Group 1 
systems are usually operated directly by the unit that requires the video or imagery.  
Group 2 systems are heavier, operate at altitudes higher than Group 1, and have payloads 
that are more capable.  Group 3 systems are even heavier, up to 1320 pounds, and can 
operate up to 18,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL).  Group 4 systems weigh more than 
1320 pounds, and fly up to 18,000 feet MSL.  Group 5 UASs fly above 18,000 feet 
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[USMC Combat Development Command, 2009].  Table 3 shows this data in a tabular 
form. 
Table 3. UAS Categorization in Groups 
This table shows the UAS category based on speed, weight and altitude.  Group 1 includes the small 
handheld UASs, while Group 5 includes the large high-altitude UASs.  Table after [USMC Combat 












Group 1 0-20 < 1200 AGL 100 
WASP III, TACMAV, RQ-
14A/B, BUSTER, 
BATCAM, RQ-11B, 
FPASS, RQ-16A, Pointer, 
Aqua/Terra Puma 
Group 2 21-55 < 3500 AGL 
< 250 
ScanEagle, Silver Fox, 
Aerosonde 
Group 3 < 1320 
< 18,000 MSL 
STUAS, RQ-7B, RQ-15, 
XPV-1, XPV-2 
Group 4 
> 1320 Any Airspeed 
MQ-5B, MQ-8B, MQ-
1A/B/C 
Group 5 > 18,000 MSL UCAS, MQ-9A, RQ-4, RQ-4N 
 
Group 1 UASs are often launched by hand or rail and operate LOS with the unit 
that launched it.  Figure 8 shows an example of a GCS for this type of UAS.  This 
particular GCS can operate a Raven or Wasp UAS.  Group 1 UASs benefit from a 
handheld GCS.  Such a system enables a unit to carry both the air vehicle and the GCS 
along until the system needs to be deployed.  If a larger, common GCS were mandated, it 
could reduce the mobility of the unit and increase its chance of detection.  It would also 
increase the manpower requirements of the handheld UAS.  For example, a vehicle 
installed GCS may be overkill for Group 1 UASs.  The benefits of commonality may well 




Larger UASs, especially those in Groups 4 and 5, are able to operate in both LOS 
and OTH modes of communication.  Because of the air vehicle size and payload 
capabilities, larger vehicles often require both a remote pilot and a sensor operator.  
Chapter II.E shows some examples of larger UAS GCSs.  Such GCSs are not 
man-portable.  They are installed in either a vehicle or a structure.  These systems are 
envisioned to be in operation for many years.  They also carry larger LCC than those in 
Group 1.  Small gains in efficiencies or small reductions in costs could translate to large 
benefits if commonality and interoperability are applied to the large UASs. 
Requiring a common GCS to operate with all UASs, regardless of size or 
grouping, may be counter-productive.  The requirements and capabilities of a Group 5 
UAS will dictate a GCS with greater capabilities than a Group 2 UAS.  For this reason, a 
Group 5 GCS will have extra features that a Group 2 GCS does not require.  UAS 
capabilities should be considered along with the potential benefits of commonality.  
Commonality involves compromise, and what works for a Group 2 UAS may provide 
insufficient capability for a Group 5 UAS.   
2. Air Vehicle Control versus Mission Specific Payload Control 
 As identified in STANAG 4586, discussed in Chapter II.C, each UAS has five 
distinct elements: the air vehicle element, the payload element, the data link element, the 
GCS element, and the launch and recovery element.  Three of these five elements address 
air vehicle functions.  These are the air vehicle element, the payload element, and the 
launch and recovery element.  This section addresses how commonality may affect 
control of the air vehicle portion of the UAS, including the launch and recovery element 
and the payload element.     
The air vehicle control element can be impacted by commonality through 
identifying common or standard interfaces between the air vehicle and the GCS.  This 
will also lead to increased interoperability.  The payload element can be impacted by 
commonality in the same way.  The most direct element that could be common that 
would impact both the air vehicle control and the payload element is the data link 
element.  It would require both the air vehicle control and the payload element to utilize 
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message traffic that has been standardized.  However, this common standardization may 
require additional hardware and software on the GCS and the air vehicle to be able to 
convert it to and from the common message traffic.  Standardized message traffic has 
been identified in STANAG 4586.  STANAG 4586 contains appendices that address 
standards for interoperability.  One addresses the Data Link Interface (DLI) and the other 
addresses the Command and Control Interface (CCI).  The standardization of the CCI is 
intended to achieve interoperability between the UAS and the C4I users.  There is no 
standardization to allow mission specific payload message traffic to be interoperable, so 
there is less leverage for commonality from a mission payload standpoint.  Commonality 
could be leveraged to achieve interoperable CCI.              
The 2003 NDIA report identified issues for the air vehicle control interfaces that 
currently exist with respect to commonality: 
 UAV CONOPS are inconsistent in their approach to AV C2 interfaces 
 No formalized C2 specific requirements 
 UAV manufacturers have proprietary data concerns 
 Compatibility with external interfaces has not been established 
 Adaptability to future systems is not embedded 
 Backward-compatibility has not been addressed 
 C2 interface training is different for each UAV  
For current UASs, the air vehicle control interface is exclusively located at the GCS for 
each system.  Therefore, these challenges must be addressed in the GCS design.   
The 2003 NDIA report also identified the following issues for the mission specific 
payload interfaces that currently exist with respect to commonality: 
 Payload controllers see only their payloads 




 Mechanism for communicating with payloads is unique for almost all existing 
platforms 
 Payload contention for vehicle control addressed by human operators 
 Information assurance limited to encryption and human judgment 
 Bandwidth issues are generally static 
 Any platform-platform interactions within constraints imposed by the 
communications links, doctrine, and CONOPS are human-mediated  
The report specifically identifies that “Tasking is disjoint for all payloads.  There is no 
standard method…for making generic requests for information” [NDIA, 2003]. 
While there are many benefits that can be achieved with commonality in the air 
vehicle control and mission specific payload domains, there are still many challenges 
associated with each respective domain.  However, based upon the current 
standardization that has already been addressed with the STANAG 4586, it is anticipated 
that the air vehicle control interface is more likely to benefit from commonality efforts at 
this time.   
3. Human-Machine Interface 
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for UASs consists of the controls and 
displays that the operators use to interact with the system.  Controls and displays with a 
common functional and physical architecture provide progress towards meeting the tenets 
of the ADM. “We can provide flexibility to adapt the man-machine interface for specific 
Military Service‟s Concepts of Operations while maintaining commonality on the 
underlying architecture and computing hardware….These improvements can also reduce 
training requirements, decrease training time, and increase the pool of UAS 
pilots/operators” [USD(AT&L), 2009]. 
Some UASs may not be a good candidate for common GCS controls and displays.  
For instance, small hand-launched UAVs may require a simple handheld remote 
conrtroller and a laptop computer for sensor display.  It is unlikely that the WASP (0.7 
pounds) controls and displays would provide the required functionality for BAMS 
 
46 
(32,000 pounds).  Additionally, fixed wing UAS controls may not work for rotary winged 
UASs. 
Controls may consist of a joystick, keyboard, mouse, trackball, and in some cases 
foot pedals and throttles.  All of these controls may not be required and are dependent 
upon the UAS mission and type.  All GCSs pass commands to UAVs via one of two 
different methods.  The first method is the legacy controlled technique where a pilot 
makes control corrections on a throttle and joystick and these control positions are 
transmitted to the UAV and provided as the inputs to the UAV flight control surfaces.  
The second method is the newer directed technique where a waypoint is transmitted to 
the UAV and the onboard flight control computer determines and commands the control 
surface changes necessary for the UAV to intercept the waypoint.  UAVs that are 
directed, vice controlled, do not have a joystick or foot pedals.  This leads to the 
conclusion that all GCS controls may not be able to be common.  For example, some 
UAVs can be commanded by remote control type controllers, as shown in Figure 15.  
This type of specialty control may not be a good candidate for a common control and 
would only work for specific UAVs.  Additionally, control inputs for directed UAVs 
could be accepted from touch screen displays, blurring the line between controls and 




Figure 15. Remote Control used on British Army Hermes 450 UAV GCS  
The red circle highlights a remote control type controller such as could be used to control a model 
airplane.  This is one type of control that is present in some unmanned systems.  Figure after [IHS (Global) 
Limited, 2009]. 
 
As discussed, there are currently different methods of implementing the pilot 
HMI.   Some GCSs, such as that of Predator and Reaper, have a controlling type pilot 
interface.  That is, the interface is designed to give the air vehicle operator the feel and 
display of being in a cockpit.  The air vehicle is issued commands through a stick and 
throttle system actually sending flight system controls to pitch, roll, and yaw the aircraft 
like a pilot would in a cockpit of a traditional aircraft.  A visual display, such as in 
General Atomics‟ new Advanced Cockpit Ground Control System, “expands the 
operators‟ field of view to 120 degrees from 30 degrees with a panoramic synthetic view 
generated by software from a military mapping server,” simulating the view a pilot would 
see out the cockpit window if the operator was there [Jean, 2009].  Similarly, Raytheon 
Corporations‟ new Common Ground Control System is “laid out in a cockpit-like 
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configuration” and “three wide-screen displays give pilots and sensor operators a 120-
degree view of the battlefield” [Jean, 2009].  
As previously mentioned, a completely different type of HMI for UAVs is 
command by direction, which is currently used by the USAF Global Hawk and planned 
in the USN BAMS UAS.  This newer directed method of command input allows the user 
to set desired states of the aircraft, such as altitude, course, and airspeed.  It is more 
likened to flying the UAS through an autopilot.  Whereas in a controlled type interface, 
the pilot pulls the stick back to gain altitude and then pushes it forward to level off, in a 
directed type interface, the pilot simply sets the desired altitude, sends the command to 
the UAV and the vehicle computes all the inputs to the control surfaces including rates, 
and maneuvers itself to get to the desired altitude.  This allows less hands-on control and 
more monitoring and usually allows the user to set waypoints (positions in 3-D space) 
that the air vehicle will fly to as a course.   
Another area that is different between the two types of systems is in the terminal 
area (the phase of flight near the ground, both takeoff and landing).  A controlled UAV 
uses GCS stick-and-rudder commands to takeoff and land and usually provides pilots 
with a camera view of the runway in front of them to takeoff and land manually.  A 
directed type system will direct the UAV to the runway, and once there, issue a takeoff 
command, where the UAV will do all of its own control adjustments to maintain its pre-
planned takeoff route while the pilot monitors its progress.  These are two dramatically 
different approaches to the takeoff and landing phases of flight. 
The DoN is going down the path of a directed point-and-click interface.  RDML 
William Shannon, Program Executive Office Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons 
(PEO(U&W)) noted, “When you say GCS, many folks picture a piece of hardware.  For 
the USAF, it really is a cockpit on the ground.  But we don‟t fly our UASs.  None that we 
have or are planning have any stick-and-rudder type of flight-it's preplanned or point and 
click” [Warwick & Chavanne, 2009].  As this report examines areas of commonality 
across UASs, the GCS operating system will be a key element.  RDML Shannon 
highlights the DoN philosophy on GCSs: “Really, it ought to be thought of as a software 
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application that can operate on any platform, from consoles to handhelds.  This thing we 
call a GCS is really a GCS application you‟d be able to employ on multiple hardware 
platforms.  That‟s where we‟d like to go” [Warwick & Chavanne, 2009]. 
When it comes to displays, an example of a GCS using commercial, militarized, 
and rack mounted displays is shown in Figure 16.    The standard commercial displays 
are highlighted with a red border.  The militarized and rack mounted displays consist of 
two larger displays, one over the other, and two smaller displays shown side by side.  
This demonstrates a lack of hardware commonality in that even within a single GCS, the 
operator can use three different display types. 
 
Figure 16. Predator Ground Control Station  
Inside a Predator ground control station at Creech Air Force Base showing commercial monitors and rack 
mounted militarized monitor.  Figure after [IHS (Global) Limited, 2009]. 
 
Another HMI consideration is the way data is displayed to the operator.  
Displayed data can conform to the common symbology contained in MIL-STD-2525C: 
Common Warfighting Symbology [DoD, 2008].  One of the problems with 
MIL-STD-2525C is that it was originally published in 1994 and was designed for older 
displays with low resolutions.  The updates to the standard have not kept pace with the 
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technological advances realized by newer high definition displays.  Using a common 
symbology can enhance training commonality between different UASs.  An example of 
common symbology from MIL-STD-2525C is shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Examples of Common Symbology  
This graphic shows standard identities for common sensor contacts.  Red denotes hostile or suspect, yellow 
denotes pending or unknown, blue is friend and green is neutral.  Figure from [DoD, 2008]. 
 
Additional considerations when discussing common HMI for GCSs include 
nonstandard control and display solutions such as Helmet Mounted Displays (HMDs).  
HMDs were considered by the DoD and quickly discounted due to the added complexity 
and the likelihood for motion sickness, eye strain, and disorientation.  This was 
determined during a 2004 experiment at the Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 
which evaluated UAV operators wearing an HMD versus using a conventional computer 
joystick to perform sensor target search tasks.  “The subjects‟ ability to place the cursor 
on a target of interest (targeting accuracy) was significantly better in the computer 
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monitor condition than the HMD.  The distance at which subjects could classify an 
object‟s identity was also significantly better in the computer monitor condition.  
Subjective measures showed no overall differences for self-reported fatigue, workload, 
and situational awareness.  A significant disadvantage, however, was found for the HMD 
with respect to self-reported nausea, disorientation, and oculomotor strain” [Morphew, 
Shively, and Casey, 2004]. 
The previously mentioned HMI considerations must be taken into account when 
discussing a common UAS GCS.  Many of the variations in HMI aspects of GCSs 
manifest themselves as challenges when looking for a common interface. 
4. Hardware and Software Combination 
The GAO report titled Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help 
Address Emerging Challenges cites:  
The services have generally been reluctant to adopt common mission 
management systems or other interoperability approaches within similar 
types or classes of UAVs.  As a result, it appears that some UAVs may not 
be fully interoperable with other UAVs, with manned aircraft systems, or 
even with conventional forces.  For example, in certain instances ground 
forces have not been linked to or able to utilize data generated by other 
services‟ UAVs.  Each service has tended to initiate its own separate 
development program, specifically tailored to its own requirements, rather 
than adopting an existing capability from another service.  The DoD is 
aware of this problem and has taken some steps to address it.  For 
example, the DoD is evaluating several areas, including vehicle 
development, training, and data sharing, to determine if improvements in 
these areas will increase UAV interoperability. [GAO, March 2005]   
While vehicle development, training, and data sharing are being addressed to determine if 
improvements in these areas will increase UAV interoperability, it is evident that the 
DoD will need to evaluate the hardware and software combinations to achieve that goal.  
However, a challenge for common hardware or software for the DoD is a result of unique 
requirements for each service.   
The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (JUCAS) program was initiated as a 
USAF and USN program for attack of land targets:   
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Concerned about the accelerated schedule and a lack of synergy in the 
separate Air Force and Navy efforts, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
officials intervened to reconcile requirements and funding challenges and 
to improve oversight.  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
was designated to lead the joint demonstration program with Air Force 
and Navy participation.  Plans and strategy established a $4 billion 
demonstration program that would develop larger versions of the Air 
Force and Navy prototypes, leading to an operational assessment in 2007.  
A common operating system was to be developed and both versions were 
expected to also share common subsystems and weapons.  The intent was 
to then offer alternatives to the services leading to possible start-up of 
systems development in 2010.  Although not clear at this time <2005>, 
program direction and content appears to be again changing.  Congress 
reduced fiscal year 2005 funding, stating that the program had not 
properly coordinated with the services and that the focus should be on 
meeting Air Force and Navy requirements. [GAO, March 2005] 
Even with a proposed common operating system, the services found their respective 
requirements were not being met.  The USAF pulled out of the program and “redirected 
its development efforts towards a larger, stealthy high-altitude unmanned platform.”  The 
USN decided to “continue with a more „traditional‟ Unmanned Combat Air System 
(UCAS) design” [Hewson, 2006].  Even when common hardware and software are 
products of a program, the services find they do not meet their requirements.   
A 2003 NDIA common UAV architecture study analyzed this problem and 
identified some challenges associated with commonality.  For the processor architecture, 
the NDIA identified the following issues with respect to commonality: 
 Few common operational interfaces 
 No universal conversion standards 
 Little backward-compatibility except within family 
 No multi-level security 
 Little common software 
 Few universal external interfaces  
These issues, whether or not they were allocated to software or hardware, would need to 
be addressed in order to achieve commonality.  The report recommended “developing 
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hardware independent software using open hardware/software architectures, standards 
and COTS products” [NDIA, 2003].  
Discussions of a common or interoperable GCS must take into consideration the 
manifestation of the commonality.  Decisions must be made whether hardware 
commonality, software commonality, or both are required to achieve the goals of the 
DoD.   
5. Implementation through Retrofit or New Acquisition 
To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and the 
DoD have required more commonality among UASs.   GAO has recommended “that 
before initiating new unmanned aircraft development programs, the Secretary should 
require the services to demonstrate in their acquisition plans and strategies that they are 
taking an open systems approach and that the potential for commonality has been 
rigorously examined” [GAO, 2009].  Therefore it is assumed that future development will 
be required to meet some minimum level of commonality and interoperability.  
As common components and subsystems transition from development into 
production, new UAS programs should require their incorporation.  The use of 
off-the-shelf and non-development items should be required as well.  Initial engineering 
development models should be delivered with common components and tested for 
performance and interoperability [Van Dyke, 1990].  In this manner future UAS GCSs 
can be designed for commonality.   
Many options exist for those GCSs already fielded and operational.  Forced 
retrofit, requiring all GCSs to adopt the common components or systems, would be the 
most extreme option.  Block upgrades could be conducted, taking smaller groups of 
GCSs and upgrading them to the new common design.  Individual GCSs could be made 
common by attrition. In this case, as systems fail, they could be reconfigured to a 
common system.  Introduction of common components and modules into the supply 
system would be another method of achieving commonality by attrition.  As individual 
components fail, common components and subsystems could be identified as preferred 
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spare parts for replacement.  Finally, there is the option to do nothing with systems that 
are already fielded and focus solely on new acquisition.  Systems already fielded or far 
enough in development may be left as-is until their retirement due to unplanned cost 
increases. 
As stated, forced retrofit would be the most extreme option.  It would ensure the 
maximum level of interoperability in the minimum time.  The benefits of commonality or 
interoperability may not be sufficient to offset the cost of a forced retrofit.  Negative 
transfer on such systems could also be expected.   
Negative transfer occurs when training on one system interferes with the learning 
of another.  Habits in a legacy UAS could be applied to the new system.  Personnel who 
operated legacy GCSs could be expected to rely on years of experience with those 
systems, even if that experience was no longer relevant after the retrofit.  This situation is 
worst when displays and interfaces between the two are similar, and when similar actions 
on the legacy system have very different consequences in the new one [Lydall & 
Wickens, 2005]. 
At the first opportunity, modifying GCSs during scheduled or unscheduled 
maintenance would eventually achieve commonality over time.  Often this is the DoD‟s 
preferred method of implementing change because of its low cost and the timing of 
modifications [Crowder, 1992].  
Modification by attrition would take an even longer time to fully implement 
compared to first opportunity.  Only when systems or components fail would they be 
modified to a more common configuration.  Systems or components with high reliability 
may take years to fail.  However, the impact to the end user is minimal.  Only when the 
system has a failure, and is thus already non-operational, is it taken off-line for 
modification. 
Modification by attrition or first opportunity may increase the risk of negative 
transfer.  Since systems are not all changed at once, it is possible for an operator or 
maintainer to work on one configuration one day, and another soon after.  Training in the 
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new configuration would be required, and human error could increase as personnel rely 
on the way they initially learned the system. 
UAS programs already in development have spent large amounts of money 
developing GCSs with more under contract.  Major changes to these GCSs may carry a 
large price tag.  It may be more beneficial to finish these systems and leverage lessons 
learned from legacy and new systems.  On the other hand, the number of proprietary 
GCSs continues to grow.  With no concern for commonality, the problem will only get 
worse.  Directives are in place and the services need to respond.  Doing nothing is not an 
acceptable option. 
6. Department of Defense Multiservice Cooperation 
As stated within FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, “…the 
Roadmap lays out a vision in terms of potential missions that could be performed by 
unmanned systems, the desired functionality and performance needed by the systems to 
perform those missions, and the technology advancements needed to achieve such 
performance” [OSD, 2009].  It is in this document that the Office the Secretary of 
Defense‟s vision is communicated for UASs.  This vision addresses the following areas 
[OSD, 2007]: 
 Conducting a more integrated approach to identifying how unmanned systems 
can be optimized to support a greater set of mission areas 
 Identifying those common areas of technology maturation that can lead to 
performance improvements in all domains 
 Identifying the technology enablers needed to foster the ability to conduct 
collaborative operations between multiple unmanned systems in multiple 
domains 
Areas well suited for commonality will be investigated as a candidate for 
implementation.  By identifying those common technology areas for the common GCS, a 
more integrated approach to supporting a greater set of mission areas can be achieved. 
As the OSD Roadmap states, UASs can perform persistent Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), a capability that fleet commanders have never 
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had before.  “They can be rapidly and dynamically re-tasked to other areas with a higher 
priority, and are currently enjoying tremendous freedom of action in uncontested 
airspace. Because of this, UASs are proliferating throughout the theater of operations 
supporting both the JFC and ground combatant commanders. To shape their battle space 
and make decisions affecting the outcome of their engagements, commanders at all levels 
require situational understanding and UASs can provide a variety of these components. 
They increase the situational awareness (SA) of commanders through intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition” [OSD, 2009].   
However, all DoD services do not utilize UASs in the same manner.  Each service 
will employ a UAS to meet its specific operational needs.  “All four Services employ 
multiple UASs for a variety of tasks and missions including fleet, perimeter security, 
tactical surveillance, weapons spotting, targeting, and weapons guidance, as well as a 
host of other unit mission-specific tasks” [OSD, 2009].  Although there are similar UASs 
across the DoD, each service will utilize their UASs in a unique manner to meet their 
specific operational needs.  This lack of a common joint operational concept is one of the 
challenges of creating a common UAS GCS.   
The NDIA 2003 report that presented challenges with commonality also identified 
CONOPS as an issue associated with commonality across the DoD services. “There are 
no inherent forces driving towards Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
commonality....Operators will employ the delivered capabilities of each system to meet 
their training and warfighting requirements, and while similarities will be apparent, there 
is no driving need for CONOPS commonality across inherently different systems” 
[NDIA, 2003].  Although some DoD groups have been working toward a common UAS 
CONOPS since the NDIA report was released in 2003, all the services must agree and 
adhere to these CONOPS before true commonality can ensue.  A specific example of the 
commonality challenge across the DoD services is the Predator and Sky Warrior case 
presented in Chapter I.C.   
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7. United States and Allied Cooperation 
NATO UAS operations originated during the mid-1990s.  “Unmanned aircraft 
presence in the Balkans theater of operations dates back to 1994.  In 1995, U.S. Predators 
flew operationally for the first time over Bosnia.  In October and November of 1998 U.S. 
Air Force RQ-1 Predators flying from Hungary supported the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verification mission over Kosovo.  The German 
Army followed with CL-289 drones, based in Macedonia.  Soon afterwards several other 
NATO countries deployed their own assets” [Saiz & Lewandowski, 2008].  
“Efficient utilization of the capabilities provided by the different unmanned 
systems proved to be challenging with, in some instances, a tendency for 
micromanagement by senior commanders.  Every single unmanned mission over the 
Balkans had to be included in the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) with the consequent 
difficulties of coordination.  Another important obstacle to overcome was de-confliction.  
The situation got even more complicated after the deployment of KFOR and the 
increased helicopter and air transport activities” [Saiz & Lewandowski, 2008].  
Currently, interoperability between UASs within a single nation does not exist, let 
alone interoperability between multinational UASs.  “In an attempt to address the 
problem of interoperability between nodes in a multinational UAV network, the NATO 
STANAG 4586 was created to address standard interfaces of UAV control systems.  In 
its second edition, STANAG 4586 was conceptualized to promote interoperability 
between one or more control stations, UAVs and their payloads, and the C4I network, 
particularly in joint operational settings.  STANAG 4586 attempts to accomplish this 
through implementing „standard interfaces‟, which should not be confused with HCI.  
The standard interfaces are essentially communication message sets between the vehicle 
and a control station” [Cummings, Kirschbaum, Sulmistras, and Platts, 2006]. 
The need for UAS interoperability among NATO Alliance members is understood 
and accepted.  The implementation of this standard has begun. “Several vehicles have 
flown using STANAG software hosted on the Common Data Link (CDL) Systems 
Vehicle Control Station, including Silver Fox (Advanced Ceramics Research), 
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Grasshopper (Xiphos), Warrior - Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) (General 
Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI)), Kingfisher (BAE Systems), and Shadow 
and Pioneer (AAI) are to be flown within the year.  The USN is implementing STANAG 
4586 through the Raytheon Tactical Control Station (TCS) for the VTUAV RQ-8B Fire 
Scout” [Cummings, et al., 2006].  
 “STANAG 4586 is the only standard that exists to promote interoperability 
across a command and control network of unmanned aerial vehicles.  Such standards are 
needed to truly „flatten‟ the battlefield such that communications between allied forces 
occur without the significant uncertainty and technical difficulties that exist in joint 
operations today.  The flexibility is lost when designing a system to a standard can be 
countered both with reduced costs and reduced degrees of freedom for uncertainty.  This 
is particularly true when humans are in a supervisory control loop because introducing a 
standard clearly identifies boundaries.  Moreover, introduction of interoperability 
standards aids in simplifying the design process, as well as the operation of these 
complex systems” [Cummings, et al., 2006]. 
“The optimum synergy among the various national UAVs deployed requires close 
coordination and the ability to quickly task available UAV assets, the ability to mutually 
control the air vehicles and their payloads, as well as rapid dissemination of the resultant 
information at different command echelons.  This requires the employed UAV systems to 
be interoperable.  In order to enable interoperability for UAV systems the implementation 
of standards for key system interfaces and functions is required.  These standards are laid 
down in a number of existing or emerging NATO STANAGs and generally applied 
commercial standards documents” [Saiz & Lewandowski, 2008].   
NATO has attempted to implement some commonality standards, reiterating the 
fact that commonality and interoperability between the United States and Allied countries 
must be a consideration when discussing UAS GCSs. 
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D. AREAS IMPACTED BY COMMONALITY AND INTEROPERABILITY 
The previous section explored some of the elements that affect the capability to 
achieve commonality and interoperability in UAS GCSs.  This section examines the areas 
that are impacted if commonality and interoperability are achieved.  These system areas 
cover a wide range of topics including: logistical elements, cost, and mission capability.  
1. Training 
There are several advantages from commonality that are applicable to training. 
Some advantages are consolidation of training courses and materials, increased reuse of 
training materials, and shorter retraining times that can focus on proficiency for 
assignments to common systems. 
Consolidation of ground training courses and materials, as well as training 
material reuse, has been demonstrated by the F-35 JSF program.  Lockheed Martin 
Corporation is building a training center at Eglin Air Force Base, FL, which will be used 
by all JSF pilots and maintainers.  According to Peter Walker, project manager for 
Lockheed Martin simulations, training, and support, “Even though there are three variants 
of the aircraft and nine different countries involved with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
program, 70 percent of the training is common” [Jean, July 2008]. 
Another example of flight and ground training courses and materials as well as 
training material reuse has been demonstrated by the JPATS.  The JPATS is a set of 
primary flight training devices tailored in its design to replace the USAF T-37B and USN 
T-34C aircraft and their associated ground-based training systems.  “JPATS consists of 
the T-6A Texan II air vehicles, simulators and associated ground-based training devices, 
a Training Integration Management System (TIMS), instructional courseware, and 
contractor logistics support.  The Services will acquire common aircraft and the 
remaining components will be as common as possible” [Global Security, 1999]. 
The potential savings in training time and dollars from developing and fielding 
equipment with common attributes is well understood in the commercial world, 
especially where training costs are high, such as for airline flight crews [Held, Newsome, 
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and Lewis, 2008].  Southwest Airlines‟ decision to fly a fleet with a single airframe, the 
Boeing 737, simplifies the training of pilots, maintainers, and flight attendants [Treacy & 
Wiersema, 1994].  This training advantage is so important that the company will reject 
changes that reduce commonality.  For example, “in more recent models of 737s, Boeing 
designed a „glass cockpit‟ with computer screens replacing old fashioned analog dials.  
But in order to maintain interoperability, Southwest asked Boeing to program the new 
displays to look like the „old steam gauge‟ dials and indicators that are so familiar to 
Southwest pilots” [Sheffi, 2005]. 
In 2003, the USAF deputy chief of staff for war-fighting integration prompted an 
NDIA study group to seek recommendations from major UAV platform manufacturers 
on how best to achieve a plug-and-play architecture that would allow multiple unmanned 
aircraft, sensors, mission control, and ground stations to work in a common network.  The 
final report stated that, “Joint, interoperable UAV systems must become the norm for 
operational planning, training and exercises” [Erwin, 2003].  The group also wrote, “The 
Air Operations Center (AOC) is becoming inundated with a proliferation of „tribal‟ 
stovepipes requiring „tribal‟-unique training, configuration-unique electronics and 
software, and an ever-increasing AOC bandwidth load and ground station logistics 
footprint” [NDIA, 2003]. 
The U.S. Army has started to implement within-service commonality for UAS 
ground stations, which has had a positive effect on operator training.  The U.S. Army 
flies all of its unmanned aircraft with the One System Ground Control Station (OSGCS), 
a technology that can command different vehicles with a common data link.  Being able 
to fly any of the unmanned aircraft systems using the same interface reduces the training 
time for operators, says Maj. Robert Kadavy, an action officer in the aviation directorate 
at U.S. Army MQ-1C Sky Warrior headquarters [Jean, December 2008]. 
Training cost savings achieved through commonality are well understood.  The 
extent of these savings depends on the specifics of the program.  The extent of 
commonality in the HMI systems will directly affect the cost savings for operator 
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training, while the extent of commonality in hardware systems will directly affect the 
savings for maintainer training. 
2. Basing 
Commonality can improve basing within the DoD in several key areas.  Basing 
focuses primarily on locations for operational and logistical placement of centers in 
support of land and amphibious or sea basing doctrines.  From the operational standpoint, 
commonality would focus on centralized air vehicle control centers and geographically 
co-located launch and recovery sites.  From the logistical standpoint, commonality would 
focus on locations of repair centers, storage facilities, and training centers [USMC 
Combat Development Command, 2009].  Even synergies of different systems with partial 
common elements or components can contribute to some type of beneficial basing 
results.   
Commonality and basing can create several possible improvement areas.  
Commonality can affect basing by encouraging facilities consolidation, which can reduce 
the logistical footprints of an overall system by reducing geographical dispersion, 
consolidating facilities that support the fleet systems (e.g. repair centers, storage 
warehouses, and transportation shipping mechanisms).  Consolidation of training 
facilities and use of similar equipment can also affect basing of common systems by 
enhancing and standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures that can enhance the 
performance of the operator and reduce reaction or response times that can be significant 
to mission success.  These can be easily controlled in a centralized location for training. 
Centralized locations for intelligence gathering, analysis, filing, and distribution 
would be facilitated if UAS GCSs were common.  Intelligence centers can encompass 
real-time intelligence gathering (networking), real-time data sharing between intelligence 
command posts, and provide expedited feedback of battle situational awareness to 
combat commanders. 
Common GCSs, which are also interoperable, can reduce the numbers of launch 
and recovery sites and equipment, reducing required procurement and the LCC of various 
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UASs and their associated support equipment.  This would create focal-point locations in 
operational theaters for maintenance, logistics, launch and recovery equipment, and 
common air vehicle control stations.  However, security of the designated locations and 
facilities needs to be at such a level to prevent damage from enemy attacks.  Successful 
enemy attacks on a common basing approach would be more detrimental to the U.S. 
forces than comparable attacks on distributed basing. 
3. Manpower Requirements 
Commonality influences manpower requirements through improvements in 
training, availability, flexibility, operator quality, capability, and productivity for military 
or contractor personnel required in performing operation and support field activities for 
UASs.  Common UAS GCSs will require a reduced number of UAS training systems by 
enabling flexibility through a common architecture.  A common architecture allows for a 
single UAS ground training system to be reconfigured for multiple UASs.  A reduction in 
the number of UAS training systems will reduce manpower requirements for training.  
Commonality can also enable flexible interchange of personnel at different sea and shore 
UAS sites, which can reduce overall manpower requirements and increase efficiency 
through a common trained force servicing a number of UASs.  Personnel working on the 
same systems ashore and at sea will enable, through common systems, a more flexible 
force. 
“Manpower requirements provide the Navy a dynamic system for planning, 
programming, and budgeting total force manpower resources to support the operating 
forces and the shore establishment under peacetime and wartime conditions” [DoN, 
1998].  Manpower requirements for UASs include: 1) program management, 
development, engineering and logistics, 2) contractor engineering, manufacturing, 
development, and support and, 3) military or contractor operation and support field 
activities. 
Operational UAS GCS manpower requirements include vehicle and sensor 
operators, as well as any analytical support as required.  AVO staffing will be dependent 
on the complexity of the UAS and the number of UASs to be operated.  The most 
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complex UAS will need a highly trained operator with a formal flight-training program 
[Cummings, 2008].  Sensor operators will need a variety of training to operate the 
different sensor suites that include Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR), radar, and Signal 
Intelligence Gathering (SIGINT).  Analytical support for sensor and mission products 
will be provided by outside organizations. 
4. Personnel Assignments 
Commonality influences personnel assignments through improvements in 
training, availability, flexibility, operator quality, capability, and productivity for military 
or contractor personnel required in performing operation and support field activities for 
UASs.  Common UAS GCSs and training systems allow for a reduction in the number of 
billets required for operating and supporting operational and training systems.  Operators 
trained in a common UAS will allow for the same operators to utilize the same equipment 
ashore and at sea, making personnel assignments more flexible and decreasing the need 
for specialized assignments.  Common support realizes the same flexibility and efficiency 
as training and operations. 
Personnel assignments for the USN are managed through the Navy Personnel 
Command (BUPERS).  Management includes assigning Naval Enlisted Classification 
and Naval Officer Classification.  Naval classifications “identify a skill, knowledge, 
aptitude, or qualification…enhancing efficient use of personnel in distribution and 
detailing” [Navy Personnel Command, 2004].  Training and classification supplements 
the total force manpower requirements, but are more specifically targeted to individuals 
and their skill sets. 
As with operator manpower requirements, personnel assignments will include 
both operations and support functions.  New designators should be implemented for the 
operations, but no new major designators need to be required for support functions.  
Cross service support training should be utilized along with new minor designators for 
support functions.  Cross service training decreases the manpower and facilities 
requirements needed for training, which reduces cost. 
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5. Reliability and Maintainability 
Reliability and maintainability (R&M) have well documented effects on 
operational availability and LCC as systems reach maturity.  Maturity in the context of 
this discussion is the point where no more or very little improvement to R&M should be 
expected.  As more operating hours are accumulated at a faster rate due to more total 
users and higher utilization of shared common GCSs, system maturity will be achieved 
sooner.   
Reliability growth rates will be accelerated for common systems because there 
will be increased total numbers of systems fielded and utilization will be higher for 
shared common resources.  The reliability growth is achieved through analysis and 
corrective action for high failure rate components within a system [Smith & Oren].  
MIL-HDBK-189: Reliability Growth Management includes concepts and principles of 
reliability growth, advantages of managing reliability growth, and guidelines and 
procedures used to manage reliability growth.  It allows the development of a plan that 
will aid in developing a final system that meets requirements and lowers the LCC of the 
fielded system [DoD, 1981]. 
There are some negative effects of commonality on the reliability of common 
systems.  Although increased commonality will decrease the number of components that 
need to be developed, complexity may increase if the components need to be more 
flexible or offer additional capabilities [Held, et al., 2008].  Factors such as greater 
complexity from enhanced functionality may lead to increased failure rates and reduced 
reliability for the system. 
Maintainability improvement is a reduction in the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) 
and total Maintenance Man-Hours (MMH).  MTTR and MMH can be reduced much 
faster for common systems because there will be larger total numbers of operators and 
more systems fielded in a shorter period of time.  This reduction is mainly accomplished 
through maturing of maintenance procedures and tools through continuous analysis and 
correction of deficiencies documented by users and testers. 
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6. Other Logistical Areas 
There are several logistics elements not previously mentioned that are affected by 
commonality.  Facilities, technical data, support equipment, and supply support are some 
of the elements for which commonality will have the greatest impact. 
One of the main affects of commonality on facilities other than common basing, 
which has been previously discussed, is the opportunity to utilize a common depot 
facility.  Common depots will result in higher utilization of facilities, tooling, and 
manpower [Catington, Knudson, and Yodis, 2000].  As a result of the 1991 Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC), the U.S. Army and USAF were able to consolidate 
depot repairs for sensors, airborne avionics, electronic warfare equipment, and radios.  
This consolidation of depot repair for common systems resulted in an 83.7 percent 
reduction in depot repair cost for the affected work [Braman, 1997]. 
Commonality allows the use of common technical publications, including 
operator and maintenance manuals.  Common maintenance manuals have advantages 
beyond just reduced total development cost.  Technical manual updates of repurposed 
737NG manuals for the P-8A, which happens periodically for every platform, will be 
shared with commercial common 737NG fleet operators [Figueras, 2007].   
If common systems are designed with common interfaces, there is an opportunity 
to procure and use common support equipment.  A decision was made by the USN to 
integrate a common cockpit into the MH-60S and MH-60R.  The Navy estimates a cost 
avoidance of $80 million on different support equipment and components [PMA-299, 
2009].  
A benefit of having common supply support or spare parts is that the total number 
of spares required to support the fleet can be reduced.  If different operators of a common 
system agree to share a common pool of parts, the total number of spares required can be 
reduced significantly [Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2009].  An example of benefits 
from this type of cooperative agreement has been proven beneficial in the global 
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commercial airline business with the rotable pool of spare parts available to all customers 
that buy the service [Gill, 2003]. 
There are at least two disadvantages of having common spare parts.  These 
disadvantages include finding major design defects that exist in the parts that may ground 
or significantly restrict an entire fleet, and obsolescence of common parts, which could 
create a shortage of parts within the supply chain.  If one part is defective or becomes 
obsolete, it affects every system in the inventory that uses that part. 
7. Cost 
When commonality is considered, the most frequently stated benefit is reduced 
cost.  Costs associated with commonality not already discussed in other sections include 
Research and Development (R&D) cost, procurement cost, and inventory storage cost. 
Although increased commonality will decrease the number of components that 
need to be developed, the development costs may increase if the component needs to be 
more flexible or offer additional capabilities [Held, et al., 2008].  An example of this is 
the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) that was 
developed in the 1980s.  Initially, the USAF and the U.S. Army were pursuing separate 
programs for an airborne radio, each with its own R&D costs.  The initial cost was 
estimated to be $13.7 million for the U.S. Army and $32 million for the USAF.  The cost 
of adding USAF requirements into the U.S. Army program was estimated to be $16 to 
$22 million, for an overall savings of $10 to $16 million arising from a reduction in the 
number of R&D efforts, despite a higher total overall R&D cost [GAO, 1985].  If a 
component can be common with one that is already available, development costs can be 
very low or even zero.  The U.S. Marine Corps was able to use the U.S. Army‟s Shadow 
as “a „100 percent‟ solution” to their need for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition capabilities without any service-unique modifications [GAO, 2009].  The U.S. 
Marine Corps was able to avoid the $180 million development cost and leveraged 
existing production facilities, which reduced program risk and cost significantly. 
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The relative magnitude of economies of scale and purchasing power compared 
with excess capability will determine the net impact of parts costs [Held, et al., 2008].  
Common components offer a decrease in unit costs as a result of production economies of 
scale.  For instance, procurement savings for the USN MH-60S and MH-60R common 
cockpit is expected to be $105.8 million [PMA-299, 2009].  Greater commonality can 
also allow for greater purchasing power and increased competition among vendors for a 
common part as a result of the higher volume.  However, costs do not necessarily 
decrease.  Common components provide excess functionality.  For instance, one 
transportation vehicle manufacturer decided that a common electric cable design for both 
low-end and high-end items was too costly to field on the low-end products [Nobelius & 
Sundgren, 2002].  An uncommon part was fielded, resulting in a nearly 50 percent 
reduction in parts costs. 
Inventory holding cost is the cost of carrying one unit of inventory for a period of 
time.  Holding cost is the sum of capital cost, handling cost, storage cost, obsolescence 
cost, and other costs such as theft and damage.  The cost of storing and handling the 
inventory may be opportunity costs in that a reduction in costs would not be realized 
unless distribution facilities and personnel associated with handling were reduced.  Use 
of common components among different systems with different life cycles may result in 
decreasing obsolescence costs.  An increase in the number of common components is 
expected to decrease the number of units held in inventory.  This change arises from 
increased risk pooling and reduced relative variability of demands.  Net inventory cost, 
however, may either decrease or increase, depending on the unit price effect.  Careful 
consideration of the relative magnitudes of these costs is important [Held, et al., 2008].   
When determining whether to implement commonality, all of the elements must 
be considered. A business case analysis that considers all of the advantages and 
disadvantages of commonality is appropriate. 
8. Mission Capability  
Mission capabilities within multiple theaters of warfare can be improved and 
exploited by the use of common and interoperable systems in conjunction with common 
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tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment.  If a common and interoperable GCS were 
developed, it must be able to support all missions that are currently being conducted in 
theater of operations and also support the future growth of mission capabilities.  If the 
GCS did not support certain mission threads, stovepiped stations would be developed 
instead and would defeat the purpose of commonality.  All mission scenarios and 
capabilities of UASs must be initially identified. 
If a common GCS is to be developed to support all or most possible mission 
scenarios, a user-needs assessment must be conducted to rank the highest to lowest 
priorities of current and future mission threads and concepts.  This will allow the systems 
engineer to concentrate on the must-haves of system functionality and deliver to the user 
what they need for mission success.  If the systems engineering principles are not 
conducted properly when determining the key attributes and requirements of a common 
GCS, attempting to accomplish the multitude of required UAS missions and capabilities 




IV. PROBLEM SCOPING 
The research effort by the JUCCS team generated information spanning a wide 
breadth of material associated with the UAS community.  Completing the efforts 
described in later sections of the paper required limiting the scope of the focus area to 
identify a subset of the problem space that could be addressed with limited time and 
resources of this project.   
The first scoping effort limited the problem area to a subset of the elements 
influencing commonality and interoperability described in Chapter III.C.  For each of the 
elements, the team chose a few particular aspects of UAS GCS commonality and 
interoperability based on an understanding of those areas, quality and quantity of 
available information, and the feedback received from stakeholders as to their interest 
areas.  The list below summarizes the selections made by the team for further 
investigation with respect to elements affecting commonality, they aided the JUCCS team 
in production of the functional architecture described in latter sections of the paper: 
 Airframe Size and Groupings - Limit scope to Groups 3 and above.  
o Mission and operational procedures for Group 3 and above UASs share 
much more in common than Groups 1 and 2 (small UASs).  Eliminating 
the smaller systems allows a more in-depth concentration on larger UASs. 
 
 Air Vehicle Control versus Mission Specific Payload - Explore commonality 
and interoperability for air vehicle control functions only. 
o Payloads for UASs are very specific to the mission of the aircraft.  These 
missions may vary greatly depending on the nature of the need.  Air 
vehicle command and control, however, shares many common functions 
regardless of the aircraft mission and payload.  For this reason, the scope 
will be limited to air vehicle control functions to maximize the impact of 
the proposed architecture. 
 
 Human-Machine Interface - Examine common HMI for air vehicle control 
functions only. 
o Commonality from a human machine interface standpoint will be limited 
to ensure adequate resources for a thorough study.  The functional focus of 
the proposed architecture will be limited to air vehicle control, so the HMI 






 Hardware and Software - Hardware and software allocation is not required. 
o The study will limit scope to functional level.  Since no physical 
allocations will be determined, differentiation between software and 
hardware functions is not required. 
 
 Implementation through Retrofit or New Production - Consider implementing 
the proposed functional architecture on new production assets only, retrofit 
will not be explored. 
o Limiting scope to new production assets will allow greater strides to be 
taken in implementation of a common architecture.  Requiring retrofit of 
existing systems would limit the capability to implement new common 
functions in the architecture due to current system limitations. 
 
 Department of Defense Multiservice Cooperation - Concentrate on 
Department of Navy systems and requirements. 
o The first step in achieving commonality across the DoD is to ensure some 
commonality within the individual services.  Since this objective is not 
currently attained within the Navy, this study will limit the focus to 
Department of Navy systems. 
 
 United States and Allied Cooperation - Limit scope to U.S. only. 
o The first step in achieving commonality across allied forces is to ensure 
commonality within the U.S. DoD.  Since this objective is not currently 
attained, this study will focus on U.S. systems only as a possible stepping 
stone for future allied commonality. 
The second scoping effort limited the JUCCS benefit analysis to a subset of the 
areas impacted by commonality and interoperability described in Chapter III.D.  The list 
below summarizes selections made by the JUCCS team for further investigation with 
respect to the areas impacted by commonality, they will aid the JUCCS team in 
production of the benefits analysis described in latter sections of the paper: 
 Training – Training is the primary focus for the benefits of the proposed 
common architecture. 
o When investigating common HMI related to air vehicle control functions, 
there appears to be a potential for benefits from a training perspective.  
These potential benefits arise from the common human interface that may 
allow some consolidation of training assets.  Due to this potential, training 
will be the focus for possible benefits of the common architecture. 
 
 Basing - Potential benefits examined only when related to training as 




 Manpower Requirements - Potential benefits examined only when related to 
training as described in above section. 
 
 Personnel Assignments - Potential benefits examined only when related to 
training as described in above section. 
 
 Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) - Not examined further as part of this 
effort. 
 
 Other Logistical Areas - Not examined further as part of this effort. 
 
 Cost - Potential benefits examined only when related to training as described 
in above section. 
 
 Mission Capability - Not examined further as part of this effort. 
The scoping effort for JUCCS will allow creation of a common air vehicle control 
functional architecture for Group 3 and above UASs, which will facilitate some level of 
interoperability and commonality for the DoN operational community.  Limiting the 
scope as described led to concentration on the current DoN UAS programs of BAMS, 
Fire Scout and STUAS.  A benefits analysis performed by the JUCCS team shows that 
programs implementing the recommended solution will realize savings in the logistical 
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V. TRAINING AS AN AREA OF INTEREST  
As previously discussed, there are current DoD programs that utilize common 
training concepts: the Joint Strike Fighter, the Army One System, and the Joint Primary 
Air Training System.  A common schoolhouse is one of the benefits cited for these DoD 
programs that may be applicable to UASs.  In order to achieve the common schoolhouse 
training benefit, a standardized training for AVOs would need to be established.  United 
States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) recognized this and established a command 
for UASs.  This command enacted policy identifying the required skill sets for an AVO.  
These skills sets would serve as the basis for the common training curriculum. 
A. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM UAS AVO COMMON TRAINING 
As cited in the JSF example in Chapter III.D.1, their program is projected to 
experience 70 percent common training across the three variants.  One of the methods 
that will enable common training is a common schoolhouse, which is being set up at 
Eglin Air Force Base.  The DoN is exploring a common schoolhouse for UAS AVO 
training.  A potential benefit from common UAS AVO training includes efficiencies 
gained in training overhead, such as configuration control and update of course 
curriculum.  Common training also ensures standard UAS policies and procedures are 
taught.  A common schoolhouse would provide a shore station opportunity and repository 
for fleet UAS training expertise [U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), 2009].  A study 
by NAVAIR Training Systems (PMA-205) that analyzed a common schoolhouse cited 
decreased manpower and facilities cost, but no quantifiable figures were provided [PMA-
205, 2009].      
The common training, especially if hosted at a common schoolhouse, would 
enable a reduced number of trainers (both simulators and Computer Based Training 
(CBT)), classrooms and personnel housing.  This would result in a reduction in 
infrastructure.  Another benefit of common training would be the reduced manpower 
required for support.  The instructors, technicians and courseware managers would be 
co-located.  This reduced infrastructure is due to training occurring at one site, vice 
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having training spread out at various locations.  Finally, training assets would have a 
higher utilization rate and gain more efficient use of those assets.  These benefits result in 
reduced infrastructure, reduced manpower, and higher asset utilization rate and would 
result in cost savings for the DoN.  Estimated cost savings have yet to be determined.    
B. OTHER GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TOWARD COMMON UAS 
TRAINING 
USJFCOM and the DoN are working towards establishing policy that addresses 
how UASs will be utilized in the future.  In these policy documents, training has been 
addressed by identifying how the AVO will gain qualification.  In addition to policy, the 
DoD has established a joint command that will facilitate acquisition of UASs.    
1. Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence 
The Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JUAS) Center of Excellence (COE) is a 
government organization consisting of both military and government personnel that 
facilitates the development and integration of common UAS.  Located at Creech Air 
Force Base, Nevada, the JUAS COE‟s mission statement is to: 
Provide support to the Joint Operator and Services by facilitating the 
development and integration of common unmanned aircraft system 
operating standards, capabilities, concepts, technologies, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, procedures and training. JUAS COE leverages existing 
COCOM and Service initiatives and activities to provide joint integrated 
solutions and improved interoperability. [Nellis Air Force Base, 2010] 
On 1 November 2007, the JUAS COE was realigned under USJFCOM.  Figure 18 
depicts the different organizations responsible to the Commander USJFCOM.  The JUAS 
COE organization structure has four primary divisions: Chief of Staff, Operations 
Division, Training Division, and Concepts Division, as shown in Figure 19.  The Chief of 
Staff is adminstrative in nature.  The Operations Division focuses on the training and 
tactics that are currently being employed in combat and in training areas throughout the 
world.  They assess the capability gaps on current unmanned systems.  They also 
coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and foreign airspace centers 
and understand the flight regulations pertaining to UAS flight across the globe.  The 
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Training Division focuses on the current and future methods of employment and 
standardization within the joint services and coalition forces.  The Concepts Division 
concentrates on future capabilities and future threats to the unmanned systems.  They 
attempt to project what type of unmanned systems will be employed in the distant future.  
They also attempt to roadmap what future capabilities will be required and the platforms 




Figure 18. JUAS COE Placement within the USJFCOM Organization Structure 
While the commander of the JUAS COE is an O-6, the organization is placed on the same level as other 









Figure 19. JUAS COE Organization Structure 
The JUAS COE Organization is comprised of four divisions consisting of Chief of Staff, Operations, 
Training, and Concepts.  Figure from [Colt, 2009]. 
 
2. Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Levels of Qualification 
The JUAS COE has identified five critical skill sets and Knowledge Skills and 
Abilities (KSAs) that are common throughout Joint UAS communities: UAS Flight Crew 
Skills (UASFCS), Joint Mission Qualification (JMQ), UAS Mission Crew Skills 
(UASMCS), Unique Service Skills, and Basic UAS Qualifications (BUQ) [Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2009]. 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) are the attributes required to 
perform a job and are generally demonstrated through qualifying 
experience, education, or training. Knowledge is a body of information 
applied directly to the performance of a function. Skill is an observable 
competence to perform a learned psychomotor act. Ability is competence 
to perform an observable behavior or a behavior that results in an 
observable product. [U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 2010] 
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UASFCS identify practical skills to operate UASs with situational awareness and 
the ability to execute tasks during flight operations.  The skills satisfy practical flight 
requirements for BUQ Levels I-IV [CJCS, 2009]. 
JMQ levels A to C provide general knowledge of the UAS mission and objective.  
This is critical to ensure the crews understand their role in accomplishing a larger military 
objective.  It allows the operators the ability to coordinate and execute in joint operations.  
JMQ-A qualifications support unit-level Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) in support of the Joint Force Commanders (JFC).  They also provide mission 
support with capabilities defined in the Joint Mission Task Lists (JMTL).  JMQ-B 
qualifications support theater-level advanced ISR and Incident Awareness and 
Assessment (IAA) mission support with defined capabilities in the JMTL of the JFC 
[CJCS, 2009]. 
UASMCS are a group of skills required to ensure accomplishment of the assigned 
task.  They are also mission skills to execute joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
meet UAS employment mission objectives.  UASMCS satisfies practical mission 
requirements for JMQ Levels A-C [CJCS, 2009]. 
Unique Service Skills provide the UAS crewmember with the knowledge and 
understanding of service specific missions and associated requirements.  Examples 
include maritime environment for naval UAS and pre-strike reconnaissance for air 
interdiction [CJCS, 2009]. 
BUQs have four levels associated with them consisting of BUQ-I through 
BUQ-IV.  They focus on the general aviation knowledge for successful UAS 
employment and are the foundation for successful employment of UAS and subsequent 
qualifications.  These qualification levels can be seen in Figure 20.  Since these levels of 
qualification are necessary amongst different platforms of different services and 
missions, commonality among the various services can be reached.  BUQs will be the 




Figure 20. UAS Qualification Hierarchy 
There are multiple layers of skill sets that are essential to effectively operate a UAS.  The lowest layer 
addresses the BUQs that are further discussed in this paper.  Figure after [CJCS, 2009]. 
UAS qualifications range from a minimum level of BUQ-I to a maximum level of 
BUQ-IV.  A higher BUQ level requires that each subsequent level is mastered before the 
next higher level is attempted.   
BUQ Level I is the minimum recommended training level for all UAS 
crewmembers.  It possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly under 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in Class E, G, and restricted or combat airspace greater than 
1200 feet Above Ground Level (AGL).  Explanation of the different classes of airspace 
can be found in Appendix C.  BUQ-I is the necessary training level for the small Group 1 
UASs and some of the larger Group 2 UASs. 
BUQ Level II possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly 
VFR in Class D, E, G, and restricted or combat airspace greater than 18,000 feet Mean 
Sea Level (MSL).  Explanation of the different classes of airspace can be found in 





BUQ Level III possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly 
VFR in all airspace greater than 18,000 feet MSL.  BUQ-III is the necessary training 
level for some of Groups 3 and 4 UASs. 
BUQ Level IV possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly in 
all weather conditions and classes of airspace up to 60,000 feet MSL.  BUQ-IV is the 
necessary training level for some of Group 4 and all of Group 5 UASs.  This indicates 
that larger, more complex UASs, such as BAMS, require the highest level of skills that 
have been categorized. 
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3255.01  
The purpose of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
3255.01 titled Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Minimum Training Standards (JUMTS) is 
to identify the minimum knowledge required for a UAS crewmember to support JFC 
objectives.  The instruction defines the grouping of various platforms (i.e. Groups 1-5) 
and the JUMTS skill sets (i.e. BUQ, UASFCS, JMQ, UASMCS, and Unique Service 
Skills). 
CJCSI 3255.01 mandates that each group of UAS operators obtain a minimum 
level of BUQs.  Minimum requirements for the BUQs are shown in Table 4.  The DoD 
services will ensure that their UAS programs meet or exceed these minimums while 
fulfilling their responsibility of achieving the JUMTS skill set definitions.  Waiver 
authority from not meeting the stated minimum requirements will be in accordance with 
DoD service directives.  However, the waiver granting authority will be no lower than 
general or flag officer.   
 JUCCS will focus on UAS Groups 3-5 due to the complexity and amount of 
funding required to procure and sustain each platform, and train the required users.  The 
JUCCS team will also focus on BUQs analysis since they are the foundation of all 
JUMTS and they allow for commonality within training joint operators. 
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Table 4. Minimum BUQ requirements for Each UAS Group 
This chart shows the comparison of UAS Group versus required BUQ levels.  It shows that larger UASs 
require more BUQ qualifications.  Figure after [CJCS, 2009]. 
 
4. Fleet UAS Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations 
The Fleet Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Platform Wholeness Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) was promulgated by the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command.  It delineates requirements and assigns responsibilities for all aspects of fleet 
UAS support to achieve platform wholeness.  Platform wholeness covers the full range of 
organization, manpower, training (individual, team, and unit-level), logistics, 
maintenance, and shore support needed to establish BAMS, Fire Scout, and STUAS in 
the fleet. 
The CONOPS is unclassified but for official use only.  The intent is to present the 
reader with information needed to understand how the fleet will manage UAS within the 
Future Years Defense Program.  This CONOPS summarizes the UAS Type 
Commander‟s (TYCOM) intentions for UAS organizational structure, manpower, 
training, and maintenance.  
The Fleet Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Platform Wholeness Concept of 
Operations is an important source of information for the JUCCS training analysis since it 
concentrates on the Group 3-5 UASs.  It uses the Joint Concept of Operations for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems [USJFCOM, 2008] and Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Minimum Training Standards [CJCS, 2009] as the primary references to training by 
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establishing a modular training approach.  This approach utilizes several modules to 
form a course of instruction that has been found to accelerate the training, reduce costs, 
and provide greater efficiencies in the use of training resources.   
In the near term, training of AVOs and MPOs will rely on legacy programs as the 
fleet develops the modular training approach.  Modular training tailors a UAS training 
program to the specific requirements determined by UAS capabilities and mission 
requirements.  The JUCCS team analyzed the different BUQ levels (I-IV) across multiple 
training regimes by comparing the number of KSAs that were learned in each 
schoolhouse.  
C. NAVAIR AVIATION TRAINING SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS OF BASIC UAS 
QUALIFICATIONS 
On 15 October 2009, NAVAIR Training Systems (PMA-205) released a study 
titled Naval Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Family of Systems (FoS) (Groups 1-5) 
Common/Core Training Requirements Study [PMA-205, 2009].  PMA-205 analyzed the 
following existing training pipelines against Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSAs) for 
basic qualification requirements for UAS operators: 
 Army Raven Mobile Training Team (MTT) 
 Army Shadow training 
 Army Hunter training 
 Army Warrior training 
 Air Force UAS Operator training 
As a result, the spectrum of existing GCS architectures can be compared and analyzed for 
commonality traits with respect to training.  This analysis can help determine whether the 
current training strategies already incorporate some commonality.  A summary of the 
PMA-205 analysis has been broken down into qualification levels, and can be found in 
the charts on the following pages. 
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1. BUQ-I Analysis 
 BUQ Level I is the minimum recommended training level for all UAS 
crewmembers.  The results of the analysis in Figure 21 show that the Army Hunter UAS 
trains to the most KSAs across all other the platforms and training pipelines.  Since it 
meets the majority of the required KSAs, the Army Hunter UAS curriculum has the most 
potential to achieve a commonality requirement for a joint UAS training site for BUQ-I.  
The Army Raven MTT trains to the least of the KSAs when compared to other specific 
UAS platforms. 
 
Figure 21. BUQ-I KSA Analysis across Various UAS Training Pipelines 
Not a single current training program examined provides all KSAs required for a Level I BUQ 
certification.  Figure after [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
2. BUQ-II Analysis 
 The results of the analysis in Figure 22 show that the USAF UAS Operator 
pipeline trains to all of the KSAs analyzed.  Since it meets all of the required KSAs, the 
USAF UAS Operator curriculum has the most potential to achieve a commonality 
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requirement for a joint UAS training curriculum for BUQ-II.  The Army Raven MTT 
continues to train to the least of the KSAs when compared to other specific UAS 
platforms. 
 
Figure 22. BUQ-II KSA Analysis across Various UAS Training Pipelines 
The USAF UAS Operator training provides all KSAs required for a Level II BUQ certification.  Figure 
after [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
3. BUQ-III Analysis 
BUQ Level III possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly 
VFR in all airspace greater than 18,000 feet MSL.  The results of the analysis in Figure 
23 show that the USAF UAS Operator pipeline trains to all of the KSAs analyzed.  Since 
it meets all of the required KSAs, the USAF UAS Operator curriculum has the most 
potential to achieve a commonality requirement for a joint UAS training curriculum for 
BUQ-III.  The Army Raven MTT trains to the least of the KSAs when compared to other 




Figure 23. BUQ-III KSA Analysis across Various UAS Training Pipelines 
The USAF UAS Operator training provides all KSAs required for a Level III BUQ certification.  Figure 
after [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
4. BUQ-IV Analysis 
BUQ Level IV possesses the required aviation knowledge and UAS skills to fly in 
all weather conditions and classes of airspace up to 60,000 feet MSL.  The results of the 
analysis in Figure 24 show that the USAF UAS Operator pipeline trains to all of the 
KSAs analyzed.  Since it meets all of the required KSAs, the USAF UAS Operator 
curriculum has the most potential to achieve a commonality requirement for a joint UAS 
training curriculum for BUQ-IV.  The Army Raven MTT continues to train to the least 




Figure 24. BUQ-IV KSA Analysis across Various UAS Training Pipelines 
The USAF UAS Operator training provides all KSAs required for a Level IV BUQ certification.  Figure 
after [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
5. BUQ-I through IV Combined Analysis 
The results of the analysis in Figure 25 show that the USAF UAS Operator 
pipeline trains to the most KSAs across all other platforms and training pipelines when 
BUQ Levels I-IV are combined.  Since it meets the majority of the required KSAs, the 
USAF UAS Operator curriculum has the most potential to achieve a commonality 
requirement for a common joint UAS training site that trains to all BUQ KSAs.  The 





Figure 25. BUQ-I through IV Combined KSA Analysis across Various UAS Training Pipelines 
The USAF UAS Operator training comes closest to meeting all required KSAs for gaining BUQ Levels 1-IV 
certification.  Figure after [PMA-205, 2009]. 
The intent of reviewing the PMA-205 analysis is to determine whether or not 
current UAS training systems actually teach all of the UAS training requirements.  A 
look at these various programs shows that none of them train to all of the KSAs required 
for BUQ Levels I-IV.  Additionally, the study reveals that the training strategies do not 
share common goals, since they all teach to different numbers of KSAs for each BUQ 
level.  This implies that there is little commonality between the current training systems. 
These revelations lead to the following questions: 
 If a common GCS architecture were created, would it allow greater 
efficiencies across the UAS training pipelines? 
 What requirements are necessary for this type of common GCS? 
 To meet these requirements, what architectural characteristics need to be 
developed? 
The first step in answering these questions is to derive some requirements for a common 
GCS that relate back to the KSAs for the BUQ levels described above. 
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VI. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS FOR A COMMON GCS 
Limiting the scope of the project led to concentration on the current DoN UAS 
programs of BAMS, Fire Scout and STUAS.  A requirements analysis of these UAS 
programs was conducted as part of the systems engineering process to understand the 
requirements of UASs and to establish a foundation from which to proceed.  This 
analysis included programs of record which were in some stage of acquisition by the 
DoN as of fiscal year 2010.  Additionally, further review of the source documentation led 
to the development of a set of requirements which were used for the basis of the proposed 
common GCS architecture discussed in Chapter VII. 
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT NAVY UAS REQUIREMENTS 
A requirements analysis of the three UAS programs of interest began with an 
evaluation of their approved Capability Development Document (CDD) or Capability 
Production Document (CPD) and system specification.  Exploration of each document 
revealed similarities and differences in the areas of primary interest to the JUCCS team: 
training, interoperability, and requirements explicitly detailing commonality.  Also 
examined from each program‟s requirements documentation were the Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes.  The following sections provide these 
analyses.     
1. Key Performance Parameters 
KPPs are those system attributes that are considered essential for successful 
mission accomplishment.  Each acquisition program generally contains a limited number 
of KPPs (usually eight or fewer) that capture those parameters needed to reach the overall 
desired capabilities for the system.  Failure to meet a KPP threshold can be cause for the 
system selection to be reevaluated, the program to be reassessed or terminated, or the 
content of production increments modified [USD(AT&L), 2008]. 
Table 5 displays the KPPs for BAMS, Fire Scout, and STUAS.  
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Table 5. Comparison of DoN UAS Key Performance Parameters 
This list shows those requirements considered most important to determine the success of each program.  None of these requirements is levied on the GCS, nor is 
there any application of a requirement across all three programs with the exception of the Net Ready KPP. 
PARAMETER Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective
Effective Time on 
Station
On station 24/7 
(ETOS 80%)
On station 24/7 for 30 
consecutive days (ETOS 
95%)
Mission Radius ≥ 2,000 nm ≥ 3,000 nm
Net Ready-KPP COMMON COMMON COMMON COMMON COMMON COMMON
Level of Interoperability 
2 LOS Capability
LOS ISR Payload 
sensor data reception 
to Maritime Forces 
afloat (CVN, LHA, 
LHD) 
LOS/BLOS multi-ISR 
payload reception to 
Maritime Forces
Level of Interoperability 
1-5 
MOB MCS shall be 
capable of 
LOS/BLOS LOI 1-5 
of the UA
MOB/FOB MCS shall be 
capable of LOS/BLOS 
LOI 1-5 of the UAS
Ao
≥ 0.7 at IOT&E
≥ 0.8 at IOC + 2 
years






Day Sensor Resolution 
from 3,000 ft altitude
EO sensor shall 
support classification 
of 1m size object
EO sensor shall 
support classification 
of 0.5m size object
Night Sensor Resolution 
from 3,000 ft altitude
IR sensor shall 
support classification 
of 3m size object
IR sensor shall support 
classification of 1.5m 
size object
Launch and Recovery 
from Air Capable L-
Class Ships
Combined max ship 
motion no less than ± 
3° pitch and ± 5° roll
Combined max ship 
motion no less than ± 
5° pitch and ± 8° roll
Module/Interchangeable 
Payload
Change payloads in < 
60 min
Change payloads in ≤ 
30 min
AV Endurance with 
mission payload
10 hrs 24 hrs
Automatic launch and 
recovery of AV with 
max. displacement of:
± 3° pitch and 
± 5° roll host platform 
deck displacement 
from 0° centerline
± 5° pitch and 
± 8° roll host platform 
deck displacement 
from 0° centerline





It should be noted that the only KPP shared between all three programs is the Net Ready 
KPP mandated for all acquisition programs.  Aside from this requirement the three 
programs have established their own unique criteria for essential system capabilities. 
With the majority of KPPs involving the air vehicle, it is apparent that the GCS is 
not the focus of key requirements for existing programs.  Training is not shown as a KPP 
in any of these programs.  Commonality is also not a focus of required capabilities for 
any of these systems.   
2. Key System Attributes 
Key System Attributes are those system attributes considered most critical or 
essential for an effective military capability but not selected as KPPs.  Key System 
Attributes provide decision makers with an additional level of capability prioritization 
below the KPP but with senior sponsor leadership control.  Key System Attributes and 
other performance attributes will be based on analysis of the required capability 
[USD(AT&L), 2008]. 
BAMS has Key System Attributes that address the deployability of the air 
vehicle, mission planning, flight, on station capabilities, and sensor capabilities.  None of 
the Key System Attributes focus on the GCS capabilities.  Other requirements are levied 
on the GCS that include the ability to control multiple air vehicles (three as a threshold 
and twelve as an objective).  The GCS is required to be capable of transferring control of 
an air vehicle from one BAMS GCS to another BAMS GCS [PMA-263, 2007].  There 
are no requirements to be interoperable or common with other platform GCSs. 
Similarly, the Key System Attributes for the Fire Scout program do not focus on 
the GCS or on training.  The Fire Scout program does require that the GCS be capable of 
mission planning, air vehicle control, receipt of data and dissemination of data [PMA-
263, 2008].  The GCS shall be able to control two Fire Scout aircraft simultaneously and 
transfer control of an aircraft from one GCS to another [Northrop Grumman Systems 
Corporation, 2007].  Again, this transfer is only required between Fire Scout GCSs. 
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The STUAS Performance Based Specification (PBS) contains three pages of Key 
System Attributes.  System reliability, sensor performance and affordability are the 
subjects of Key System Attributes [PMA-263, 2009].  Once again, training and 
commonality are not listed in any of the Key System Attributes.    
3. CDD, CPD and System Specification Comparison 
For each of the programs examined, the CDD, CPD and system specification was 
found and then compared and contrasted with one another.  Some surprising 
commonality in requirements language was discovered and can be seen in Table 6.  The 
extent of the similarity suggested that each program copied wording from the previous 
program.  Yet, interestingly, there was no requirement for each individual program to 
specifically leverage off the other system‟s development or to gain in any way from 
previous development.  Each training system separately developed its own training 
support system.    
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Table 6. CDD and CPD Wording Related to Training for DoN UASs 
This table compares some of the similar requirements from BAMS, Fire Scout and STUAS with respect to 
training. Note the similarities in wording across the various systems. 
BAMS Fire Scout (VTUAV) STUAS 
Training shall be available at 
any operating location and 
will be sustainable over the 
life of the system. 
Training will be available at any 
operating location, through the 
use of training devices and a 
distributed learning system, and 
will be sustainable over the life 
of the system. 
Training will be available at 
any operating location, through 
the use of training devices and 
a distributed learning system, 
and will be sustainable over the 




verification procedures will be 
part of the BAMS UAS 
training system. 
Appropriate human performance 
metrics, methodologies and 
verification procedures will be 
part of the VTUAV System 
training system. 
Human performance 
requirements will be 
considered in the design of the 
Tier II/STUAS from the 
earliest stages of acquisition 
and throughout the life cycle 
engineering activities. 
The BAMS UAS training 
system should be supportable 
by the Navy personnel 
distribution system and will 
ensure qualified personnel 
report to assume assigned 
duties within a minimal 
turnover period. 
The VTUAV System training 
system will be supportable by 
the Navy personnel distribution 
system and will ensure qualified 
personnel report to assume 
assigned duties within a minimal 
turnover period. 
The Navy‟s STUAS training 
system will be supportable by 
the Navy personnel distribution 
system and will ensure 
qualified personnel report to 
assume assigned duties with a 
minimal turnover period. 
In Table 7, it is apparent that each program looked to have embedded training 
capability so that training could leverage off the operational system.  Although this may 
help a specific program‟s ability to reduce its own training related expenses, it does 
nothing to assist the other program‟s efforts.  Likewise, there appears to be foresight in 
the need to leverage off the operational system software development, however nothing is 
captured in the requirements to leverage off software development completed by other 
programs.  Each program is on their own in developing separate hardware and software 
solutions, even though they strive for similar goals.  
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Table 7. System Specification Wording Related to Training for DoN UASs 
This table shows some of the system specification wording across the various programs.  Note that the 
programs are all discussing embedded capabilities for usage in training, but none are requiring 




BAMS Fire Scout (VTUAV) STUAS 
The UAS Training System 
(TS) will be an integrated 
system which will use the 
baseline developed Top Level 
Operator Mission Task 
Analysis and the Contractor 
and Government performed 
Instructional Systems 
Development (ISD) Front End 
Analysis (FEA) processes to 
determine specific training 
requirements. 
The VTUAV CS shall be 
compatible with embedded 
and add-on interactive 
training. 
As an integral portion of the GS, 
the MTD provides the ability to 
execute training through a safe, 
interlocked interface which 
physically isolates a GS 
workstation from communicating 
with any AV, while still using the 
GCS operational software to 
provide proficiency, emergency 
procedure and mission rehearsal 
training to the crew. 
The MOB MCS shall include 
an integrated, full-mission 
training capability. 
The VTUAV system shall 
provide for training of 
organizational level 
operator and maintenance 
personnel. 
The integrated GCS and UAS 
MTD assembly shall provide the 
sufficient and necessary 
capabilities to complete 
emergency procedures training, 
proficiency training, and mission 
rehearsal for all users. 
The MOB MCS shall include 
an integrated, full-mission 
training capability. 
All electronic media 
training materials shall 
function stand-alone via 
CD ROM, over the web, 
via Navy E-Learning/Navy 
Knowledge On-Line, and 
from Navy-Marine Corps 
Internet (NMCI) 
computers. 
The software in GCS used during 
flight operations shall be the 
same software when interfacing 
with the MTD. 
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4. Commonality as a New Requirement 
As evidenced through the requirements analysis of the BAMS, Fire Scout, and 
STUAS programs, each has taken a program-centric approach with little or no 
consideration to commonality.  Moreover, until the release of the February 2009 ADM 
that directs UAS GCS commonality, there has been no requirement for programs to be 
common.  The origin of this requirements gap has been illustrated chronologically per 
Figure 26.  The following section addresses this requirements gap, and attempts to extract 
requirements for a proposed common GCS.   
 
Figure 26. Timeline Showing Requirements Development for DoN UASs 
The timeline shows the chronological development of the DoN UAS requirements documents.  Note that all 
documents with commonality philosophies come after the UAS specifications have already been developed.  
This condition has led to the current lack of commonality among DoN systems. 
 
B. NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS FOR A COMMON GCS 
An objective of this project is to determine what a common GCS architecture 
would look like.  One of the first steps toward this goal is to extract some requirements 
for a common GCS. 
1. Requirements Facilitating Common AVO Training 
Following the 2009 ADM, the Fleet UAS Platform Wholeness CONOPS [USFFC, 
2009] was published providing guidance for achieving commonality among UASs.  This 
CONOPS was used to extract the first requirement for the proposed common UAS GCS: 
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 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) 
training commonality across multiple Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
platforms. 
For AVO training commonality, programs are directed to ensure compliance with the 
BUQs defined in CJCSI 3255.01 Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training 
Standards [CJCS, 2009].  As identified by the expanded JUCCS analysis, all but seven of 
these BUQs can be accommodated through implementation of a common GCS.  By 
requiring GCS commonality, common AVO training can be achieved.  Therefore, the 
following specific characteristics have been extracted for the GCS in order to facilitate 
the common AVO training concept: 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall have a common Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI) for Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) functions. 
In order to achieve a common GCS and common AVO training, a common HMI is 
necessary for AVO functions.   
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall allow for directed vice controlled air 
vehicle operation.  
Fire Scout has set requirements for a point-and-click route planning to include terrain 
avoidance warning, fuel calculations, and radar terrain masking.  The necessity for a 
point-and-click route is considered to be the directed as opposed to the controlled UAS 
philosophy. 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall allow for separate Human-Machine 
Interfaces (HMI) for payload and air vehicle control.  
Fire Scout has called for a GCS “consisting of an AVO and an MPO work station.”  It 
goes on to state that “crews will consist of an AVO and an MPO” [PMA-205, 2008].  The 





 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall have a common mission planning 
system.  
Fire Scout requires that the GCS will be used to plan and monitor flights for performance 
of assigned missions [PMA-205, 2008].   A common mission planning system is 
necessary to enable a common GCS with common AVO training functions.  
2. Additional Requirements for a Common GCS 
Up to this point, evaluation of UAS GCSs has focused on AVO training.  A 
common GCS would need requirements beyond the AVO training.  To achieve greater 
potential benefits and to enable a common GCS, the following requirements are proposed 
by the JUCCS team in addition to aforementioned common AVO training: 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable interoperability between 
multiple Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs).  
STANAG 4586, as discussed previously, details interoperability standard for UASs and 
GCSs.  All three programs evaluated in this report require compliance with STANAG 
4586.  It is therefore reasonable to expect all future UAS programs to require 
interoperability.  
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable common communications and 
data link management between multiple Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs).  
The OSD Roadmap indicates that “all UAS systems will have the ability to communicate 
and can therefore act as relay nodes for C2 communications” [OSD, 2007].  In order to 
achieve this, it is essential for common communications and data link management. 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall utilize a common data format to 
enable communication between multiple manned and unmanned systems.  
USD(AT&L) calls for accelerating the fielding of CDL compliant communications 
systems.  The OSD Roadmap recommends “greater interoperability among system 
controls, communications, data products, data links, and payloads/mission equipment 
packages on unmanned systems” [OSD, 2007].  A common data format will enable 
increased interoperability and sharing of data collected by the air vehicle. 
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 The Ground Control Station (GCS) systems software and architecture shall be 
modular and scalable.  
USD(AT&L) has directed the services “to develop and demonstrate a common, open, and 
scalable UAS architecture supporting Groups 2-5” [USD(AT&L), 2009].  The use of 
modular and scalable systems software and architecture will facilitate interoperability.  It 
will also enable the incorporation of future technologies. 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common approach to 
simplify support and maintenance across multiple Unmanned Aircraft System 
(UAS) platforms.  
The UAS Wholeness CONOPS requires that UASs shall use common approaches to 
simplify UAS support and maintenance.  
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common approach to reduce 
the manpower requirements across multiple Unmanned Aircraft System 
(UAS) platforms.  
The UAS Wholeness CONOPS requires that UASs shall use common approaches to UAS 
manpower support. 
 The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common approach to 
minimize Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) basing.  
The UAS Wholeness CONOPS requires that UASs shall use common approaches to UAS 
manpower basing. 
These requirements are those considered vital to a proposed common GCS.  The 
first set of requirements will facilitate the common training while the others are a mixture 
of miscellaneous requirements that aid in the successful creation of a common GCS.  The 




Table 8. Necessary Requirements for a Common GCS 
This table summarizes the requirements necessary for a common GCS.  The table includes specific wording 
for the requirements along with the source of the requirement derivation. 








The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 









 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 
 CJCSI 3255.01 
 
 USD(AT&L) ADM 
 
 Field UASs with common AVO training 
standards. 
 Increase training efficiencies and decrease 
training time. 
 Reduce training requirements. 
2. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
have a common 
Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI) for 




 Fire Scout System 
Specification 
 
 STUAS CDD and PBS 
 
 BAMS PBS 
 
 UAS shall use a STANAG 4586 compliant 
GCS. 
 
 Human machine interfaces shall comply with 
MIL-STD-1472. 
3. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
allow for directed 
vice controlled air 
vehicle operation.  
 
 
 Fire Scout System 
Specification 
 
 STUAS PBS 
 
 
 The GCS HMI shall be a directed type 
interface. 
4. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
allow for separate 
Human-Machine 
Interfaces (HMI) for 




 Fire Scout NTSP 
 




 Operators shall operate a single GCS 
consisting of an AVO and an MPO work 
station.   
 










5. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 




 Fire Scout NTSP 
 
 JUAS CONOPS 
 
 GCS will be used to plan and monitor flights 
for performance of assigned missions 
 
 Current doctrine provides for parallel 
planning processes for ISR/RSTA and Joint 
Fires. 
 
 UAS planning and employment 
considerations will be examined 
 
6. The Ground Control 





Systems (UASs).  
 
 STUAS CDD 
 
 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 
 Fire Scout System 
Specification 
 
 STUAS PBS 
 
 USD(AT&L) ADM 
 
 
 GCS shall be compliant with STANAG 4586 
for system interoperability. 
 
 GCS shall be interoperable with other UAS 
operating and control systems. 
 
 GCS shall use a standardized user interface 
across all configurations. 
 
 Improve interoperability. 
 
7. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable common 
communications and 
data link management 
between multiple 
Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UASs).  
 
 Fire Scout System 
Specification 
 
 Fire Scout NTSP 
 
 JUAS CONOPS 
 
 USD(AT&L) ADM 
 
 OSD Roadmap 
 
 GCS shall be capable of interfacing with 
other fielded UASs via common C4I systems. 
 
 GCS shall have the capability for external and 
internal voice communications with other 
manned and unmanned systems. 
 
 A suite of communications systems shall 
include the common data link to provide 
continuous contact between system operators 
and the UAV 
 
 Field common data link compliant 
communications system leveraging to the 











8. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
utilize a common data 






 STUAS CDD 
 
 Fire Scout System 
Specification 
 
 GCS shall use standardized data and controls. 
 
 All communications systems shall meet DoD, 
U.S. and International frequency spectrum 
management policies and regulations. 
 
 Improve data access. 
 
9. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) 
systems software and 
architecture shall be 
modular and scalable.  
 
 
 STUAS CDD 
 
 Fire Scout NTSP 
 
 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 
 USD(AT&L) ADM 
 
 UAS shall implement a modular open 
systems architecture. 
 
 AV and GCS software shall be modular and 
scalable.  
 
 System shall support existing Navy system 
external interfaces and implement an open 
systems architecture standard. 
 
 Adopt a common GCS architecture that is 
open and allows for modular functionality.  
 
 Develop and demonstrate a common, open, 
and scalable UAS architecture supporting 
Groups 2-5. 
 
10. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 





(UAS) platforms.  
 
 
 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 
 UASs shall use common approaches to 
simplify UAS support and maintenance.   
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11. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 





(UAS) platforms.  
 
 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 
 BAMS CDD 
 
 Fire Scout CPD 
 
 USD(AT&L) ADM 
 
 UAS shall use common approaches to UAS 
manpower support. 
 
 The workload associated with training must 
be analyzed and accounted for in the 
manpower requirements. 
 
 Increase pool of UAS pilots/operators. 
12. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 






 UAS Platform Wholeness 
CONOPS 
 




VII.  JUCCS PROPOSED COMMON GCS ARCHITECTURE 
The common architecture proposed by the JUCCS team was developed using the 
requirements derived from the analysis in the previous section.  The architecture 
development focused on the air vehicle control functions with a modular, scalable 
construct that would enable a common GCS across multiple platforms.  This approach 
was influenced by the requirements for commonality as directed in the ADM.  The 
architecture development approach included research and analysis of current relevant 
architectures and architecture development strategies, development of an external 
systems diagram, and development of a functional architecture [Dam, 2006].  The 
architecture focused on the human-machine interface of the air vehicle control functions. 
A. JUCCS ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS 
1. Inspiration for the Architectural Structure 
 The JUCCS architecture is based on the ability to be both modular and scalable in 
accordance with the requirements derived in Chapter VI.B.  The concept will be limited 
to a functional allocation to allow for a variety of physical architectures.  This allows 
different number of crew positions based on mission requirements and GCS operating 
locations.  A two person crew might be needed for a smaller UAS while an eight person 
crew layout might be needed for a larger UAS.  
 Limiting the architecture to a functional level enables the hardware to be 
customized based on the operating environment as long as it maintains the same 
functional elements.  As an example, a mouse is a 2-D input device that can be used well 
in shore based GCS applications while for a ship or airborne control station it might not 
be as effective since it can move with the motion of the vehicle.  This condition may lead 
to the use of a trackball instead.  The functional architecture will not limit this type of 
hardware change.  
Since the equipment may be mounted in different operating environments, it may 
become necessary to use hardware that is more robust based on its intended operational 
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environment.  A shipboard GCS might need humidity and salt resistant computer 
hardware and antennae, while a land based GCS would have less stringent environmental 
requirements.  This architecture will be able to support different physical allocations 
while ensuring a functional allocation that is common.  Therefore, the system will be 
modular and scalable per Requirement 9 found in Table 8. 
2. Enabling Common AVO Training 
 Through the requirements analysis and the list of requirements in Chapter VI.B, 
the need for common AVO training was found to have a derived requirement of common 
AVO HMI for control of the air vehicle.  This common HMI also needs to be in the form 
of a directed type AVO interface vice a controlled AVO interface as discussed in Chapter 
VI.B. 
 The architecture also needs to separate the AVO HMI from the payload HMI to 
facilitate easier interface changes to the GCS.  This will allow AVOs to use an interface 
without interdependencies on the payload HMIs that can vary so radically between air 
vehicle types. 
 Lastly, from the requirement in Chapter VI.B, use of a common mission planning 
tool enables all AVOs to be trained on the use of a single common interface for mission 
planning.  This will facilitate even greater commonality in pilot training. 
3. Enabling Interoperability 
In addition to common AVO training, the research revealed other requirements 
for a common GCS architecture.  An important requirement is for a level of 
interoperability between the GCS and different types of UAS air vehicles.  This was 
captured in the Requirement 6 found in Table 8.  
 To help with interoperability, Requirements 7 and 8 found in Table 8 show that 
the GCS will need a common way to have data link management.  This will facilitate the 
use of common forms of both voice and data formats that can be used by all UASs that 
work with the common GCS.   
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 The architecture is designed to have separate air vehicle control to translate 
internal GCS system commands into a standard common control format for the UAS air 
vehicle.  This will enable interoperability while allowing the GCS to maintain different 
hardware in the physical architecture and allowing the architecture to remain scalable.  
B. ARCHITECTURAL SYNTHESIS FROM AN AIR VEHICLE CONTROL 
PERSPECTIVE 
The initial step in developing the architecture was to develop an external systems 
diagram that depicts the system, external systems, and context [Buede, 2009].  
Development of the JUCCS architecture was influenced by the segregation of the HMI as 
a separate functional area as first seen in the BAMS architecture.  The JUCCS external 
systems diagram illustrates the UAS, the external entities, and the relationships between 
the UAS and the entities as shown in Figure 27.  The UAS, shown as block C0, consists 
of both the UAV and the GCS.   
A unique approach in developing the external diagram was the inclusion of block 
C1, the Area of Interest (AOI), Contact of Interest (COI), and Target of Interest (TOI).  
None of the examined UAS architectures had included these elements although the 
elements communicate and exchange data and energy with the UAS.  Another unique 
approach in the architecture development was to include the threat information in block 
C6.  Threats can come in the form of directed energy, cyber attack (non-kinetic attacks) 
and physical attacks (kinetic attacks).  AOIs, COIs, TOIs and the potential threats impact 




Figure 27. JUCCS External Systems Block Diagram 
JUCCS external systems diagram illustrating the UAS, external entities and relationships. Unique 
characteristics of this architecture can be seen with the inclusion of block C1 (AOI, COI, TOI) and block 
C6 (Threat). 
 
1. UAS Elements and Functions 
The UAS consists of two major elements, the GCS and the UAV.  The GCS is the 
ground control component that performs all the functions to control the UAV and 
interfaces with external entities to ensure the mission is executed.  The UAV is the 
mobile air element of the UAS that utilizes onboard payloads (sensors, weapons, etc.) and 
communications to execute the mission. 
The GCS interactively communicates externally with the UAV, various command 
elements, air traffic control elements, and the customers.  The GCS interacts and receives 
data and energy from the environment in the form of weather and Electromagnetic 
Environmental Effects (E3).  The GCS may also receive energy or data from various 
threats. 
The GCS controls piloting, navigation, and payload (sensor, weapon, etc.) 
functions of the UAV.  The GCS operator directs the takeoff, navigation, flight path, and 
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landing of the UAV.  The GCS controls the sensor payload of the UAV that includes 
sensor status, video and data control, and control of the physical operation of the sensors.  
The sensor payload can include EO/IR, radar, SIGINT, as well as other sensor payloads.  
The GCS controls the payload functions of weapon payloads of the air vehicle including: 
status, selection, programming, data and video, and control. 
The UAV provides mobile capabilities to execute the mission.  The UAV 
provides the following functions:  1) Communications to the GCS which include platform 
status, position, and control feedback.  2) Weapons and sensor status and control 
feedback to the GCS.  Sensor data can include sensor status, video, and data such as 
EO/IR, radar, and SIGINT.  Sensor control includes feedback from the sensors located on 
the UAV.  Weapon data includes weapon type, status, video, and data from the weapon 
on or launched from the air vehicle.  3) UAV to customer communications including all 
sensor status, data, control, and feedback.  4) UAV to Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
communications where ATC information includes Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
interrogator and transponder information and sense-and-avoid information such as the 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).  5) UAV to threat sensing including 
constantly scanning for E3, cyber, and weapons threats.  6) UAV to AOI, COI, and TOI 
sensing that includes energy that is sent from or received by the UAV sensors.  
2. External Entities and Functions 
External entities include command elements, AOIs, COIs, TOIs, air traffic, 
customers, environment, and threats.  A summary of the context and relationships with 
the UAS are described in the following paragraphs. 
Command elements provide tasking and management of the UAS such as mission 
and reporting requirements.  The command element includes strategic, tactical, and 
coalition command and control elements.  Tasking includes communication regarding 
mission planning and execution.  UAS status is the current operational status of the GCS 
and the UAV, which could include health and position data.  Weapons authorization 
includes authorization for weapons release and weapon information that includes type, 
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status, data, and video. Sensor data includes sensor status, video, and data that could 
include EO/IR, radar, and SIGINT.  
The areas and items deemed important to the UAS mission include AOIs, COIs, 
and TOIs.  The AOIs include all large and small ground and ocean area surveillance.  
COIs include all specific surveillance items of interest: personnel, vehicles, weapon 
systems, aircraft, boats, ships, buildings, and facilities.  TOIs include adversary 
personnel, vehicles, weapon systems, aircraft, boats, ships, buildings, and facilities.  
Energy transmitted to or from the UAV is any electromagnetic energy: RF, EO/IR, 
emitted or reflected by the UAV or AOI, COI, TOI and is detectable by the UAV sensor 
suite.  An example of an energy flow is RF energy in the form of a radar pulse that is 
emitted by the UAV and reflected from a TOI back to the UAV radar sensor.  Data is 
transmitted to or received from a COI.  An example of data to and from a COI would be 
Blue Force Tracker data that indicates the status and position of friendly forces. 
Air traffic includes all civilian and military air traffic and air traffic control 
elements within communications range of the air vehicle [NASA, 2010].  ATC 
information includes Air Traffic Management (ATM) and air traffic data.  ATM includes 
all voice and data that affects the flight path and safety of the UAV.  ATM elements 
include:  1) IFF interrogator and transponder information and sense and avoid 
information such as TCAS.  2) External entities, such as a local airport air traffic control 
elements that direct the UAV flight path, altitude, and heading and provide current flight 
safety data such as weather, air traffic, radio frequencies, and routing information.  The 
air traffic data includes voice and data air traffic command and control information to and 
from the UAS ground station.  The air traffic data could include Flight Service Station 
(FSS) information such as ATC clearances, and recordings for Notices to Airmen 
(NOTAMs).  The FSS broadcasts aviation weather and National Airspace System (NAS) 
information.  The station receives and processes VFR and IFR flight plans, and monitors 
navigation aids.  In addition, at selected locations, an FSS provides an En Route Flight 
Advisory Service (Flight Watch), gathers weather data, and issues airport advisories.  The 
FSS also advises U.S. Customs and Immigration of trans-border flights [NASA, 2010].  
The customer element can include strategic, tactical, and coalition elements.  Customer to 
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UAV communication includes:  1) Sensor status, video, and data that could include 
EO/IR, radar, and SIGINT.  2) Sensor control includes sensor control information and 
feedback from the sensors located on the UAV.  3) Weapons data includes weapon type, 
status, video, and data from the weapon on or launched from the air vehicle.  4) Weapon 
authority is the weapon control including launch, feedback, and programming of the 
weapon.  Customer to GCS communications includes the following data elements: 1) 
Tasking is communication regarding mission planning and execution.  2) Sensor data is 
sensor status, video, and data that could include EO/IR, radar, and SIGINT.  3) Weapon 
control includes launch, feedback, and programming of the weapon. 
The external environmental effects include both weather and E3.  Weather affects 
operation of both the GCS and UAV.  Weather can affect the physical operation of the 
UAS in temperature, rain, snow, sleet, sand, dust, wind, etc.  Operation can mean the 
ability to operate the equipment in all weather conditions, to include communications and 
sensing.  E3 affects both the GCS and UAV from electromagnetic effects including those 
emanating from: communications, jammers, radars, etc.  E3 can also include large scale 
electromagnetic pulses from nuclear detonation as well as lightning. 
The threat element can include all manner of threats that affect both the GCS and 
the UAV.  Threats include: E3 threats from jammers and spoofers, cyber threats that 
include illegal hacking of networks or information either through the air or by tapping 
into land lines, kinetic weapons that include everything from small arms to missiles, and 
non-kinetic Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) threats to the GCS. 
C. CREATING THE JUCCS FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE WITH 
BLOCK DIAGRAMS 
The functional architecture was created from the external systems diagram by 
developing functions from the relationships between the GCS, UAV, and the external 
entities.  Relevant examples were utilized from existing programs and system engineering 
guidance including: The Engineering Design of Systems [Buede, 2009], Systems 
Engineering and Analysis [Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006], DoD Architecture Framework 
[Dam, 2006], BAMS Architecture, and notes from various NPS classes and professors. 
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The main functions were developed using the GCS system requirements in 
Chapter VI.B and the external context diagram.  The first step was to decompose the 
UAS block of the external systems diagram into GCS and air vehicle functions as shown 
in Figure 28.  The decomposition of the UAS system functions follow by decomposing 
the GCS and air vehicle functions linked to the data from the external entities in the 
external context diagram. 
 
Figure 28. JUCCS UAS Block Diagram 
JUCCS UAS functional block diagram showing external entities, GCS and Air Vehicle Functions, and the 
data elements between them. 
 
1. Top Level Hierarchy of JUCCS Architecture 
The top level hierarchal JUCCS systems diagram was developed from the 
external systems diagram and the context of the external elements as shown in Figure 29.  
The UAS was first decomposed into two functions relating to the GCS and the air 
vehicle.  The functions of the air vehicle are not included at this time as the concentration 
is on the control of the air vehicle from the GCS.  The GCS was further decomposed into 
eight sub-functions: Provide Human Interface, Plan Mission, Manage Mission, 
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Command and Control Air Vehicle, Control Payload, Process Payload Data, Manage 
Communications and Disseminate Data, and Perform External Communications.  Further 
decomposition will take place on only three of the GCS sub-functions: Provide Human 
Interface, Manage Mission, and Command and Control Air Vehicle.  This is due to the 
project focus on common training by having a common HMI for air vehicle control. 
 
Figure 29. JUCCS Architecture Top Level Hierarchy 
JUCCS Architecture highlighting the emphasis on the GCS functions, including the Provide Human 
Interface, Manage Mission and Command and Control Air Vehicle functional elements.  Blocks shown in 
blue are further decomposed in the architecture. 
 
2. A1 Block Diagram:  Perform GCS Functions 
The A1 diagram is the main functional component for a common GCS.  There are 
external entities that feed data to the GCS including the air vehicle which is internal to 
the system, and various external entities.  The main functional architecture of the GCS is 





 A1.1 Provide Human Interface 
 A1.2 Plan Mission 
 A1.3 Manage Mission 
 A1.4 Command and Control Air Vehicle 
 A1.5 Control Payload 
 A1.6 Process Payload Data 
 A1.7 Manage Comms and Disseminate Data 
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Figure 30. JUCCS Perform GCS Functions Block Diagram 
This diagram shows the eight functions that comprise the Perform GCS functions and their associated data 
flows.  Blocks shown in blue are further decomposed in the architecture. 
A1.1 Provide Human Interface is the function that provides all the interaction 
between the system and the human operators.  All of the system human interfaces from 
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system output to the operator (visual, aural, or tactile) and inputs to the system through 
input devices (mouse, keyboard, joystick, etc) are functionally modeled here.  This is the 
function that interacts with the rest of the system through the functions A1.2, A1.3, A1.6, 
and A1.7.     
A1.2 Plan Mission is the mission planning function.  One of the derived 
requirements for common training is that a common mission planning system be used and 
mandated through a common GCS.  This function is separate and its own functional 
module to ensure that a new mission planning system can be changed in the architecture. 
A1.3 Manage Mission is the function that is the central point of the system 
operations.  It takes in the information from the air vehicle including aircraft telemetry, 
AV system status, payload status, payload data, mission plan information, and then uses 
those to interpret the operator input from A1.1 Provide Human Interface.  A1.2 is where 
the system keeps track of the air vehicle, where it is, what it is doing, and allows the 
operator commands to occur. 
A1.4 Command and Control Air Vehicle provides the translator function taking 
internal system commands and converting them to a standard interoperable language that 
all UAVs can understand.  This will address the requirement for interoperable AV 
control.  This function is also modular and separate from the payload control to ensure 
that either function can be changed in the physical architecture without having 
interactions change with the other to meet the requirement of separating the AV control 
and the payload control. 
A1.5 Control Payload is the function that allows control of the payloads.  These 
payloads can be sensors, weapons, or other devices.  The need here is to separate the 
payload control from the AV control as payloads can vary widely from air vehicle type to 
type.  This function translates the specific system commands to the payload commands 
necessary for that type of payload.  This allows specific changes in this functional 
module to be more readily changed when payloads are changed. 
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A1.6 Process Payload Data allows for the raw payload data from different 
payloads to be manipulated by the operator.  The raw data is input to the function and the 
operator can change the metadata, format, or fuse with other information.  An example of 
this could be taking a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image and marking targets of 
interest or associating electro-optical imagery with geographic locations. 
A1.7 Manage Comms and Disseminate Data is a function that controls what data 
leaves the GCS.  It directly handles information internal to the system (between the GCS 
and the AV) and governs the format and data type.  For communications external to the 
system, the recipient and data is sent to A1.8 Perform External Comms. 
A1.8 Perform External Comms takes data from the A1.7 Manage Comms and will 
format and send to the directed external entity.  This function allows the separation of 
communication functionality between those that are internal to the system (between GCS 
and the AV) and those that are between the GCS and other entities external to the GCS.  
It needs to be noted that some communications from the air vehicle to other external 
entities are still handled in the GCS by A1.7 Manage Comms because some 
communications data can be ported to the air vehicle and then transmitted from the air 
vehicle to entities external to the system. 
D. DOCUMENTING AND LINKING THE ARCHITECTURE WITH CORE® 
The JUCCS architectural team realized that a Model Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) tool would be beneficial due to the complexity of the proposed functional 
architecture.  There are several MBSE tools available for systems engineering design and 
two common choices are Vitech Corporation‟s CORE® and IBM‟s Rational System 
Architect.  The JUCCS architectural team chose CORE® since a student license was 
already established from earlier NPS classes and the JUCCS architecture team was 
familiar with the basic operation of the CORE® software.  CORE® Enterprise version 
5.1.5 was used to document the JUCCS functional architecture.  The JUCCS architectural 
team used the formerly described architectural synthesis to identify the boundaries 
between the UAS and the external environment. 
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The CORE® software allows the use of either Enhanced Functional Flow Block 
Diagrams (EFFBD) or the Integration Definition for Functional Modeling (IDEF0) as an 
architectural format.  The EFFBD is used “for capturing dynamic behavior in a 
representation that can be simulated” [Buede, 2009].  IDEF0 is a process model which 
addresses “how outputs are transformed from inputs via some function, activity, or task” 
[Buede, 2009].  The complex interaction between multiple functions within the UAS is 
more suited to the functional and non-linear IDEF0 format, so this is the format that was 
chosen by the JUCCS architectural team. 
The IDEF0 format consists of several functional blocks per diagram, and each 
block can consist of four activities.  These activities consist of the Inputs, Controls, 
Outputs, and Mechanisms (ICOM).  The input is an activity flow that enters the 
functional block from the left.  The control has an effect on the function and enters the 
block from the top.  The output captures what the function has done and exits the block 
from the right.  Finally the mechanism, although not used in the JUCCS functional 
architecture, is an external entity that can affect the function.  It is recommended that 
each functional level contain three to six functional blocks.  Some of the JUCCS IDEF0 
diagrams consist of as many as eight functional blocks and as few as two.  The JUCCS 
architectural team determined these variations from the IDEF0 recommendations were 
warranted in order to properly describe the corresponding functions [Knowledge Based 
Systems, Inc., 2010]. 
During the initial design, each of the major functions within the UAS system was 
defined based on the functional requirements detailed in Chapter VI.B.  These major 
functions provided the backbone for the JUCCS functional architecture and it was during 
this initial design that the CORE® software proved useful.  When data flow linkages 
between functions at different levels were not consistent the CORE® software provided 
indications of the inconsistencies.   The inconsistencies could then be adjudicated and 
corrected to allow consistent functional flow.  
Additionally, further usefulness of the CORE® software was realized when 
editing and making changes to the functional architecture.  An artifact of using the 
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CORE® MBSE tool is that changes made at one level were properly reflected at lower 
levels or an indicator identified an inconsistency.  Since the JUCCS functional 
architecture went through seven major revisions, the tool enabled the JUCCS 
architectural team to quickly and accurately make changes that would have been difficult 
to track if an MBSE tool was not used.   
E. JUCCS PROPOSED COMMON GCS ARCHITECTURE 
As discussed, the architectural views were developed using an IDEF0 approach.  
The IDEF0 functions were decomposed only to the level needed to show the air vehicle 
control functions and to those levels necessary to show that the requirements in Chapter 
VI.B for common training are demonstrated by the architecture.  Each sub-function was 
then modeled in IDEF0 to ensure consistent data flow between levels. 
1. A-1: External Systems Diagrams 
The initial context diagram, shown in Figure 27, was modeled in IDEF0.  This 
was accomplished by creating an external system diagram, shown in Figure 31, and 
defining the different data flows between the elements.  The IDEF0 version of the 
original diagram results in a greater resolution of what data flows between elements and 















Figure 31. JUCCS IDEF0 A-1 External Systems Diagram 
The external context diagram in IDEF0 format shows the external entities that are outside the system (C0) and how they interact with the system.  The 
block shown in green (UAS) has been further decomposed in the architecture.
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As discussed, the A-1 external diagram here is the IDEF0 version of Figure 27.  
The descriptions of each of the external entities and how they interact with diagram have 
already been discussed and can be found in Chapter VII.C.   
2. A0: UAS Node Diagram 
The A0 JUCCS UAS node diagram was modeled in IDEF0 as shown in Figure 
32.  This was accomplished by taking the JUCCS UAS block diagram shown in Figure 
28 and defining the different data flows between the elements.  The IDEF0 version of the 
diagram results in a greater resolution of what data flows between elements and in what 
direction that data flows. 
 
Figure 32. JUCCS IDEF0 A0 UAS Node 
This diagram shows the two internal nodes of the A0 system diagram.  They include the Air Vehicle and the 
Ground Control Station functions. Only the Ground Control Station functions shown in the green block will 
be decomposed in this architecture. 
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The IDEF0 A0 diagram shows the two functions of the UAS as a whole system.  
They are the Perform Ground Control Station Functions and the Perform Air Vehicle 
Functions.  The descriptions for these functions are located in Chapter VII.C.1.  The 
information flows from the A-1 external nodes are shown in the diagram.  They represent 
the interactions of the external entities with both functions of the UAS, as well as how the 
two functions of the UAS pass data between the Perform GCS Function and the Perform 
Air Vehicle Function. 
3. A1: Perform GCS Functions 
Perform GCS Functions details the overall system functions for the GCS.  The 
IDEF0 diagram of A1 Perform GCS Functions can be seen in Figure 33.  This IDEF0 
depiction shows all of the data flows between the GCS functions.  It is important to see 
that all communication from the air vehicle comes through A1.7 Manage Comms.  This 
includes things that are transmitted to the air vehicle from sources external to the system 
and then sent from the air vehicle to the GCS.  All communication that arrives at the GCS 

































Figure 33. JUCCS IDEF0 A1 Perform GCS Functions 
This IDEF0 diagram shows the eight functions that comprise the Perform GCS functions and their associated data flows. The blocks shown in green 
have been further decomposed in the architecture.
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The IDEF0 A1 diagram shows the eight functions of the GCS as a system.  The 
descriptions for these functions are located in Chapter VII.C.2.  The information flows 
from the A0 external nodes and from the Perform Air Vehicle Functions node are shown 
in the diagram.  They represent the interactions of the external entities with the GCS 
functions as well as how the two functions of the UAS pass data between them. 
4. A1.1: Provide Human Interface 
The A1.1 Provide Human Interface function is a top level GCS function.  It 
breaks out the human machine interface for all operator actions into a separate function.  
The functional architecture of the Provide Human Interface is made up of six functions: 
 A1.1.1 Perform Security and Role Based Access 
 A1.1.2 Provide HMI Setup Management 
 A1.1.3 Provide Mission Planning Interface 
 A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Control 
 A1.1.5 Provide Payload Data Processing Interface 
 A1.1.6 Provide Communication and Data Dissemination Interface 
Of these functions, A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Control will be 
decomposed further to show the AVO human-machine interface.   These six functions 

































Figure 34. JUCCS IDEF0 A11 Provide Human Interface 
The Provide Human Interface function allows all the operator interfaces to be grouped together in one functional group.  1.1.4 Interface with Mission 
Management Control will be further decomposed to show the AVO Human-Machine Interface. 
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A1.1.1 Perform Security and Role Based Access is the function that provides the 
interface to log into the system.  The function will then ensure that the person has the 
security clearance to use the system.  It will then find the role that allows that operator to 
access certain functions and therefore certain HMI functions and not others depending on 
the role that has been set up for that person.  It will provide the user access to the other 
functions in A1.1 to allow for their use through the validated user access data.  The 
function will allow the pass through of mission data through the A1.1.1 to the other 
functions. 
A1.1.2 Provide HMI Setup Management is the function that allows a validated 
user to change the way information is presented to them.  It can allow for setting of 
parameters such as the volume or tone of aural information.  It can allow the setting of 
parameters such as the colors or size of visual information.  It can also allow the setup of 
parameters for tactile information such as vibration frequency or amplitude of a controller 
or chair.  It could also allow setup of the input devices such as cursor scroll rate, etc. 
A1.1.3 Provide Mission Planning Interface is the function that provides the 
interface for the mission planning function of the GCS.  It will allow the HMI to the 
authorized operator to plan the UAS AV mission plan and transfer the data to the 
function A1.2 Plan Mission. 
A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Control is the function that provides 
the interface for A1.4 Manage Mission.  Inside of this functional area the HMI for the 
AVO interface necessary to meet the JUCCS requirement 1, 2, 3, and 4 are located.  This 
function will be further decomposed as shown in Figure 35.   
A1.1.5 Provide Payload Data Processing Interface is the function that provides 
the HMI for the A1.6 Process Payload Data.  This interface will control how the raw 
payload data is manipulated, annotated, and fused by the operators. 
A1.1.6 Provide Communication and Data Dissemination is the function that 
provides the HMI for the A1.7 Manage Comms and Disseminate Data.  This function 
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allows for the selection of data transmission paths, carrier frequencies, etc. to flow to the 
UAS AV and to sources external to the GCS.   
The decomposition of A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Control can be 
seen in Figure 35.   
 
Figure 35. JUCCS IDEF0 A114 Interface with Mission Management Control 
The Interface with Mission Management Control IDEF0 diagram shows the operator interface for mission, 
air vehicle and payload control.  The block shown in green is further decomposed in the architecture. 
 
The A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Control IDEF0 diagram shows 
the interaction between the JUCCS common HMI and the mission management 
functions.  Mission management functions consist of the operator interface for mission, 
air vehicle and payload control.  The user setup preferences control input consists of that 
specific operator‟s stored preferences.  The specific operator is authenticated using the 
validated user access control to ensure air vehicle commands only come from authorized 
operators.  The A1.1.4.1 Interface with Mission Control functional block provides the 
main input linkage and parses out the air vehicle or payload control as required.  The 
center function, A1.1.4.2 Interface with Air Vehicle Control functional block, is shown in 
green and is further decomposed to show how common air vehicle training benefits can 
be realized by this function.  The A1.1.4.3 Interface with Payload Control functional 
block provides the operator interface for controlling the specific payload.  Due to the 
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multiple different types of payloads which consist of weapons and sensors and their 
proprietary nature, this was not a function where the JUCCS architectural team focused 
their attention in order to realize commonality.  
 
Figure 36. JUCCS IDEF0 A1142 Interface with Air Vehicle Control 
The Interface with Air Vehicle Control IDEF0 diagram is the lowest decomposition of the operator 
interface with the air vehicle.  The actual human operator resides within the Interact with Human Operator 
functional block shown in the center as 1.1.4.2.2. 
 
The A1.1.4.2 Interface with Air Vehicle Control IDEF0 diagram consists of the 
functions that deal with how the current air vehicle mission information is presented to 
the operator.  The user setup preferences control input consists of that specific operator‟s 
stored preferences.  The specific operator is authenticated using the validated user access 
control to ensure air vehicle commands only come from authorized operators.  The 
A1.1.4.2.1 Convert Data to Desired Format functional block translates the air vehicle 
information to audio, visual or tactile information, or any combination of the three, 
depending on what is appropriate for that particular data and the operator‟s preferences.  
This translated air vehicle information is provided to the A1.1.4.2.2 Interact with Human 
Operator functional block which is where the human operator resides.  The human 
operator then makes decisions and provides unformatted inputs, through system input 
 
124 
devices such as a keyboard, mouse, joystick, touch-screen, etc.  This unformatted data is 
sent to the A1.1.4.2.3 Format and Disseminate Inputs and System Status functional block 
which translated the unformatted input into an air vehicle or mission management 
command.  An example of this translation would be the raw keyboard data being 
translated from the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) to the 
specific command, in its native format, going to the air vehicle, based on the operator‟s 
keystrokes.  An additional output from the A1.1.4.2.3 functional block is the detection of 
the operator‟s current mission setup features which are fed back up into the A1.1.2 
Provide HMI Setup Management functional block where the settings are stored for this 
operator‟s future use.    
5. A1.3: Manage Mission 
The A1.3 Manage Mission function is a top level GCS function.  It is the central 
function that the GCS system works through.  The function takes current information 
from the UAS AV status, payload information, mission plan, and uses inputs from the 
operator to send commands out to the system. The functional architecture of Manage 
Mission is made up of four functions: 
 A1.3.1 Monitor Mission 
 A1.3.2 Assess Mission 
 A1.3.3 Update Mission 
 A1.3.4 Direct System 
Of these functions, the A1.3.4 Direct System interface with A1.4 Command and 
Control Air Vehicle is necessary to send commands to the UAS AV to meet JUCCS 











Figure 37. JUCCS IDEF0 A13 Manage Mission 
The Manage Mission IDEF0 functional diagram provides the Monitor Mission and Assess Mission functions.  Based on the payload or air vehicle 
operator updated commands, the payload or air vehicle is provided with updated commands if required.
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The A1.3 Manage Mission IDEF0 functional diagram shows the JUCCS 
architecture‟s four major mission functions.  The A1.3.1 Monitor Mission functional 
block accepts air vehicle information, raw payload information from the weapon or 
sensor, and data for mission planning and management as input from the A1.2 Plan 
Mission function.  This information is translated and allows the operator to assess the 
mission at the A1.3.2 Assess Mission functional block.  The Assess Mission function also 
allows for input of the mission plan and outputs the current mission parameters and the 
mission management data for human use which feeds back into the HMI.  The output 
from A1.3.2 is the current assessed mission data from the operator which is input into the 
A1.3.3 Update Mission functional block where the operator makes mission changes based 
on the current data.  The output from A1.3.3 is the raw payload data, which is sent to the 
A1.6 Process Payload Data functional block, and the mission data, which is sent to the 
A1.7 Manage Comms & Disseminate Data functional block.  The final output from 
A1.3.3 is the system direction command which is the input to the A1.3.4 Direct System 
functional block.  The Direct System functional block then formats the appropriate 
commands for the air vehicle (which is an input to A1.4 Command and Control Air 
Vehicle) and the payload (which is an input to A1.5 Control Payload).    
6. A1.4: Command and Control Air Vehicle 
The A1.4 Command and Control Air Vehicle function is shown in Figure 38.  It is 
important to see that the two sub-functions here are both transfer functions that translate 
system specific commands into a standard set of command controls to facilitate JUCCS 





Figure 38. JUCCS IDEF0 A14 Command and Control Air Vehicle 
The JUCCS IDEF0 Command and Control Air Vehicle is where the proprietary command enters the 
Control Air Vehicle functional block and is translated into a standard command output (an example of 
which would be the STANAG 4586 interoperable formatted commands) on the output.  Similarly the 
formatted air vehicle status data enters the Monitor Air Vehicle functional block and is translated to its 
proprietary air vehicle information for use in the GCS. Both of these blocks are decomposed further. 
 
The A1.4 Command and Control Air Vehicle IDEF0 diagram consists of the 
A1.4.1 Control Air Vehicle and A1.4.2 Monitor Air Vehicle functional blocks.  While the 
main purpose of these functional blocks is to control and monitor the air vehicle, here is 
where the main tenets of STANAG 4586, a common standard format for UAV control 
external to the GCS, can be realized.  Formats, however, are not limited to STANAG 
4586.  For instance the A1.4.1 Control Air Vehicle functional block receives the 
proprietary (e.g. Boeing, Northrop Grumman, etc.) air vehicle commands and translates 
them from a proprietary air vehicle language into standard formatted commands for the 
air vehicle.  This translation is conducted through the use of software subroutines that 
perform the translation within the Control Air Vehicle functional block.  Similarly the 
A1.4.2 Monitor Air Vehicle functional block translates the common standard formatted 
air vehicle status and converts it to the native system language within the GCS.  These 
two translation functional blocks allow for the commonality and interoperability that 
STANAG 4586 and the 2009 USD(AT&L) ADM are requesting.  











Figure 39. JUCCS IDEF0 A141 Control Air Vehicle 
The JUCCS Control Air Vehicle IDEF0 diagram shows the functional blocks responsible for formatting flight parameters, electrical power settings and 
specific avionics equipment settings from the proprietary language into a common standard formatted commands.   
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The A1.4.1 Control Air Vehicle IDEF0 diagram provides further decomposition of 
the Control Air Vehicle functional block.  The A1.4.1.1 Control Air Vehicle Flight 
Parameters functional block accepts the proprietary air vehicle commands that relate to 
flight parameters, such as climb to a certain altitude or proceed to a certain waypoint, and 
translates them into a standard STANAG 4586 formatted flight parameter.  The A1.4.1.2 
Control Air Vehicle Power functional block accepts the proprietary air vehicle commands 
that relate to vehicle power management and translates them into a standard STANAG 
4586 formatted command.  An example of this functional block in operation is turning 
off the external lights, radios and payload power in the event of an emergency generator 
failure to conserve battery power for flight control surface movement required for the 
emergency landing.  The A1.4.1.3 Control Air Vehicle Equipment functional block 
accepts the proprietary air vehicle commands that relate to equipment settings and 
translates them into a standard STANAG 4586 formatted command.  An example of this 
functional block is setting the IFF codes provided by ATC or changing communications 
frequencies.  The A1.4.1.4 Provide Air Vehicle Interface functional block accepts the 
three standard STANAG 4586 formatted commands (flight parameters, power 
commands, and equipment settings) and prioritizes and queues these commands for 
transmission to the air vehicle through the A1.7 Manage Comms & Disseminate Data 
functional block.  
The A1.4.2 Monitor Air Vehicle function is shown in Figure 40.    
 
Figure 40. JUCCS IDEF0 A142 Monitor Air Vehicle 
The JUCCS Monitor Air Vehicle IDEF0 diagram performs the translation of the input standard (such as 
STANAG 4586) formatted air vehicle status messages and translates these messages to the native system’s 
proprietary language making interoperability possible. The link status is also monitored for usability.  
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The A1.4.2 Monitor Air Vehicle IDEF0 diagram shows the two functional blocks 
that monitor the air vehicle link, telemetry and health.  The A1.4.2.1 Monitor Air Vehicle 
Link Status functional block receives the standard STANAG 4586 formatted status 
message, checks the data link status for proper operation, and then translates the status 
message into the proprietary native language.  The A1.4.2.2 Monitor Air Vehicle 
Telemetry and Health functional block receives the standard STANAG 4586 formatted 
air vehicle telemetry and health status message and translates these messages to the 
proprietary native language.  The native air vehicle telemetry and health status message is 
then queued and added to the native air vehicle data link status and disseminated as 
native air vehicle information to the A1.3 Manage Mission functional block. 
F. SUMMARY OF JUCCS ARCHITECTURE AND LINKAGE TO 
REQUIREMENTS 
The JUCCS common architecture requirements were derived in Chapter VI.B 
from NAVAIR program and other UAS documentation.  The requirements were 
tabulated and relationships were linked from the JUCCS common architecture.  Each 
requirement was related to the functional architecture in order to trace the requirements 
of the system to the initial requirements stated in the ADM.  Table 9 shows the 




Table 9. Linkage of JUCCS Architectural Elements to Requirements 
This table shows the linkages between the JUCCS architectural elements and the requirements that were 
defined earlier in the report.  The table shows that some of the requirements are directly met by specific 
functional blocks while others are indirectly met by the overall methodology used in the architecture.  
Table 9. Linkage of JUCCS Architectural Elements to Requirements (continued) 
Common Architecture 
Requirement 
Linkage to JUCCS Proposed Common Architecture 
1. 
 
The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 









Requirement 1 will be fulfilled when the derived requirements 2-5 are satisfied. 
2. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
have a common 
Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI) for 




Function A1.1.4.2 Interface w/ Air Vehicle Control found inside of A1.1 
Provide Human Interface allows the architecture to meet requirement 2.  The 
interface is made standard through a single AVO interface in the common GCS 
architecture.  This will allow the training of AVOs of different UAS air 
vehicles in a single way of entering commands for the air vehicle into the GCS.  
This means a single type of training can be developed and AVOs will be able 
to operate different types of air vehicles. 
3. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
allow for directed 
vice controlled air 
vehicle operation.  
 
 
Function A1.1.4.2 Interface w/ Air Vehicle Control allows for the air vehicle 
controls to be designed as directed controls so that they are common from air 
vehicle to air vehicle.  Using controlled inputs (flight control stick, rudder and 
throttles) would still lead to differences in how each vehicle was given inputs, 
but by being a directed control system, all the commands can be taught the 
same way. 
4. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
allow for separate 
Human-Machine 
Interfaces (HMI) for 




The structure of A1.1.4 Interface with Mission Management Controls 
specifically breaks out air vehicle controls from payload controls.  It is 
important in this architecture that the air vehicle control be isolated from the 
payload control.  Payloads can vary greatly in function and operation from air 
vehicle to air vehicle type.  The AVO controls however should be and can be 
the same, and this separation of the functions becomes necessary. 
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Table 9. Linkage of JUCCS Architectural Elements to Requirements (continued) 
Common Architecture 
Requirement 
Linkage to JUCCS Proposed Common Architecture 
5. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 





Since UAS air vehicles require a mission planning system, if all the mission 
planning systems are common in the GCS, then a single way of training for use 
of the mission planning interface can be utilized.  This will allow for all AVO 
training to be consolidated into a standard AVO training pipeline. 
6. The Ground Control 





Systems (UASs).  
 
This requirement is met by function A1.4 Command and Control of Air 
Vehicle.  This function allows for each command within the GCS system to be 
translated into a common control language to be sent to the air vehicle. This 
common language can be used to send information to all the different UAS air 
vehicles that understand the common language. 
7. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable common 
communications and 
data link management 
between multiple 
Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UASs).  
 
Requirement 7 and 8 are met with function A1.7 Manage/Disseminate Data and 
A1.8 Perform External Comms.  These functions enable physical transport 
layer and encoding layers that are standard between vehicles.  They also allow 
for a standard interface that can be trained to operators in common training. 
8. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
utilize a common data 





Requirement 7 and 8 are met with function A1.7 Manage/Disseminate Data and 
A1.8 Perform External Comms.  These functions enable physical transport 
layer and encoding layers that are standard between vehicles.  They also allow 
for a standard interface that can be trained to operators in common training. 
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Table 9. Linkage of JUCCS Architectural Elements to Requirements (continued) 
Common Architecture 
Requirement 
Linkage to JUCCS Proposed Common Architecture 
9. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) 
systems software and 
architecture shall be 
modular and scalable.  
 
This requirement is satisfied by the separation of functions in the architecture.  
This will allow the architecture to be modular and scalable to different number 
of workstations.  The software can follow this functional architecture allowing 
for different hardware to meet the functional requirements based on the 
operating environment and the need of the GCS.  Each GCS can then be 
designed independently as long as it can run the common interface software so 
that common training can be realized.   
10. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 





(UAS) platforms.  
 
 
Because the software can be designed to follow the common architecture, a 
single set of software can be used for the AVO control and interface.  This 
means that only one set of software needs to be updated and maintained.  This 
will simplify the support and maintenance by reducing multiple software suites 
that need maintenance to only a single common set of software. 
 
11. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 





(UAS) platforms.  
 
Requirement number 11 is indirectly satisfied through this architecture by the 
fact that using this common architecture will reduce the manpower required.  
First, because of common training, fewer instructors will be needed to train 
new AVOs. Secondly, because AVOs can fly different types of air vehicles 
from the common GCS, AVOs can share responsibilities for launch and 
recovery of air vehicles as well as be used to help fill share AVO assignments. 
 
12. The Ground Control 
Station (GCS) shall 
enable a common 






Requirement 12 can be indirectly met because with a common GCS and 
common interfaces, common simulators or training systems can be utilized on a 
base.  This reduces the number of different kind of simulators needed.  This can 
reduce the number of bases or the number of people needed to maintain the 




The twelve JUCCS common architecture requirements were related to elements of 
the JUCCS common architecture.  The functional architecture is now related to the 
derived requirements, which in turn are related back to the original ADM requirements.  
The functional architecture is also traceable to elements of NAVAIR and DoD UAS 
requirements.  The requirements and architecture are the basis of a common, modular, 


















VIII. IMPROVED TRAINING POSSIBILITIES WITH JUCCS 
COMMON GCS ARCHITECTURE 
The current DoN UAS AVO training concept is stovepiped for each platform and 
is based upon the existing manned platform user community.  Based upon JUCCS 
analysis of the BUQs, the proposed training concept is for common AVO training across 
UAS platforms.  Benefits and challenges associated with the common AVO training 
proposed by the JUCCS team are explored in this section.      
A. CURRENT NAVY UAS TRAINING PRACTICES 
1. Navy Training System Plans 
Developing stovepiped UAS training plans may be the simplest option, but it is 
probably not the most efficient or cost effective method to train future UAS AVOs.  
BAMS and Fire Scout have very different training plans and STUAS will almost 
certainly develop its own unique training plan when the program reaches that point. 
As part of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) Family of 
Systems (FoS), the BAMS UAS will provide a multiple-sensor, persistent maritime ISR 
capability, as an adjunct to the USN P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 
(MMA) weapons system.  The BAMS UAS supports a wide variety of military 
operations.  They include: maritime surveillance, communications relay, homeland 
defense, collection of enemy order of battle information, mine warfare, maritime 
interdiction, surface warfare, battle damage assessment, counter drug operations, port 
surveillance, battlespace management, situational awareness, and support for targeting for 
maritime and littoral strike [PMA-205, 2007]. 
The BAMS UAS, like most Group 3-5 UASs, plans to transition Naval Aviators 
from manned platforms to fill the AVO role.  Initially, BAMS UAS operators will consist 
of experienced P-3C Naval Aviators who will transition directly to the BAMS UAS, and 
provide a pool of experienced operators.  In the future, BAMS UAS operators will be 
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comprised of not only experienced P-8A Poseidon aircrew, but may also include initial 
accessions not exclusively from the MPRF community as shown in Figure 41. 
As much as practical, BAMS UAS training media and delivery will emulate P-8A 
Poseidon and other UAS FoS approaches to ease transition training and provide training 
standardization.  The notional BAMS UAS training system is expected to include formal 
schoolhouse training as well as informal training (CBT and Web-Based Training 
(WBT)), a Learning Management Information System, deployable training, embedded 
training, and training devices necessary to provide the most effective and efficient 
training system [PMA-205, 2007]. 
 
Figure 41.  BAMS Training Pipeline 
The pipeline shows the training required for a BAMS AVO to be mission qualified.  The training begins 
with new accessions, and ends with a BAMS squadron.   
 
Fire Scout is a USN UAS that will provide a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and 
Target Acquisition (RSTA) and an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
and communications relay capability in support of littoral operations.  It is designed to 
operate as part of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Aviation Mission Package (AMP) with 
support being focused on a distributed LCS force [PMA-205, 2008]. 
The Fire Scout UAS will transition MH-60 Naval Aviators to fill the AVO role.  
A two-man crew will operate the Fire Scout system.  The crew will consist of a Naval 
officer AVO or MC (Mission Commander), and an enlisted Mission Payload Operator 
(MPO).  The AVO or MC will be dual-qualified as a MH-60R/S variant helicopter pilot 




Fire Scout training courses will be developed in accordance with Sharable 
Content Object Reference Model and Integrated Learning Environment requirements.  
The training will be provided using Interactive Media Instruction, Interactive 
Courseware, Computer-Aided Instruction, and the Fire Scout Mission Training Device 
(MTD) [PMA-205, 2008]. 
 
Figure 42. Fire Scout Training Pipeline 
The pipeline shows the training required for a Fire Scout AVO/MC to be mission qualified.  The training 
begins with new accessions, and ends with a fleet squadron on an LCS.   
 
Both the Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) and Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command (NECC) will operate STUAS under differing organizational and 
operational constructs.  CNSF will operate STUAS through ship-based detachments.  The 
detachment will bring all necessary equipment to operate STUAS from a ship that has 
been modified to accommodate the UAS.  NECC forces within the Maritime 
Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) will employ STUAS in a detachment construct.  
The MESF plan calls for a detachment in each Maritime Expeditionary Security 
Squadron (MSRON).  MSRON personnel will be cross-trained to operate some or all of 
the unmanned vehicles in the squadron, to include air, surface, or undersea vehicles.   
Actual STUAS manpower and personnel requirements require further study and 
refinement based on training programs and operational experience.  CNSF's initial 
manpower estimates indicate that a detachment size of five personnel is required to 
operate STUAS.  The current MESF plan calls for a six man detachment in each of the 
thirteen MSRONs. 
STUAS will be designed to be operated by personnel with the same or equivalent 
skill levels and classifications that are in the current USN active duty inventory, but this 
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does not imply that rated aviators are required or desired to operate the air vehicles and 
sensor payloads.  The STUAS training system is expected to include a mix of instructor 
led courseware, CBT, WBT, and scenario based crew simulation training. 
2. Current Navy UAS Training Concepts 
BAMS fleet training will occur at one of the Continental United States (CONUS) 
BAMS squadrons which may be co-located with P-3C or P-8A Main Operating Bases 
(MOB).  The BAMS UAS will be designed with an integrated full mission simulation 
capability, which will be capable of individual and crew training and be able to 
participate in strike group, fleet, and joint task force exercises [USFFC, 2009].  While 
this minimizes the number of unique training facilities and devices, any required 
modifications would be fully borne by the BAMS program. 
Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) and Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) squadrons 
support a variety of detachments including LCS aviation detachments.  Since the Fire 
Scout AVO and MC is identified to come from the MH-60 community, the schoolhouses 
are conceptually identified to be co-located with fleet concentration areas of MH-60 to 
ease training travel and funding issues.  Figure 43 illustrates the current distribution of 
MH-60 and Fire Scout aviation detachment locations [USFFC, 2009].  While this may 
make Fire Scout training more convenient for the squadron, it will require each MH-60 
base to set up a full training facility for all operators and maintainers.  With so many 
unique training facilities and devices, utilization will certainly not be optimal and any 




Figure 43. MH-60 Fleet Concentration Areas 
This illustrates worldwide concentration of MH-60/Fire Scout Aviation Detachment locations and 
personnel quantities.  Figure from [USFFC, 2009]. 
 
It is premature to discuss the current STUAS training pipeline since the program 
is still in an early development stage.  Actual STUAS manpower, personnel, and training 
requirements require further study and refinement based upon future training programs 
and operational experience. 
Figure 44 illustrates the large number of locations where training is currently, or 
planned to be performed, and the training devices for selected UAS platforms.  It also 
highlights an inefficient USN and U.S. Marine Corp UAS training plan.  These 
inefficiencies have caused PMA-205 to propose a common schoolhouse for future UAS 
training [PMA-205, 2009].  In addition to the common schoolhouse that PMA-205 has 
proposed, the JUCCS team has expanded the original PMA-205 BUQ analysis in order to 
determine if a common GCS architecture combined with the common schoolhouse 





Figure 44. Current UAS Training Locations  
This figure illustrates training locations for selected large UASs.  Note the wide distribution of training 
locations.  Figure from [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
B. PROPOSED FUTURE NAVY UAS TRAINING PRACTICES 
PMA-205 has proposed a common schoolhouse that would be capable of common 
training for AVOs based upon their analysis of the BUQs.  Their proposal would include 
a common core curriculum and platform centric curriculum.  The JUCCS analysis 
expands upon the PMA-205 analysis and addresses the BUQs that could be achieved 
through the proposed architecture.  
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1. Expanded Analysis of Basic UAS Qualifications 
The BUQ I-IV KSAs are the foundation for the design and implementation of the 
AVO training concept of operation.  As described previously in Chapter V.C, there 
currently is not a single UAS training model that is employed, but rather disparate 
methods at decentralized training locations.  A primary theory in the approach to this 
problem was that overhead costs incurred during AVO training would be reduced by 
implementing a common GCS architecture.  This architectural change across Group 3-5 
UASs would potentially require less infrastructure, reduced manpower requirements, and 
a single course of instruction for primary AVO KSAs.  An analysis was conducted on the 
BUQ I-IV KSAs to determine if a quantifiable benefit could be realized. 
The method of the analysis was to compare the BUQ I-IV KSAs against two types 
of GCS architectures across Group 3-5 UASs.  Instructor pilots, operational pilots, and 
UAS engineers were asked to assess how the training of each BUQ could be conducted 
against two different GCS architectures.  A score of common was to be awarded if the 
BUQ training was common across all the UASs.  A score of unique was to be awarded if 
the BUQ training was deemed to be unique to each UAS.  If one stakeholder deemed a 
task unique, while another scored it common, the unique scoring was awarded.  This was 
done to create the most conservative comparison possible.  
The first type of architecture analyzed was labeled the As-Is architecture.  The 
As-Is represents the current approach to UAS GCS architectures where there is no 
consideration of commonality from one system to another.  The second type of 
architecture analyzed was the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture.  The JUCCS 
Proposed Common represents a common GCS architecture implementation across all 
Group 3-5 UASs as proposed in this project.    
Table 10 represents a sample of the BUQ-III KSA analysis raw data.  As an 
example, for the Obtaining an IFR clearance KSA, a score of common was awarded for 
both architectures.  This is because the teaching and execution of this task is not 
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dependent on the interface between the AVO and the GCS.  The IFR clearance is a 
procedural task conducted prior to flight operations and is independent of any interfaces.  
Conversely, the Establishing and maintaining constant altitude, airspeed, and heading 
during instrument flight KSA was scored unique in relation to the current HMI employed, 
but was scored common based upon the implementation of the JUCCS Proposed 
Common GCS Architecture.  In this example, the instruction to teach this task would 
require platform specific training based upon current system design.  However, the 
JUCCS proposed architecture with a common HMI interface would allow this task to be 
taught exactly the same across all candidate platforms.  Table 10 shows an excerpt of the 
BUQ analysis, while the complete analysis of the BUQs can found in Appendix D. 
Table 10. Sample of Expanded BUQ Analysis Based on Architecture Type 
This table is a sample of the expanded BUQ analysis performed by the JUCCS team.  It shows whether 
specific KSAs would need to be taught in a common or unique manner based on the As-Is or JUCCS 














The results of the analysis for BUQs I-IV are shown in Table 11.  The data shows 
that implementation of the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture will reduce the 
number of unique training tasks from 154 out of 213, down to 7 out of 213 total KSAs.  
These seven tasks are related to pre-flight, post-flight, and emergency procedures specific 
to the different airframes of the UASs, and will always require platform specific training.  
The magnitude of the reduction of unique tasks allows the consideration of a common 
training pipeline for AVOs, which could result in tremendous manpower, infrastructure, 
and cost efficiencies. 
Table 11. Reduction of Unique KSAs for the JUCCS Proposed Common versus As-Is GCS 
Architectures 
This table shows a summary of the expanded BUQ analysis.  The number of unique KSAs that need to be 




















BUQ I 36 68  97 7  104 
BUQ II 13 18  31 0  31 
BUQ III 5 14  19 0  19 
BUQ IV 5 54  59 0  59 




2. Proposed Common Schoolhouse Navy UAS Pipelines 
The concept of a common UAS schoolhouse has been proposed as a method to 
increase efficiency in the training methods of the DoD.  This idea can be seen in the 
following statement made by the UAS Platform Wholeness CONOPS:  
In order to ensure standard UAS policy and procedures and gain efficiency 
in training overhead a common UAS flight school or UAS school house 
should be established to bridge the gap between accessions programs and 
type/model/series (T/M/S) specific UAS training courses. [USFFC, 2009] 
Driven by this statement, PMA-205 has proposed a common schoolhouse concept.  Note 
that this concept is simply to geographically consolidate training programs, and does not 
rely on a common GCS concept.  In order to further develop the possibilities created with 
a combined common schoolhouse and a common GCS, the JUCCS team expanded the 
BUQ analysis performed by PMA-205.  This expanded analysis in the previous section 
shows that the number of unique KSAs for each BUQ level is dramatically reduced by 
implementing the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS architecture. 
The common schoolhouse concept proposed by the PMA-205 analysis is shown 
in Figure 45.  It shows a common, core schoolhouse where the majority of the UAS 
instruction is performed.  It accommodates new accession operators with a 
comprehensive training curriculum as well as previous operators with platform specific 
instruction.  Analysis of this concept shows that 59 of the 213 BUQ I-IV KSAs could be 
performed using common training with the remainder requiring platform specific 
training.  It is important to note that this concept does not require the use of a common 






Figure 45. PMA-205 Notional Operator Training Path 
This diagram shows a notional training path that would result from implementing a common, core 
schoolhouse (but not a common GCS) concept.   Note that 154 KSAs remain platform specific and need to 
be taught outside the common core instruction.  Figure from [PMA-205, 2009]. 
 
If the common GCS concept were included into the above analysis, improved 
capabilities would be realized.  The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 46 on the 
following page.  It is very similar to the PMA-205 notional operator training path, but 
includes more commonality based upon the proposed architecture with a common AVO 
interface.  The JUCCS analysis shows that 206 of the 213 BUQ I-IV KSAs could be 
performed using common training with only seven KSAs requiring platform specific 
training.  These seven remaining KSAs are airframe specific functions related to 
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Figure 46. JUCCS Notional Operator Training Path 
This diagram shows a notional training path that would result from implementing a common, core 
schoolhouse concept with JUCCS proposed common architecture.  Note that only seven KSAs need to be 
taught outside the common schoolhouse.  These KSAs are airframe specific functions related to preflight, 
post-flight, and emergency procedures. 
 
3. Quantitative Benefits Analysis of JUCCS Proposed Common GCS 
To compare the benefits of implementing different approaches to GCS 
architectures and AVO training methods, the JUCCS team created a notional illustration 
to compare the three different training strategies discussed in this paper.  Since STUAS is 
still in source selection and no training approach has been defined, Fire Scout and BAMS 
were the only existing UASs included in this analysis for each described approach.  
The first comparison item, labeled Option 1 in Table 12, consists of the As-Is GCS 
Architectures with Distributed Schoolhouses.  This concept is based upon existing BAMS 
[PMA-205, 2007] and Fire Scout [PMA-205, 2008] training pipelines and documented 
training CONOPS.  The BAMS and Fire Scout GCS architectures for this concept are not 



























Option 2 in Table 12 consists of the As-Is GCS Architectures with Common 
Schoolhouse.  This concept is based upon the NAVAIR Training Systems (PMA-205) 
co-located training model discussed earlier in this paper [PMA-205, 2009].  Although this 
concept includes a common schoolhouse, the GCS architectures remain unique to their 
respective programs.  
Option 3 in Table 12 consists of the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture 
with Common Schoolhouse.  This concept is based upon the common GCS architecture 
proposed by JUCCS in this project.  In addition to providing a common GCS 
architecture, this analysis assumes inclusion of the common schoolhouse as described by 
PMA-205. 
To lay the foundations for the analysis and to ensure that an appropriate 
comparison of existing and notional pipelines was completed, the following assumptions 
were employed: 
 Analysis is based upon yearly Operations and Sustainment (O&S) cost of the 
different alternatives.  Historically, O&S costs are the largest component of 
Life Cycle Costs (LCC), and are the most relevant for this comparison.  The 
development and Military Construction (MILCON) costs of the notional 
alternatives are not considered in this analysis as they are a very small 
percentage of the larger LCC over a 20 year operational lifespan. 
 AVO throughput is assumed constant at 115 students per year.  This is the 
sum for the current documented throughput of 75 for BAMS [PMA-205, 
2007] and 40 for Fire Scout [PMA-205, 2008].  
With the above assumptions made, a strategy for an appropriate analysis can be 
produced.  This results in a set of procedures and logic that are detailed in Appendix E.  
The creation of this logic was based on research from many sources, which are also listed 
in Appendix E. 
The assumptions and strategy were then incorporated into the O&S cost analysis 
displayed in Table 12.  The O&S cost categories include: number of training sites, total 
number of simulators, total annual simulator O&S cost, total annual courseware 
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management cost, total annual infrastructure cost, total number of instructors, total annual 
instructor cost, total number of support and administrative personnel, and total annual 
support and administrative personnel cost.  The table compares the cost categories for the 
three training options.   
Option 2 is included in the analysis because it is an intermediate step between the 
As-Is GCS Architectures with Distributed Schoolhouses and the JUCCS Proposed 
Common GCS Architecture with Common Schoolhouse.  This option is the PMA-205 
proposed common schoolhouse solution with no common GCS architecture.  It does not 
realize the full benefits of the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture.  Therefore, 
the following discussion of the analysis will focus on comparing Option 1 to Option 3.  
Several observations of the comparative analysis of Option 1 and Option 3, found 
in Table 12, were noted:  
 A common schoolhouse concept reduces the number of training sites required 
from 7 to 1 
 Required number of simulators decreases from 14 to 4 
 Annual courseware management costs using a common architecture are 
reduced by taking advantage of a 96 percent common training curriculum 
 Total annual infrastructure costs are reduced as the number of sites decreases 
 The number of instructors, support, and administrative personnel is reduced 




Table 12. High Level Analysis of O&S Costs of Different Training Options 
This table represents the notional O&S costs of the current and proposed training concepts.  Note the 
reduction in O&S costs as the level of commonality increases. 
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simulators








$381,000 $381,000 $762,000 $571,500 $381,000
Total annual 
infrastructure cost
$231,200 $578,000 $809,200 $231,200 $231,200
Total number of 
instructors
12 30 42 11 8
Total annual 
instructor cost
$2,581,608 $6,454,020 $9,035,628 $2,366,474 $1,721,072









$2,353,392 $5,883,480 $8,236,872 $1,045,952 $522,976
Total annual 
training O&S cost






Several conclusions of the comparative analysis of Option 1 and Option 3 were 
noted.  The total annual simulator O&S cost decreases by over $5 million.  Courseware 
management costs are reduced by half to approximately $318,000.  Total annual 
infrastructure costs will be reduced by 67 percent, to $231,000.  Total annual instructor 
cost is reduced by over $7 million.  Total annual support and administration personnel 
cost is reduced by 94 percent from $8.2 million to $0.5 million.  The total annual O&S 
cost savings is projected to be reduced from $26.3 million to $5.0 million.  Over a 20 
year period the LCC savings would be $426 million in current year dollars.   
C. SUMMARY OF COMMON UAS TRAINING BENEFITS 
It is clear from the USD(AT&L) ADM that Mr. John Young believed that an 
opportunity existed to maximize training efficiencies by implementing a common UAS 
GCS architecture [USD(AT&L), 2009].  The DoN has also recognized this potential and 
has documented it in the Fleet Unmanned Aircraft System Platform Wholeness Concept 
of Operations [USFFC, 2009].  In this draft document, the goals of Commander, Fleet 
Forces Command for the DoN‟s UAS FoS are discussed and include:   
The Navy will efficiently field a FoS of affordable UASs that are reliable 
and supportable in both Navy and USMC environments and interoperable 
with today‟s combat systems.  The FoS approach will identify 
opportunities for commonality that can provide affordability, flexibility, 
efficiency and greater effectiveness.  These opportunities include, but are 
not limited to:  Commonality among UAS operator training standards.  
Common approaches to UAS manpower support and basing needs... 
[USFFC, 2009] 
The benefits of implementing a common GCS HMI architecture directly support these 
goals.  From an affordability perspective, the reduced need for infrastructure is the largest 
factor in addressing this requirement.  By implementing an architecture that allows the 
majority of UAS training across different platforms to be common, one can also lead to 
the ability to train all of those operators at a single location.  This leads to a reduced need 
for capital investments in personnel housing, training buildings, classrooms, support 
elements, and simulators.  It also allows the efficiency desired by reducing the need for 
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the manpower required to run the training centers.  Under the proposed approach, there is 
a reduced need for the number of instructors, simulator technicians, courseware 
managers, and support personnel.  Efficiencies are also realized by increasing the 
utilization rate of the facilities. 
The benefits of implementing a common GCS architecture still hold true even if 
the DoN elects to forgo a centralized training location.  Some of the capital benefits 
discussed above certainly are reduced, however instruction could still be standardized.  
This leads to the requirement to develop a single core syllabus that could be centrally 
managed.   
Another benefit of implementing the common architecture is that the time to 
transfer and train an AVO from one UAS to another is significantly reduced.  This is an 
added benefit to implementing the common architecture with common AVO HMI and 
could have a significant impact on DoN manpower requirements regardless of whether 
the co-located training concept is implemented.   
D. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING COMMON UAS TRAINING  
Implementing a UAS training concept with co-located training brings several 
potential benefits as discussed above, however there are some concerns that deserve 
proper attention.  They range from tangible concerns to cultural issues that should be 
considered prior to implementing this approach.   
A primary concern is that there are vast differences between the larger operational 
concepts of the UASs that are proposed to be combined into a single training pipeline.  
Flying an eight hour average BAMS mission is much different than executing a two hour 
average Fire Scout mission.  If one considers the pure difference in size between these 
two UASs, and the fact that one is a fixed-wing UAV while the other is a rotary-wing 
UAV, it becomes apparent that challenges exist.  The argument is if the status-quo of 
separate training locations remains, the new AVOs would be trained by instructors who 
most likely are past operators of the same system, or at least fully immersed in the single 
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system, and are likely to tailor the training experience toward real world operations.  In 
the proposed combined training concept, one could have a Fire Scout instructor teaching 
a BAMs operator how to conduct a landing approach.  If the proposed architecture is 
implemented correctly, it should not matter, but it is a concern that must be addressed.   
There are also benefits to conducting training at the operational bases of the UASs 
vice at a separately located training center.  This is less tangible, but there is a benefit in 
having access to actual fleet AVOs during training.  They provide a good source of 
knowledge and also are generally good critics of the quality of instruction that is being 
provided.  They also are used to provide training to students, which may be lost if the 
training center was not co-located with the operational units. 
Finally, if a common training center approach was implemented, the individual 
program offices of the UASs under development would have to implement integrated 
approaches toward training.  This would require each PMA to relinquish total authority 
for training (as is implemented today) and establish a forum to employ common training.  
This would add requirements to the programs that would impact the budgets of the 





IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The JUCCS team conducted research to determine the plausibility of 
implementing commonality in UAS GCSs, and the potential benefits that could be 
attained by achieving such commonality.  The team focused on the GCS since this is a 
necessary, but often overlooked portion of the overall system.  Additionally, the ADM 
released by USD(AT&L) in 2009 directed that commonality be implemented in UAS 
GCSs.   
To scope the problem, the JUCCS team concentrated on creation of a GCS 
functional architecture that enabled common AVO training.  The AVO functions were 
chosen because they are similar from UAS to UAS, while payload functions (weapons 
and sensors) can vary greatly between systems.  Training was selected as a focus because 
it was specifically cited in the ADM as a potential benefit from GCS commonality.  The 
scoped problem was then used to answer the research questions posed by the team at the 
beginning of the project:  
Research Question 1. What is meant by common and what is this project‟s 
interpretation of common? 
At a basic level, common means that some aspect of a system is shared with another 
system.  This can include hardware, software, or data link languages in a UAS.  This 
project interprets common to mean that two or more UASs share an aspect that will add 
functional, operational, or logistical advantage to the systems. 
Research Question 2. Is there a link between commonality and interoperability? 
The analysis showed that commonality and interoperability, while sometimes used 
interchangeably, are two different concepts.  Discussions included the notion that 
commonality and interoperability can be achieved independently from each other.  It was 
shown that commonality is possible without interoperability, and interoperability is 
possible without commonality.  Achieving the goals stated in the 2009 ADM require 
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some level of both commonality and interoperability for UASs.  In general, some amount 
of commonality is typically required to realize a level of interoperability between 
systems.  JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture facilitates commonality for the 
GCS and enables interoperability between UAS platforms. 
Research Question 3. Is it possible to achieve some level of commonality for 
UAS GCSs, and if so, what requirements are necessary? 
The analysis completed in this project shows that it is possible to achieve some level of 
commonality for UAS GCSs.  While this has not happened frequently in the past, it is 
possible for future acquisitions. 
In order to facilitate common AVO training to the maximum extent, the JUCCS 
analysis showed that a common HMI for AVO functions is necessary.  The common 
HMI concept requires a directed type interface where the flight parameters (airspeed, 
altitude, latitude, longitude, etc) are input, as opposed to a controlled type interface where 
piloting devices (flight sticks, throttle, rudder, etc) are utilized.   This type of HMI 
commonality does not exist for current systems.   
Analysis of BUQs showed that there were no common standards for AVO 
training and qualifications.  Additionally, requirements for UAS commonality were not 
present in any DoN programs examined.  The following twelve system requirements 
were determined to be necessary to achieve common AVO training and the other 
functions required by the DoN UAS community: 
Requirement 1. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable Air Vehicle 
Operator (AVO) training commonality across multiple UAS platforms. 
Requirement 2. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall have a common 
Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) functions. 
Requirement 3. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall allow for directed vice 
controlled air vehicle operation.  
Requirement 4. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall allow for separate 
Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI) for payload and air vehicle control.  
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Requirement 5. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall have a common 
mission planning system.  
Requirement 6. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable interoperability 
between multiple Unmanned Air Systems (UASs).  
Requirement 7. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable common 
communications and data link management between multiple Unmanned Air 
Systems (UASs).  
Requirement 8. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall utilize a common data 
format to enable communication between multiple manned and unmanned 
systems.  
Requirement 9. The Ground Control Station (GCS) systems software and 
architecture shall be modular and scalable.  
Requirement 10. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common 
approach to simplify support and maintenance across multiple Unmanned Air 
System (UAS) platforms.  
Requirement 11. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common 
approach to reduce the manpower requirements across multiple Unmanned Air 
System (UAS) platforms.  
Requirement 12. The Ground Control Station (GCS) shall enable a common 
approach to minimize Unmanned Air System (UAS) basing.  
In order to be effective, these requirements would need to be mandated for future 
acquisition programs.  This list of requirements alone is not enough to create an actual 
common system, and leads to the next research question: 
Research Question 4. To meet these requirements, what architectural 
characteristics need to be developed? 
From these requirements the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture was 
developed.  This architecture fulfills the commonality desired in the ADM.  The primary 
characteristic modeled was an independent HMI function for interacting with the AVO.  
The functional architecture was developed to be both modular and scalable.  The air 
vehicle control function was designed to be a single interoperable format that would be 
used by all future UAVs to communicate with the common GCS.   
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Research Question 5. What are some of the benefits and challenges of achieving 
UAS GCS commonality?  
Using the JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture, an expanded analysis was 
performed against the BUQs.  It was shown that implementing the JUCCS architecture 
would allow for common AVO training in all areas except those that are related to 
specific UAV airframes (pre-flight, post-flight, and emergency procedures).  A brief 
analysis was performed to show an example of monetary savings that could be achieved 
by using the JUCCS architecture through reduction in instructors, training devices, and 
system and software maintenance.  The analysis showed a potential cost savings of over 
$400 million in O&S costs for training aspects of the GCS common architecture over a 
20 year span.  This quantification did not include potential benefits other than those 
found in training and additional benefits can be expected when other logistical elements 
are analyzed. 
Additionally, some of the challenges related to a common GCS architecture were 
explored.  These challenges relate to the differing missions of the UASs affecting the 
common schoolhouse concept.  UAS program offices would also lose some of the 
autonomy they currently have due to the need for a separate common GCS program 
office. 
In summary, the JUCCS project has developed a set of key requirements 
necessary for the creation of a common GCS architecture.  These requirements were used 
to create the innovative JUCCS Proposed Common GCS Architecture with a common 
AVO HMI.  This approach facilitates common training for UAS AVOs.  In addition to 
increasing operational capability, the common GCS architecture also facilitates 
interoperability.  The common GCS architecture provides additional benefits of reducing 
training O&S costs and ensuring consistent UAS AVO training. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To enable the common GCS architecture, it is recommended that changes be 
made to the existing NAVAIR acquisition process.  Currently, entire systems are 
157 
 
procured through a single program office.  For traditional aircraft and weapons with a 
single main airframe this works well.  In the world of UASs, there are two major system 
components, the UAV and the GCS.  Presently, both the UAV and GCS are procured 
together through one program office.  This is the traditional model for acquisition at 
NAVAIR. 
Some activities of hardware or software that are shared between programs, such 
as the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), are implemented by a separate program 
office that is responsible for the maintenance, support, and configuration management of 
the system.  The JMPS program office has control over the software, can set some 
specifications on the hardware that is needed to run it, and provides all the interface 
documents to the individual programs that are going to use the software. 
The method recommended by the JUCCS team to implement a common GCS is 
to establish a separate program office for the common GCS.  To allow the common GCS 
to remain modular and scalable, the common GCS program office would control the 
architecture and software of the GCS.  The AVO software could be kept standardized by 
utilizing a common HMI module specifically for AVO functions.  This would enable 
common AVO training between multiple platforms. 
Payload control software could also be kept as separate modules and libraries of 
specific software subroutines for controlling various types of payloads.  If a program 
needed to develop a new type of interface, both for data transfer and HMI, then those new 
subroutines could be added to the common payload library for use by new systems or for 
upgrading older ones. 
Each program office for a new UAS would be responsible for the new UAV and 
its capabilities.  The UAS program office would also be responsible for the physical 
hardware and layout of the GCS.  This would allow the programs to scale the GCS 
hardware to the system requirements.  Some large UASs may require a larger GCS crew, 
such as the six planned for BAMS.  Other UASs may require two or fewer operators.  
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The UAS program office could scale the operator stations to those necessary for the 
system.  This ability would allow the use of different hardware based on the operating 
environment of the GCS.  A ship based GCS may require hardware (antennae, computers, 
etc) that are hardened against water and salt.  An aircraft based GCS may need a trackball 
that can remain stationary at a workstation while the aircraft maneuvers. 
The individual UAS program offices would coordinate with the common GCS 
program office to effectively transfer the government furnished software and work with 
the UAV prime contractor to make the necessary hardware and software changes to meet 
the common GCS levels of commonality and interoperability.  This would be analogous 
to the way the JMPS program office currently conducts business with other entities 
within NAVAIR. 
Once the common GCS program office is operational, it would be necessary for 
NAVAIR to mandate a requirement that the common GCS architecture be used by all 
new DoN UAS programs.  This mandatory requirement would ensure the level of 
commonality needed to implement and sustain common AVO training.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The JUCCS team limited the scope of this research to the very specific area of 
commonality in the GCS and how it would relate to AVO training.  From the generated 
architecture and the results of the training analysis, other areas of study can be 
recommended for follow on research: 
1.  A cost benefit analysis of the effect the commonality and interoperability the JUCCS 
architecture would have on the ten elements of logistics is recommended.  This research 
could further examine the cost and time savings realization on manpower requirements, 
basing, personnel assignments and training, etc. as discussed in Chapter III.D. 
2.  An analysis and design of a standardized common AVO HMI is recommended.  While 
this report showed the benefit of using a common AVO HMI, actual functions and how 
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they would be designed for operator interaction needs to be defined.  This would include 
the software functional architecture and the actual physical architecture for the software 
user interface as well as the relative layout of the displays and audio and tactile 
information for the AVO.  This effort would need to include the requirements of displays 
and their relative positions to each other.  Implementation of input devices would need to 
be discussed as well as other operator interaction requirements. 
3.  Design of an interoperable air vehicle command and control module used by the 
common GCS for sending AVO commands is recommended.  This effort would require a 
gap analysis to look at STANAG 4586 and compare it to the needs of current DoN 
programs.  If STANAG 4586 were found to be insufficient to meet the AVO functions of 
the common GCS, a new standard for DoN UASs would need to be developed. 
4.  Further analysis of the internal and external data link and communications for the 
JUCCS functional architecture is recommended.  This would lead to an expansion of the 
JUCCS architecture to lower levels in the internal and external communications 
functions.  These new functions could then be analyzed for design of the physical 
architecture.  This design would need to examine both LOS and OTH communications.  
Existing systems would need to be explored to see if they could be used to facilitate the 
functions of the architecture. 
5.  Investigation of common payload HMI functions is recommended.  The payload HMI 
and functionality was specifically excluded from the JUCCS architecture.  Because the 
payloads can vary so greatly from one UAV to another, a common approach to payloads 
was not explored.  Further research could be conducted on possible functional modules 
for both sensors and payloads.  This research could be the basis for a payload control and 


























































































































































































































APPENDIX E: DETAILED LOGIC FOR QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
Justification for the logic found in the table was based on research from many 
sources, including: Naval Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Family of Systems (FoS) 
(Groups 1-5) Common/Core Training Requirements Study Brief [PMA-205, 2009], a 
thesis titled A Comparative Analysis of the Army MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and Navy MQ-8B Manpower & Training 
Requirements [Raymer, 2009], another thesis titled An Operational Manpower Analysis 
of the RQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) [Stracker, 
2007], the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Fiscal Year 2010 Customer 
Stabilized Rates [NAWCAD, 2009], a draft report that was done for PMA-205 by 
MITRE and AIR 4.6, and discussions with AIR 4.6 and CAPT Schmidt.  
Category Logic 
Number of training 
sites 
The number of training sites for the existing distributed schoolhouse concept is 
based on data from the Navy Training System Plans for the respective programs 
[PMA-205, 2008] and [PMA-205, 2007].  The common schoolhouse concepts 
utilize one training site. 
Total number of 
simulators 
Existing training concepts are assumed to have two simulators per site to ensure 
training capability when one is down for maintenance.  This assumption is 
based on the Navy Training System Plans for the respective programs [PMA-
205, 2008] and [PMA-205, 2007].  The common schoolhouse number of 
simulators is notionally based on data from the throughput of 115 total students 
per year.  Assuming 60 students at one time during a course of six months, four 
simulators would be needed to accommodate periods of two hours per simulator 
with two students per simulator working in teams.  To more accurately predict 
the numbers of simulators required, more detailed analysis is required on the 
actual training plan for the BUQs and a more realistic throughput value per 
week. 
Total annual 
simulator O&S cost 
Assumptions for O&S costs were based on the concept that the simulators will 
need few corrective and preventative maintenance actions.  The simulators are 
assumed to be designed and manufactured using a majority of COTS 
components.  The COTS components include processors, memory, displays, 
keyboards, trackballs, etc.  The reliability is assumed to be high with little in the 
way of preventative maintenance.  Included in the estimate were costs for one 
technician full time at NAWCAD FY10 Civilian Band 2 rates, maintenance 
costs to replace defective simulator components, software updates to correct 







This includes the costs involved to manage all required courseware per year.  A 
single set is comprised of all printed material, software, and databases.  Using 
best engineering judgment based on current practices the JUCCS cohort 
assumed that there would be two updates per year for the courseware.  Two 
updates are manageable and would probably not interfere with pipeline training 
goals.  A technician to perform archiving, maintenance, and updates based on 
NAWCAD FY10 Civilian Band 2 rates.  Contractor provided course 
management, software modifications, computer based training, and part task 
training.  The contractor support needs more detailed analysis and is dependent 
on how the training is contracted.  If the Navy decided to utilize a prime 




The basis of this estimate was calculated with values from CNATTU Norfolk 
[Hernandez, 2010].  The calculations were based on one simulator in 3000 sq ft 
of space, 10 Navy and Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) supported computers in 
1000 sq ft of classroom space, and both spaces being in a controlled 
environment for improved reliability.  The NMCI computers support is 
estimated at approximately $4,000 per computer seat, per year.  The 
infrastructure cost for the space includes the energy requirements that include 
electrical, HVAC, and steam.  The energy costs were calculated to be $12,800 
per year.  An additional cost was calculated for Public Works to maintain the 
space for preventative and corrective maintenance at $5,000 per year.   Total 
infrastructure costs are estimated at $57, 800 per site, per year.  Estimates for 
BAMS, Fire Scout, and the common schoolhouse concepts were multiples 
based on the required number of simulators and computers.  It was estimated 
that the number of simulators per site for the BAMS and Fire Scout models 
were two, doubling the infrastructure costs from $57,800 to $115,600.  The 
common schoolhouse models would require four simulators per site and the cost 
would increase roughly four times to $231,200. 
Total number of 
instructors 
The number of instructors per site was based on best engineering judgment by 
the JUCCS cohort after review of NTSPs and discussions with NAVAIR AIR 
4.6.  The BAMS and Fire Scout programs are to require six instructors per site 
to handle throughput requirements.  The instructors will probably have 
collateral duties assigned when not training and further analysis is required to 
calculate the actual manpower requirements.  The common schoolhouse 
calculations by PMA-205 were based on estimating double the number of 
BAMS and Fire Scout instructors at a single site to handle the throughput of two 
separate, but collocated training cohorts.  The JUCCS approach calculated less 
based on an estimated 96 percent common training syllabus.  A more accurate 
estimate is recommended for future work on the common approaches.   
Total annual 
instructor cost 
The cost of the instructors was based on the NAWCAD Civilian Pay Band 4 
FY10 rate that is a professionally trained person with either a BS or MS degree 
and experience.   If an active duty instructor were utilized then a different value 








The number of support and administrative personnel per site was based on best 
engineering judgment by the JUCCS cohort after review of NTSPs and 
discussions with NAVAIR 4.6.  The number of support and administrative 
personnel includes training, personnel, and maintenance scheduling, 
maintaining training records, and other clerical and support functions.  The 
current number of support and administrative personnel for BAMS and Fire 
Scout was predicted at nine per site IAW current research.  The common 
schoolhouse estimate by PMA-205 was eight and JUCCS was four based on 
best engineering judgment and related literature.  The JUCCS concept will 
require fewer personnel due to the common training elements, which will have 
common training records and syllabi. 
Total annual support 
and administration 
personnel cost 
The cost of the instructors was based on the NAWCAD Civilian Pay Band 2 
FY10 rate that is a professionally administrative assistant with either an  AA or 
BA degree and experience.  
Total annual O&S 
cost 
This is the total annual cost to operate each approach.  It takes into account the 
total number of sites, the number of distinct UASs taught at each site, and the 




















































APPENDIX F: ACROYMNS 
 
Acronym Term 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AGL Above Ground Level 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AMP Aviation Mission Package 
AOC Air Operations Center 
AOI Area of Interest 
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATO Air Tasking Order 
AV Air Vehicle 
AVO Air Vehicle Operator 
BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 
BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel 
BUQ Basic UAS Qualification 
C2 Command and Control 
C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computer & Intelligence 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CAS Close Air Support 
CBR Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
CBT Computer Based Training 
CCI Command and Control Interface 
CCISM Command and Control Interface Specific Module 
CDD Capability Development Document 




CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
CNO Chief of Naval Operation 
CNSF Commander Naval Surface Forces 
COCOM Combat Command 
COI Contact of Interest 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CONUS Continental United States 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CPD Capability Production Document 
DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses 
DLI Data Link Interface 
DoD Department of Defense 
DODAF Department of Defense Acquisition Framework 
DoN Department of Navy 
E3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects 
EFFBD Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram 
EO/IR Electro-Optical/Infra-Red 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FL Flight Level 
FOB Forward Operation Bases 
FoS Family of Systems 
FSS Flight Service Station 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GCS Ground Control Station 
GIG Global Information Grid 
GSI Ground Segment Interface 




HMD Helmet Mounted Display 
HMI Human-Machine Interface 
HSC Helicopter Sea Combat 
HSM Helicopter Marine Strike 
IAA Incident Awareness and Assessment 
ICOM Inputs, Controls, Outputs, and Measures 
IDEF Integration Definition for Functional Modeling 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IPR Interim Project Reviews 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
JFC Joint Forces Commander 
JIPT Joint Integrated Product Team 
JMPS Joint Mission Planning System 
JMQ Joint Mission Qualification 
JMTL Joint Mission Task List 
JPATS Joint Primary Air Training System 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter 
JUAS COE Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence 
JUCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 
JUCCS Joint UAS Common Control Station – Team name for this Cohort 
JUMTS Joint UAS Minimum Training Standards 
KFOR Kosovo Forces 
KPP Key Performance Parameter 
KSA Knowledge Skills and Abilities 




LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LOI Level of Interoperability 
LOS Line of Sight 
LRE Launch & Recovery Elements 
MBSE Model Based Systems Engineering 
MC Mission Commander 
MESF Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
MILCON Military Construction 
MMA Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft 
MMH Maintenance Man-Hours 
MOB Main Operating Base 
MPO Mission Payload Operator 
MPRF Maritime Patrol And Reconnaissance Force 
MSL Mean Sea Level 
MSRON Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 
MSSE Masters of Systems Engineering 
MTD Mission Training Device 
MTT Mobile Training Team 
MTTR Mean Time To Repair 
MUT Manned-Unmanned Teaming 
NAS Naval Air Station 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
NOTAM Notice to Airmen 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NTSP Navy Training System Plan 




OPM Office of Personnel Management 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OSGCS One System Ground Control Station 
OTH Over the Horizon 
PBS Performance Based Specification 
PDA Personal Data Assistant 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PEO (U&W) Program Executive Office Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons 
PID Positive Identification 
PM Project Manager 
PMA-205 NAVAIR Training Systems Program Office 
PMA-262 NAVAIR Persistent Maritime UAS Program Office 
PMA-263 NAVAIR Small Tactical UAS Program Office 
PMA-266 NAVAIR Multi-Mission Tactical UAS Program Office 
PMA-268 NAVAIR Unmanned Combat Air System Program Office 
R&D Research and Development 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
RF Radio Frequency 
RTSA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
S&I IPT Standards and Interoperability IPT 
SA Situational Awareness 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SE Systems Engineering 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SIGINT Signal Intelligence Gathering 
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 




STUAS Small Tactical Unmanned Air System 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
TCDL Tactical Common Data Link 
TCS Tactical Control Station 
TIMS Training Integration Management System 
TOI Target of Interest 
TST Time Sensitive Targeting 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
TYCOM Type Commander 
U&W Unmanned Aviation and Weapons 
UAS Unmanned Air or Aircraft Systems 
UASFCS UAS Flight Crew Skills 
UASMCS UAS Mission Crew Skills 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCAS Unmanned Combat Air System 
UCS UAV Control System 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UMS Unmanned Maritime Systems 
USAF United States Air Force 
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
USFFC United States Fleet Forces Command 
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VSM Vehicle Specific Module 
VTUAV Vertical Take-off and Land Tactical UAV 
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